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ABSTRACT 
Ever since the United Nations declared 2005 the year of micro-credit and linked it to the 
Millennium Development Goals, and especially on poverty reduction, there has been a series 
of studies looking at factors affecting the flow of credit down the poverty line. This is of 
particular importance because in spite of the success of Microfinance Institutions such as the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol in Mexico, evidence shows that many 
Microfinance Institutions do not reach down the poverty line but tend to cluster at the top  
Developing several hypotheses using the elements of the neo-institutional theory, this study 
looks at how geographic location affects how Microfinance Institutions target their clients 
and the moderating effect that their regional context has on other factors. This is analysed 
using an unbalanced panel of 6, 645 observations drawn from 443 MFI institutions in 81 
countries divided into 5 regions for the time period 2000-2014. An ordered logit regression 
was run using the target markets as the ordinal dependable variables  
Based on the arguments of the neo-institutional theory, this study builds on previous ones by 
using a larger sample size (and number of years) to examine how the regional context affects 
the relationship between institutional quality and the selective lending behaviour of MFIs in 
81 developing countries. An ordered logit regression was carried out using an unbalanced 
panel of 6645 observations from 443 MFI institutions across six regions from 2000-2014 
against a broad range of company, country, regional and global specific variables. The results 
indicate that the geographic locations affects how MFIs lend down the poverty line with MFIs 
in and those in Eastern Europe and Central America less likely to lend to down the poverty 
line. The study found that the regional context also plays a big role in how institutional factors 
affect MFI lending practises with certain factors being more relevant in some regions than in 
others. This study also makes a case for using target markets as a better measure for depth 
of outreach as opposed to the more popular loan sizes and identifies the role that rural 
population growth and mobile phone penetration play in increasing depth of outreach of 
microfinance.   
Keywords:  - Microfinance, Depth of outreach, neo-institutional theory, institutional 
environment, ordinal logit regressions 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background of Study 
Microfinance has been defined as the provision of financial services to poor, low-income but 
economically active people (Otero, 1999; Silva and Chávez, 2015). These financial services 
provided by Microfinance institutions (MFIs) include small loans, saving accounts, and/or 
insurance and are targeted at the segment of society that are not being serviced by traditional 
financial institutions due to their lack of a stable income, collateral or credit history (Silva & 
Chávez, 2015). Microfinance has witnessed a renaissance over the last two decades and from 
its informal roots has become more formalized and a global phenomenon. As microfinance 
has continued to develop over this period so has research around it focusing on different 
aspects such as trying to understand its mechanisms, real impact, successes and failures. This 
study is interested in understanding the reach of microfinance and is focused on analysing 
and determining the effect that the geographical location of Microfinance Institutions has on 
their lending practises, looking at the country level, regional level and global level factors.  The 
study looks at groups of variables that are characteristic of the various location levels in order 
to establish what factors have the greatest influence on lending behaviour of Microfinance 
Institutions. These factors when identified, point out which location level exerts the greatest 
influence. 
1.2. Context of the Study 
The United Nations (UN) estimated that in 2002, approximately 1.3 billion (representing 
almost a fifth of the global population) lived in poverty based on their dollar a day estimation. 
In the war against poverty, microfinance has come to the fore as a major instrument in 
combating extreme poverty, with countries like Bangladesh successfully utilizing it to improve 
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the welfare of the poor in that country.  In trying to address this issue, the United Nations 
decided to capitalize on the pockets of success that microfinance was having around the 
world and declared 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. Microfinance can 
contribute significantly to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals, as agreed upon by world leaders at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, 
which aimed at halving extreme poverty by 2015 (Hermes and Lensink, 2007). As post 2015, 
the MDGs have evolved into Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), there have been reviews 
to the success of microfinance in poverty alleviation and several researchers agree with the 
United Nations that microfinance is an effective tool in reducing poverty (Panjaitan-
Drioadisuryo and Cloud, 1999; Simanowitz, 2003).  
Microfinance has become a global phenomenon and The Microfinance Exchange (MIX) 
highlights and keeps track of the development of microfinance across the globe and grouped 
into nine regions- Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, North America, Oceania, South Asia 
and Western Europe.  As much as poverty and inequality are global phenomenon’s and can 
benefit from microfinance, it can be argued that it is more characteristic of developing 
countries than developed ones (Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015).  The developing world is home 
to about 85% of total world population, and the levels of poverty in these countries is more 
than 30% of their populations while in developed countries that ratio is closer to zero 
(Alvaredo & Gasparini, 2015).  Zooming in a bit closer on the high incidence of poverty in the 
developing world,  Alkire and Santos (2011) point out that the poverty levels are above 51, 
58, 55 and 65% of the population in Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal respectively. They 
further report levels of poverty above 50% in the sub-Saharan countries of Niger, Guinea and 
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Mali, and above 30% in Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. As such, poverty seems to be 
a major challenge exclusively of the developing world and fighting poverty would be more of 
a priority in developing countries than in the developed world. This study therefore will focus 
on the developing world looking at the African, East Asian and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and the North African regions, as 
they are more likely to benefit from this study.  
1.3. Justification for Research 
There are several key reasons why this study is of relevance today. The first is that there has 
been a lot of literature covering the impacts of microfinance, less literature looking at how 
well targeted modern microcredit programs actually are and even fewer looking at factors 
affecting the targeting choices of the different types of MFIs. This research aims at covering 
the latter part.  
Secondly, evidence from research indicates that many MFIs do not reach very far down the 
poverty spectrum, either in absolute terms or relative to other income categories (Hulme, 
1999; Cohen and Sebstad, 2000). Instead, customers in these MFIs tend to be clustered 
around the poverty line, being as Woller (2002a) described them, predominately ‘moderately 
poor’ (top 50th percentile of households below the poverty line) or ‘vulnerable non-poor’ 
(households above the poverty line but vulnerable to slipping back into poverty). 
Understanding what factors affect depth of outreach to the poorest borrowers will help 
government in key policy formulation to encourage lending to this market segment. However, 
it is not possible to adopt a blanket approach in trying to understand how MFIs behave the 
way they do, as microfinance institutions have developed differently across the various 
regions in what Gravesteijn, Humberstone, Johnson, Nino, and Zarazua (2015) call the plural 
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history of microfinance. These differences in its development need to be considered in both 
research and policy formation. 
Thirdly, in the wake of calls for Microfinance Institutions to become more sustainable and 
relying less on donor funds,  the question of ‘mission drift’ is also becoming a popular topic in 
Microfinance Literature (Casselman and Sama, 2013; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). Mission 
Drift refers to the shifting focus of MFI’s from reaching the abject poor to the wealthier poor 
in order to maintain financial profitability and sustainability (Cull, Demirgu¨ç-Kunt and 
Morduch, 2007). On one side of the argument there are the institutionalists who argue that 
commercialization of microfinance may attract increased commercial funds, which may 
contribute to supporting the outreach goal of MFIs by allowing them increase the loan 
amounts to the poor and/or ensure the provision of such loans for a longer period of time. 
This could lead to the increasing of the absolute number of poor people that have access to 
MFIs or outreach. They also argue that increasing competition and adopting technology in 
lending and operations could improve the stability of MFIs and increase their efficiency. This 
again, can help generate more financial resources with can be used to help the poor. Under 
these circumstances, outreach and financial sustainability and efficiency seem to be 
compatible objectives. On the other side of the argument are the welfarists (Hermes, Lensink 
and Meesters, 2011) who emphasize the importance of outreach and see shift of focus to 
sustainability as a threat as lending money to the poor can be very expensive, the cost 
increasing with the depth of poverty. As such, they see the sustainability goals as conflicting 
with the outreach goals. These studies tend to view lending down the poverty line and profit 
making as mutually exclusive and independent of other factors and as such, previous studies 
that have touched on depth of outreach have treated it as a trade-off option. This study 
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presents a more holistic view by presenting evidence that sustainability/profit making and 
lending to the poor are not mutually exclusive and as such, provide a different premise with 
which to understand the issues affecting lending behaviour.  
1.4. Research Questions, Objectives 
In a bid to understand how MFIs target their clients and why some do not lend down the 
poverty line, studies have tested for and linked various factors. Some studies have 
concentrated on how the organizational structure or Legal Charter affects the depth of 
outreach of microfinance. The premise is that the mission or strategic intent of Non-
Government Organizations engaged in Microfinance is solely on seeking out and helping the 
poorest whereas other organizational types such as Microfinance Banks are more profit 
oriented and as such would not seek out poorer clients (Casselman and Sama, 2013; Cull et 
al., 2007). This argument has served as the basis for using mission drift to explain any 
relationship favouring profits and efficiency over depth of outreach (Hermes et al., 2011). 
However, these studies have not been able to reach a consensus and in several situations 
seem to contradict each other. Newer studies have begun to look beyond organizational 
structure and its components to external factors such as the macro-economic environment 
(Ahlin, Lin and Maio, 2011), institutional factors (Müller and Uhde, 2013) and culture (Manos 
and Tsytrinbaum, 2014). While these studies have shed more light on factors that influence 
lending patterns, they suffer one major setback- lack of generalizability.  
A key part of the issue with these results is that they vary across geographical locations. As 
such, where one study finds that legal charter affects depth of outreach, results from another 
study in a different region might indicate that it does not. Studies show that even when the 
same model is copied as in the case of the Grameen Bank (Mauricio, Daniel, & Raúl, 2017) or 
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the Raiffeisenism model (Colvin & McLaughlin, 2014) across different regions or cultures, it 
has varying results. This points towards the influence of geographical location on the 
Microfinance Institutions and what these studies have failed to do is consider this while 
explaining variations in lending behaviour of MFIs. Therefore, the aim of this study is to:  
Determine whether the geographical location of an MFI affects its lending practises. 
As such, this study has as its main research question: 
RQ1: Does the geographical location of an MFI affect its lending practise? 
Studies in organizational behaviour have put forward the argument that all things being equal, 
organizations faced with the same kind of pressures, would respond in the same way. The 
various external forces that affect MFI lending behaviour can generally occur at three 
different levels- global, regional and country levels.  Studies show that global events have the 
capacity to affect economic activities. For instance, the 2007-2009 financial crisis affected 
credit supply (Ramcharan, Verani, & Van Den Heuvel, 2016), impacted on financial  markets,  
economies, government  budgets (Lindquist, Vries, & Wanna, 2015) and stock markets 
(Dimitriou, Kenourgios, & Simos, 2013; Jin & An, 2016). However, the level to which the 
various economies and markets were affected varied from location to location (Dimitriou et 
al., 2013; Jin & An, 2016). Regional (such as the Asian financial crisis) and country specific 
events have also shaped the way economic agents perform and behave. As such, the first 
research question is broken down into three:  
RQ1A: Do Global factors have an effect on how MFIs lend to microenterprises? 
RQ1B: Do regional factors have an effect on how MFIs lend to microenterprises? 
RQ1C: Do country factors have an effect on MFIs lend to microenterprises? 
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These forces putting pressure on Microfinance Institutions are considered together as they 
do not act alone but exert pressure at the same time as there is varying level of 
embeddedness and interdependence of the different location levels being considered in this 
study. Countries are connected within regions and the regions with each other to form a 
global marketplace. Microfinance has benefitted from the recent wave of financial 
globalization that has been going on since the mid-1980s which has been characterized by a 
surge in capital flows between developed and developing countries (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, & 
Kose, 2005). This leads to the next research question: 
RQ2:  At what level is the most pressure exerted- organizational, country, regional or global? 
To answer these questions, this study turns to organizational theory (the neo-institutional 
theory in particular), which enables the study take a broader look at the environment in which 
these MFIs operate in. This study is able to offer a more holistic view of the factors that affect 
the ability of microenterprises to access credit. This study quantitatively uses a neo-
institutional theory approach to look at the effect of the environment on its lending habits 
and sets out its first objective: 
OBJ1: To identify global factors and a wide spectrum of factors that vary across regions and 
countries and measure their level of impact on MFIs lending down the poverty line 
Based on the earlier assertion that the level of impact varies, this objective is further broken 
down to three sub objectives: 
OBJ1A:  To identify global factors with impact on MFI lending and determine the 
nature of their impact  
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OBJ1B: To identify varying regional factors that affect MFI lending and determine 
the nature of their impact. 
OBJ1C. To identify varying country factors that affect MFI lending and determine the 
nature of their impact. 
While the second research objective is: 
OBJ2. To determine which of group of factors has the most impact on MFIs lending 
down the poverty line. 
1.5. Proposed Research Contributions 
By attempting to meet the set out research objectives, this study adds to the growing body 
of literature that investigates the issues with lending to the poor, taking a slightly different 
methodological approach. This study (to the best of my knowledge) is also one of the first to 
empirically investigate factors affecting depth of outreach from an organizational theory 
perspective (the neo-institutional theory) and this was done in order to obtain results that 
could better explain MFI behaviour.  
The multi-dimensional nature of Microfinance, its global presence with local action, its dual 
bottom line and its current relevance offers a unique opportunity to apply the evolving 
theories in the field of organisational behaviour. Neo-institutional theory looks at the forces 
that compel organisations towards homogeneity and applying it to this study allows us an 
opportunity to contribute to the development or extension of this theory.   
While there have been several studies exploring why MFIs are not lending down the poverty 
ladder, there seems to be a lack of general consensus amongst them (as this study will show). 
A key contribution of this study will be explain these differences.  
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Part of the issue with generalization has been the narrative of this body of research. The 
narrative of depth of outreach in microfinance has been quite singular, looking simply at the 
effects of various factors on loan sizes via series of regressions. This study seeks to expand 
these studies by focusing on target markets rather than loan sizes.  Using an ordered logistic 
regression and the neo-institutional theory allows us expand this narrative to explain why 
certain market segments are chosen over others. This study will also add to the growing 
literature that looks at the relationship between gender and depth of outreach in 
microfinance and the impact of institutional quality of depth of outreach in microfinance 
1.6. Thesis Structure 
Following this chapter, the structure of the rest of this thesis is as follows:  
Chapter 2 will focus on introducing microfinance looking at its background, evolution and key 
concepts.  To be able to fully grasp the theoretical framework of this research, it is important 
that the reader fully understands the basic concepts and history of microfinance. As such, the 
chapter begins with a historical overview of microfinance, tracing its development as far back 
as possible up to where we are today. Section 2.3 then looks at the modern day microfinance 
in its most prevalent forms and types.  Section 2.4 then looks at the agenda of microfinance 
research and how this research fits in.  As microfinance continues to be a hot topic, research 
in this area has continued to take shape over the years, as such, section 2,5 will look at 
microfinance in developing countries across several regions, briefly describing their key 
features, and where microfinance currently stands across these different regions. Specifically, 
this chapter looks at microfinance in Latin America and The Caribbean, Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Middle East and North America, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia and Africa 
respectively, highlighting the growth of microfinance in each of these regions. 
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The next chapter, chapter 3 is the literature review, reviewing theoretical and examining their 
empirical studies backing them. It begins with a look at the theories underpinning this 
research- The Theory/Theories of Microfinance, Mission Drift and The Neo-Institutional 
Theory. Section 3.3 then examines the factors affecting depth of outreach from the 
perspective of geographical location. Section 3.4 looks at the neo-institutional theory and the 
coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures and establishes a link between them 
and microfinance in section. Section 3.5 draws from the preceding sections to develop the 
hypothesis that this study will test.   
Chapter 4 discusses the methodology employed in this research. It opens with looking at the 
various methodologies employed by researchers in the area of microfinance and then goes 
on to justify the choice of method used in this research. Discussing the data, statistical 
methods used and issues of validity and reliability of both data and methods.  
Chapter 5 is the results and Discussion chapter and is dedicated to analysing and discussing 
the results.  The chapter starts with a discussion of the descriptive statistics and then looks at 
the ordered logit regression model and discusses its results in relation to the hypothesis 
developed in chapter 3. It also looks at further analysis as well as the robustness and 
sensitivity tests.  
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of this thesis and beings with a summary of the research findings. 
Section 6.3 looks at the contributions of this thesis to the growing body of microfinance 
research while 6.4 looks at the limitations of this research and 6.5 discusses recommendations 
for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND & CONCEPTS 
2.1 Introduction  
The basis for the argument this thesis puts forward is that Microfinance has developed 
independently across geographic locations and although there are pressures exerted from 
global organizations and other sources, Microfinance Institutions have kept some of their 
local characteristics and these affect how they lend. This chapter looks at the plural 
development of microfinance across the world from its basic form to the modern version we 
have today. 
2.2 Historical Overview of Microfinance 
2.2.1 Money Lenders 
Money lenders are described as individuals whose time is mostly spent lending money, 
sometimes without requiring collateral and usually for short time periods and at relatively 
high interest. Operating in markets that are highly localized, their operations have low 
transaction costs and the money lenders have close relationships with their clients/debtors 
(Buckley, 1997).  Literature shows the existence of moneylenders to be widespread. Apart 
from the extensive work done on India, there has been evidence of moneylending amongst 
the pre-colonial Yoruba’s (south-western Nigeria) and even in present day Ireland (Byrne, 
McCarthy, & Ward, 2007).  
Moneylending however had three major issues that plagued it (Falola, 1993): First is that 
borrowing from money lenders was usually an act of desperation entered into as a last resort. 
Second is the possibility that the moneylender would look for ways to cheat borrowers. One 
such way would be to make borrowers sign that they had taken as principal more money than 
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they actually had (Mihir, Rangu, & Shankar, 2007). There were also accusations of dishonesty, 
with moneylenders doing all they could to ensure that their debtors stay indebted to them by 
using their ignorance and encouraging extravagance (Mihir et al., 2007). The third problem 
with money lenders were the high interest rates they charged and this is still a major issue 
when dealing with moneylenders today. In the Punjab area of India for instance, the interest 
rates ranged from 134-159% (Singh, 1983). In Thailand the rates were 60-120% with the 
higher rates found in the remote areas (Mingmaneenakin & Tubpun, 1993). In Pakistan 
interests ranged from 18-200% with an average rate just below 70% (Aleem, 1990), while in 
some West African countries the rates were found to be 50% higher than what is charged in 
the formal sectors.  The common practice amongst the pre-colonial Yoruba’s of Nigeria was 
to collect a minimum of 100% with mortgage rates at 6pence on the pound per month (72% 
per annum). The bigger moneylenders could offer rates as low as 3p to the pound per month 
but this was on the production of title deeds of premium locations in the city (Falola, 1993). 
In India, the interest rates varied depending on area, size of the loan and the class of 
moneylender. In some instances, the interest rates were risk weighted. For instance traders 
were charged 60% per annum normally but in situations where the purchased goods had to 
go through the forest, the interest rate went up to 120% per annum and up 240% per annum 
if the cargo was sea borne (Singh, 1983). In the Bengal area, there were five classes of 
moneylenders lending to different classes of people (Singh, 1983).  
In India their punishments for defaulting on loans depending on the kind of dispute (18 were 
listed). The moneylender petitioned the king who had the powers by any means necessary to 
recover these loans sometimes employing such drastic measures like killing the debtor’s 
cattle or even his wife and children. If the debtor died before paying, the children were liable 
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for the debts. The wife of a debtor was absolved of liability if she did not consent to the loan 
but the husband of a deceased debtor was held liable whether he consented or not (Singh, 
1983). The Yoruba traditional method of debt collection was either of two methods. One was 
to use a dogo (distrainor) an elderly person sent to live with the debtor whom the debtor 
became responsible for feeding and for their funeral (if the person died while in residence 
with the debtor). The dogo would make himself such a nuisance until the debtor settled his 
debt. More drastic measures employed included selling the debtor as a slave (during the 
period of the slave trade) and forcing his family to settle the debt (Falola, 1993) 
Profit seeking was not the only reason for the high interest rates charged by moneylenders. 
Other reasons include, the lack of proper and credible documentation, the high cost 
associated with collecting the debt (both in terms of time and money), the problems with 
securing the loans (difficulty in selling the collateral and problems collecting from the surety) 
all combined to increase the risk associated with lending by money lenders and contribute to 
the high interests charged by them (Falola, 1993). In spite of the high interest rates charged, 
the money lenders net return on capital is moderate, (estimated to be an average of 15% on 
their capital) due to the high levels of risks and the large overhead cost associated with 
lending and collecting (Falola, 1993; Mihir et al., 2007).  
Various governments have attempted to make moneylending more efficient and less 
acrimonious. The representative of the British government in Lagos, Nigeria expressed his 
doubts that any legitimate use of money could give a return of 45% and as such, no one 
borrowing at such a rate would be able to extricate himself or herself from the debt. This led 
to the government of Lagos State to pass the Moneylenders' Ordinance of 1938 that limited 
interest rates and forced lenders to obtain licences (Falola, 1993).  
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Government regulation of moneylenders is a current practice in Ireland where lending is 
classified into two divisions, prime (or mainstream) and subprime lending. Money lending falls 
under the sub-prime category and is either regulated or legal and unregulated or illegal. 
Authorized money-lenders are legislated under the Consumer Credit Act 1995 and regulated 
by the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA).  They are permitted under this act 
to give loans (cash or goods) with a minimum Annual (APR) of 23%. According to the IFRSAs 
2003/2004 annual report (IFSRA, 2005) there were 52 regulated moneylenders in Ireland 
lending at an average APR of 126.9%, ranging from 29.8% to 196.5% (Byrne et al., 2007). 
In Uzbekistan, moneylenders always deal with cash and lend in both the domestic currency 
and in dollars. The rates vary according to location and loan sizes with loans offered in 
domestic currency tied to the US dollar street market exchange rate to protect against the 
risks of inflation and devaluation. Uzbekistan moneylenders mostly use a simple interest rate 
in their dealings, with interest charges accrued and paid on a monthly basis. However, they 
apply compound interest rates to overdue payments. Loans are predominantly short-term, 
with maturities varying from a few days to several months. Rates also vary according to 
location with rates in Tashkent (the most affluent province in Uzbekistan with an annual 
output three times higher than the national average output across the region) between 10 to 
15% per month on loans of between USD2000 –3000. In poorer provinces where the loan 
sizes are between USD500 –1000, the APR is between 20– 25%. This trend is similar to the 
trend of higher interest rates in poorer areas noticed in India by Ghatak (1983). (1983).  
The reasons for borrowing from moneylenders vary ranging from convenience, ease and 
speed of accessing the funds and tradition (Byrne et al., 2007) to family demands, pressure to 
fulfil social obligations and the desire to be successful, prominent and healthy  (Falola, 1993). 
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The most prevalent reason though is the fact that in most cases that they are the only 
available source of funds. 
2.2.2 ROSCAs 
ROSCAs are another means for compensating for the failures in existing formal financial 
markets arising from asymmetric information. ROSCA stands for ROtating Savings and Credit 
Association and is a group/collective saving scheme. In this savings method, the members of 
the group agree on the amount they want to contribute and the intervals at which they will 
make payments. This could be daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly as agreed on by all the 
members of the group. The total amount contributed is assigned by the entire group to each 
of the members in rotation and when everyone has had their turn, a cycle is concluded and 
the ROSCA can go either another cycle or be disbanded depending on the agreement of the 
members. The length of the cycle is dependent on both the length of the intervals and the 
number of members. Very large groups can be split into subgroups with group heads 
responsible for ensuring that their subgroup members make and receive their payments from 
the fund. The group is usually under an organizer and made up neighbours and friends. 
ROSCAs are able to overcome the issues of moral hazard, as there is a high level of 
transparency within the group because member’s personal circumstances and attributes are 
usually known. This is because membership is usually amongst relatives and close 
communities and this makes it easier to use social collateral to ensure the success of the 
ROSCA (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Falola, 1993; Kimuyu, 1999; Nurmakhanova, 
Kretzschmar, & Fedhila, 2015). ROSCAs are usually informal but there is evidence of formal 
ROSCAs in Argentina organized by banks and car dealers. Unlike the informal ROSCAs, the 
formal ones are larger (20-100 members) and the members do not necessarily need to know 
each other and never meet. As such, social capital cannot be used and in its absence, the 
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government of Argentina regulates them. The monthly payments (and by implication, the pot) 
and the length of each cycle (due to its larger membership) in formal ROSCAs are larger than 
that of the informal. Other areas where the formal ROSCA differs from the informal one are 
in the collection of fees and insurance (usually about US$600), the payment of some interest 
to net savers (Schreiner, 2000).  
There is evidence showing that ROSCAs have existed nearly universally under different names. 
Armendariz and Morduch (2010) records that they have been found in Bangladesh as loteri 
samities, in Taipei as hui, in Mexico as tanda and Chile as pollo. In Africa it is called tontines 
by the Cameroonians  (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010) and  esusu and dashi/adasahi by the 
Yorubas and Hausas of Nigeria respectively (Falola, 1993; Nurmakhanova et al., 2015) 
Participation in ROSCAs in these communities is partly driven by the need to raise school fees, 
meet medical expenses and buy food. ROSCAs funds are also used to start or promote small 
businesses and acquire assets, including livestock. Households owning smaller landholdings 
and those enjoying higher expenditures are more likely to participate in ROSCAs. The number 
of schemes in which a household participates is closely related to the main uses of ROSCAs 
funds while contributions and value of receipts are determined by total expenditures and 
frequency of turns respectively. A member can contribute more than once if they want to or 
two or more people can come together to share a payment. When it is their turn to collect, 
they split it in the same ratio they contributed. Early withdrawals are not encouraged but if a 
member has a pressing need, they could apply to the group head. When several people make 
claim for early withdrawals, the group head decides who gets it. In a situation where a 
payment is split into two or more amongst people with urgent needs, they will split another 
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payment before the end of the cycle to receive the full amount they paid (Nurmakhanova et 
al., 2015). 
If a member defaults during a cycle after they might have received all or part of the fund, the 
member is asked to repay the excess he has collected over the amount contributed, if the 
member fails to do so, they are sued to the customary court where the case is treated as a 
debt case. If the defaulting occurs in a cycle where the member has not yet collected, they 
apply for the amount due to him and collect it at the end of the cycle from any amount left 
over. Usually an attempt is made to find a replacement for the defaulting member 
(Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). 
There are no overhead costs in running a ROSCA as either members bring their contributions 
to their group head or the heads go and collect it from those under them. However, in some 
unrestricted ROSCAs the members willingly contribute an extra round at the end of the cycle, 
which is divided among the heads and subheads. There are also professional ROSCA groups 
created by people who run it as a business. They tend to insist on the extra round as 
professional fees (Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). 
There are two types of ROSCAs. The first is the conventional type, found all over the world, in 
which the full amount contributed (apart from minor deductions) is allocated to one member 
at a time, either by lot, demonstrated need or in an agreed-upon sequence. There Is also an 
advanced type found in a number of Asian countries including China, Vietnam and Nepal 
where the amount collected is allocated by auction to the lowest bidder and the balance 
returned to the members, or by tender (Seibel, 2005).  
Risk management usually occurs in either of two ways. In the first method, payments are split 
amongst two or more members to reduce the likelihood of a member defaulting after they 
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might have collected their entire contributed sum. In the second, a reserve fund is held to 
reduce the loss exposure should a member default (Nurmakhanova et al., 2015). Methods of 
enforcement include banning participants who create problems by either late payments or 
defaults from accessing other facilities such as trade credit or credit cooperatives, or denying 
them access to needed raw material. Anderson, Baland, and Moene (2003) report that in 
Kenya, ROSCA participants have been known to seize goods belonging to members who 
default for resale. Other methods of enforcement include ostracizing the defaulting member 
within the local community or exclusion from religious and/or social activity (Ardener, 1964) 
However, there are several limitations to ROSCAs. Armendariz and Morduch (2010) pointed 
out that the size of the pot or the individual contributions cannot be increased during the 
cycle. Increasing the pot at the end of the cycle would entail either increasing the size of the 
contribution (and excluding the poorer members) or adding more members (and increasing 
the cycle time). Secondly, ROSCAs cannot mobilize funds outside groups and/or communities. 
The time and timing of collection also presents a problem. Under the random method of 
allocating the pot, the time when a participant collects the fund may not necessarily coincide 
with the participants’ specific financial need that needs to be met. Using the bidding method, 
as participants can only collect the fund once during a specific cycle, they can only hope to 
handle situations which occur only once (Besley, Coate and Loury, 1993). ROSCAs also are 
limited in that they can neither mediate between strangers nor effectively diversify risk 
(Schreiner, 2000).  
Microfinance borrows the concepts of using groups to allocate resources from ROSCAs while 
being able to mobilize funds across groups and communities where needed.  
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2.2.3 Cooperatives 
Cooperative can be defined as an organization that is made up of and represents the interest 
of aggregated and full integrated independent economic units or persons (Ling, 2009). An 
alternative definition given by the United Nations defines them as  
“...an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and 
aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-
controlled enterprise” 
(ICA, 1995; Novkovic, 2008) 
Cooperatives are generally governed by seven principles of cooperation and these are 
voluntary and open membership; democratic member control; member economic 
participation; autonomy and independence; education, training and information; co-
operation among co-operatives; and concern for community (Ling, 2009) 
In terms of microfinance, financial cooperatives are simply a people-based organization 
relying on the active participation of members to differentiate themselves from investor 
owned firms, and to develop and support their competitive advantage. They are a 
modification of the ROSCA scheme. With ROSCAs, members could only save but with the 
modified structures of cooperatives, members can both save and borrow. A member could 
also choose to do either and the cooperatives structure makes room for multiple borrowers 
at the same time. Another key advantage of the cooperative (over the ROSCAs) is that it is not 
mandatory for savers to borrow, and that loan sizes vary with need. However, the trade-off 
is that funds now require storage and safekeeping and that there are the additional 
accounting and management functions, which have also become more complex. 
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Seibel (2005) narrates the history of microfinance across Asia and Europe and the narrative 
indicates that the cooperatives had a very strong presence in Europe. In Ireland, the history 
of microfinance goes back as far as 1720 starting off as a self-help initiative as the Irish Loan 
Fund which was a charity initially financed from donations and providing interest free loans. 
It then grew into financial intermediation between savers and borrowers with short-term 
loans and weekly instalment payments. There was no regulation and repayment was enforced 
using peer monitoring.  It became legal in 1823 for funds to collect interest-bearing deposits 
and charge interest on loans and in 1836, the government set up a regulatory and supervisory 
body - The Loan Fund Board. These two events saw a boom in microfinance activities and by 
1840, about 300 self-reliant and sustainable funds had sprung up. These funds went 
aggressively after deposits, with deposit rates three times higher than what the commercial 
banks were offering (and with higher interest rates on loans) and financed solely on deposits 
and profits, their outreach eventually covered 20%  of Irish households. The Irish commercial 
banks felt threatened and in 1843, they induced the government to place a cap on interest 
rates and thereby take away the Loan Funds competitive advantage. Because of this, the loan 
funds went into gradual decline and by 1950, they had disappeared (Seibel, 2005).  
Often cited in literature regarding cooperatives are its strong German roots. In Germany, the 
microfinance sector is divided into two networks:  community savings funds (called savings 
banks in English) and member-owned cooperative associations, which are now, called 
cooperative banks. The lessons from Ireland indicated that there is a strong demand amongst 
the poor for safe deposit facilities and that charity is not sustainable.  
Seibel (2005) gives a history of the evolution of cooperatives in Germany drawing from the 
lessons of the Irish. The Germans set up the first thrift society in Hamburg in 1778 and the 
communal savings fund (Sparkasse) in 1801. The savings funds had to expand their credit 
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business because of the influx of funds in the form of savings, and started agricultural lending. 
The State then passed the Prussian Savings Banks Decree in 1838 to regulate these funds and 
in 1884; the savings banks formed the German savings banks association. The great hunger 
of 1846 – 1847 led to many peasants losing their fields to moneylenders and bankruptcy. In 
1847, financed by charity donations from some wealthy people, Raiffeisen started a rural 
charity association that brought in grain from non-affected areas in the East. This charity was 
able to reduce the price of bread by 50% after only a few months. However, when Schulze-
Delitzsch’s started the first urban credit association in 1850 (McKillop, 2005), he chose to shun 
charity and to follow the principle of self-help without charity from the beginning. This saw it 
perform better than the rural ones and as such when Raiffeisen opened the first rural credit 
association in Heddesdorf, he rejected charity. When the merger between rural and urban 
credit associations occurred in 1889 under the Cooperative Act of the German Reich (which 
was the first cooperative law in the world), limited liability replaced joint liability. The 
cooperatives grew quickly and by 1913, Germany had 1,500 urban cooperatives with 
combined membership strength of 800,000 (McKillop, 2005) and more than 15,000 rural 
cooperatives with 1.5 million members (McKillop, 2005; Seibel, 2003).  
As of 1997, the two microfinance networks in Germany encompassed 39,000 branches, 75 
million customers, 64% of all financial intermediation and 51.4% of all banking assets. After 
the consolidation exercise in 2002, the number of branches was been reduced to 29,500; 
representing 93% of all bank branches in Germany.  That same year, savings and cooperative 
banks were responsible for 53% of all retail loans to private individuals and 57% of all loans 
to small and medium enterprises. In comparison to the top four commercial banks in 
Germany, these savings and cooperative banks are more profitable. In 2002 their pre-tax 
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return on equity was 8.2% among savings banks, 9.2% among cooperative banks and –3.1% 
among the four big commercial banks (Seibel, 2003).  
Apart from Ireland and Germany, other European countries joined in. Luigi Luzzati brought 
Schulze-Delitshs’ philosophies to Italy and started and promoted the peoples bank. The 
Peoples Bank of Milan became one of the largest banks in Italy by 1909. Leone Wollembory 
started rural banks for farmers and by 1913; there were 2,000 rural banks in Italy. By 1996, 
Banche di Credito Cooperativo and Banche Poplari of Italy had a market share of 29% of the 
domestic banking market (McKillop, 2005). In Austria, the first Schulze-Delitsh society (urban 
cooperative) was organized in 1858 and the first Raiffeisen (rural cooperative) in 1886. By 
1913 there were 3, 500 urban and 8, 000 rural cooperatives. As of  2005, the Volksbanken and 
Raiffeisenbanken had a market share of 32% in Austria (McKillop, 2005). In the Netherlands 
and Belgium, there are no urban cooperatives and the rural cooperatives are known as 
Rabobank in Netherland (with a market share of about 40%) and Cera (with a market share 
of 15%) in Belgium. In France, Credit Agricole, Credit Populaire and Credit Mutuel in 2005 
owned a joint market share of about 40% of the domestic banking market (McKillop, 2005) 
and 45% in 2015 (Coppola, 2015).   
It was in 1901 that the concept of credit cooperatives came to Canada from Europe and 
Alphonse Desjardins  is credited with starting the first people’s bank (caisse populaire as it 
was called) in Levis so that people excluded from the banking system to access credit facilities 
(McKillop, 2005; Poulin, 2000). Growth was slow until the Province of Quebec passed 
legislation in 1906 and now there are 700 financial cooperatives in Canada. Desjardins is the 
primary bank in Quebec with a market share of about 45% and with about 5.6 million 
members in a population of slightly above 8 million people (Adeler, 2014; McKillop, 2005). It 
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is also the biggest private employer of labour in Quebec, employing an estimated 40, 000 
people (Adeler, 2014).  
Desjardins carried the cooperative movement over the border from Canada to the United 
States where he went to help set up a people’s bank for a French parish in Manchester. New 
Hampshire. Working with the commissioner for banks in Massachusetts, Pierre Jay who 
drafted the Massachusetts Credit Union Act of 1909 and a businessperson, Edward Filene, 
they were able to spread the cooperative movement and today. one third of the American 
population or an estimated 85million people are union members and the 9,600 credit unions 
own a market share of about 7% and $630 billion in assets (McKillop, 2005). 
As (McKillop, 2005) pointed out, although all financial cooperatives are started based on the 
guiding principles of the cooperative movement, their development has varied across 
countries and has been shaped by the different historical, economic, social and political 
settings of these countries, pointing towards the effect of geographical location. 
2.3 Modern Microfinance 
As illustrated in the above discussion, the underlying concept of microfinance has been 
around for a very long time and its development was largely via informal institutions and self-
help groups. The renaissance of microfinance that has led to its formalization, the modern 
day structures built around it all the attention it is currently getting can be traced to US$27 
loan that Prof Yunus Mohammed gave to 42 people in Bangladesh in 1976. This loan was as a 
result of his analysis of the poverty trap that money lenders held the poverty stricken 
residents of Jobra in Bangladesh (Yunus, 2003). Consequent to the repayment of that loan 
and armed with evidence, Prof Yunus tried to show the local bank that it was profitable to 
lend to the credit constrained poor with no collateral but the bank refused to get involved. 
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Prof Yunus stood as a guarantor and the client base grew from the small village of Jobra to 
ten, twenty, fifty villages to one and then five districts with default rates much lower than 
that of the bank. Yet the bank still refused to adopt the business model. Realizing that the 
rigidity and structural constraints entrenched in the traditional banking system would not 
support the growth of microfinance, Prof Yunus went about setting up a bank specializing in 
loans to poor people (what has now been come to be known as a microfinance bank) and as 
such in 1983, the Grameen Bank was launched. Out of the 68,000 villages in Bangladesh, 
37,000 have a Grameen branch. 94% of the banks 2.3 million borrowers in Bangladesh are 
poor women and yet the bank has a repayment rate of 95%. The demand for microfinance 
has continued to grow and even though the loan sizes still remain small (an average of 
U.S.$175.2), by June 1997, the bank had cumulatively lent more than U.S.$2 billion  to the 
poor (Yunus, 1998).  
The success of the Grameen Bank generated so much global interest in microfinance that 
United Nations declared 2005 the year of microcredit with the aim of using microfinance not 
just to reduce global poverty by the turn of the millennium but also as a tool to reach the 
other seven Millennium Development Goals (UNCDF, 2005). These events have led to the 
development of structures and systems and the formalization of Microfinancial Institutions 
(MFIs) to successfully deliver microfinance services to the poor.  
Following is the description of some of these formal structures that have sprung up to deliver 
this service. 
2.3.1 Nongovernment Organizations (NGOs) 
  
37 
 
The term ‘Non-Government Organization’ or NGO came into usage in 1945 and was coined 
by the United Nations as a result of their need to distinguish in their charter between the 
different participation rights for specialized intergovernmental agencies and the international 
private organizations that they work with (Willetts, 2002). NGOs sprung up as a result of the 
void created by the failure of commercial banks to reach the effectively reach the poor ad 
they have been hailed as the true pioneers of microfinance (Helms, 2006). They possess 
economic, informational and intellectual resources that has allowed them gather enough 
proficiency and influence to shoulder authority in issues that were traditionally the sole 
purview and responsibility of states (Clark, 1995). There is no officially accepted definition of 
an NGO and within different contexts the term carries different meanings. However, 
according to Willetts (2002) there are a few basic characteristics that include:  
 An NGO must be independent. That is, it should not be directly controlled by any 
government.  
 An NGO cannot be created as a political party 
 An NGO should is a not for profit organization 
 They must be a non-criminal group and non-violent in nature.  
These characteristics apply in general usage, because they match the conditions for 
recognition by the United Nations. The boundaries can sometimes be blurred: some NGOs 
may in practice be closely identified with a political party; many NGOs generate income from 
commercial activities, notably consultancy contracts or sales of publications; and a small 
number of NGOs may be associated with violent political protests. Nevertheless, an NGO is 
never constituted as a government bureaucracy, a party, a company, a criminal organization 
or a guerrilla group. Thus, for this article, an NGO is defined as an independent voluntary 
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association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other 
than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities (Willetts, 2002).  
Clark (1995) pointed out, there are three main things that give NGOS their level of influence 
and make them effective in their chosen areas of dedication when compared to states.  The 
first is that whereas states have a myriad of issues they need to attend to (with national 
security being top priority); NGOs are singular in their focus. Secondly, because they usually 
take up principle-based issues, NGOs are able to commit to issues and causes that states' may 
rank lower in their list of priorities or ignore completely. The other thing is that when 
compared to states, NGOs are very intensive in their commitment to their chosen issues.  The 
narrower scope of NGOS mentioned before allows them to concentrate their resources of 
volunteer memberships and paid staff in a way that state representatives may not be able to.  
Some NGOs dedicated solely to delivering microfinance and micro-financial services, while 
there are others offering these services as part of a bundle of services. The nature of these 
NGOs also varies; they could either be entirely indigenous or have some affiliation to 
international networks. Although NGOs have been at the forefront of the development of 
microfinance, there have been a number of challenges and constraints. One of such 
constraints is their dependence on donors for financing. NGOs more often than not were 
launched with and remain dependent on donors for financing and this limits the growth of 
microfinance in areas served by these NGOs as they may not be able to meet the growing 
demand. Compounding this challenge is the fact that because their board members do not 
represent the shareholders and/or are not member-owners with a financial stake, their 
governance structure is not qualified to assume fiduciary responsibilities and this limits the 
range of finance related products they can offer. For instance, one way of increasing available 
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funds for disbursement is by mobilizing savings but NGOs cannot legally do this as this can 
only be done by banks and other intermediaries that are under the supervision of banking 
authorities. As the demand for efficiency and sustainability increases, more and more NGOs 
are moving towards commercialization in order to wean off of donor funds and be able to 
increase available funds by seeking commercial sources. As such several NGOs have scaled up 
to become formal financial institutions. However, this scaling up has raised the question as to 
whether an NGO whose primary focus are socially conscious issues would lose that focus in 
their quest for profits or financial sustainability. This is what has come to be known as ‘Mission 
Drift’. As microfinance continues to evolve, questions are being asked as to what roles 
international and domestic NGOs will play in the building of inclusive financial systems and 
since they do not have access to national payment systems and are not allowed to mobilize 
savings, if they will ever be able to offer the variety of services that poor clients are 
demanding. In general, there is an on-going debate as to the role NGOs will play in the future 
as providers of microfinance (Helms, 2006).  
2.3.2 Rural Banks 
Rural Banks are formal and/or informal financial institutions and agencies that are created 
with the help of the government to meet the peculiar credit needs of people in the rural areas 
(Desrochers, 2003; Khankhoje, 2009). Rural banks are state run (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and  
Morduch, 2009) and usually established by legislature such as the 1977 1:4 license rule in 
India (Khankhoje and Sathye, 2009) and the New Rural Bank Act (RA 7353) of the Philippines 
(Desrochers, 2003). The reasoning behind establishing rural banks was to reach the unbanked 
and poor in rural areas with financial services that met their unique needs (Khankhoje, 2009). 
As such, a lot of rural banks were offering agricultural loans.  
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2.3.3 Microfinance Banks 
The need for sustainability led to the belief that Microfinance could benefit by applying more 
commercial logic. This combined with the need to tap into more sources of funding and the 
expansion of microfinance into new areas lead to the evolution of Microfinance Banks. Banks 
were formed through one of several means. One way was for an NGO to upscale their status 
to become a bank (e.g. Bolivias BancoSol in 1992) or for donors to set up a Greenfield bank 
with a banking license and specializing in micro lending. Another way Microfinance Banks 
were formed was by commercial banks ‘downscaling’. This is when a commercial bank creates 
a microfinance department (Lützenkirchen, 2012). There are several characteristics that 
differentiate Microfinance Bank from the other big player in microfinance- NGOs. First of all, 
Microfinance Banks are clearly for-profit organizations primarily seeking to maximize 
investments for financial reward (Cull et al., 2009). There is also a difference in how they 
distribute their profits with non-profits ploughing back any profits generated into their 
business to continue to advance their social goals while for-profits have the liberty to do 
whatever they want with any after tax profits generated (Cull et al., 2009). The ownership 
structures are also different with the boards of Microfinance Banks representing their 
shareholders and/or stakeholders in the bank. They are also allowed to mobilize funds via 
savings and are as such, supervised by the government.  
Apart from the above mentioned MFIs there are also Non-Banking Financial Institutions that 
are usually NGOs that upscale  
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2.4 Microfinance Research 
A research paper by Mersland (2005) examined the agenda of recent research in 
microfinance. Results of the analysis indicated that there are two broad groups into which 
these studies fall- research on sustainability and research on the impact of microfinance. The 
study captured a shift in impact assessment studies from an individual perspective to a wider 
impact assessment. What the Mersland (2005) study doesn’t capture though is the shift in 
recent sustainability studies from best practices to a focus on the concept of mission drift, 
which as mentioned before is arising due to the increased call for sustainability and the fear 
that this might affect depth.  The study highlighted that the benefits of the research produced 
so far seems to favour donors and practitioners more and pays less attention to research that 
would benefit governments and the banking community, especially the banking community.  
Table 2-1: Type of research method vs. type of knowledge produced 1 
Article/Knowledge Sustainability Impact Both Total 
Descriptive 30 23 3 56 
Empirical 24 35 1 60 
Theoretical 6 8 0 14 
Total 60 66 4 130 
 
In another paper looking at microfinance research, Fischer and Ghatak (2011) looked at the 
gap between microfinance theories and corresponding empirical work and suggested that 
existing or new theory  should be used to explicitly design experiments and as the ex-ante 
                                                     
1 (from Mersland, 2005) 
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framework for more empirical work. This thesis takes that step by using neo-institutional 
theory to explore MFI behaviour in the hope that the results would help in formulation of 
theories that taken into consideration location based factors.  
2.5 Microfinance in Developing Countries 
When Prof Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 
2006, microfinance became a hot topic. A Google Scholar search with the keyword 
‘microfinance’ gives 12,400 results prior to 2006 but from 2006 to present day, that number 
has more than tripled to 38,400. This section looks at the development of Microfinance Post 
Yunus in developing countries in the six regions as classified by MIX. 
2.5.1 Latin America and the Caribbean 
This region comprises of 41 countries ranging from small island nations to the larger 
economies like Brazil and Mexico. It is widely diversified in terms of financial sector 
development and income levels. While growth slowed down in other regions during the 2008 
financial crises, the Latin America and Caribbean region posted a relatively strong 
performance. However, as measured by the Gini coefficient, the region, alongside Sub-
Saharan Africa are the regions with the highest income inequalities even though its recent 
growth has slightly reduced this income inequality. This income inequality is more prominent 
and significant in a number of the strongest economies in the region, such as Brazil and Chile 
(CGAP, n.d.-b). 
As of 2016, there were 433 self-reporting Micro financial Institutions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean with a combined 23.09 million active borrowers and a gross loan portfolio of USD 
43.64 billion.  
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The commercialization of microfinance has happened faster in Latin America than anywhere 
else in the world. In a few short years, microfinance has gone from being the exclusive domain 
of non-profit organizations and cooperative societies to being funded by commercial banks 
(Providing 29% of the funding for microenterprises) and licensed financial institutions 
(formerly non-governmental organizations) and other specially licensed financial 
intermediaries (providing 45%). This shift has seen the provision of micro financial services 
extended to the poor on a massive scale by commercial enterprises (Christen, 2001). This is 
possibly because of the context and manner in which microfinance developed within this 
region (different from how it developed in the Asian region) - in a failing populist system, with 
prevalent unemployment. Microfinance developed to provide credit to the cash-strapped 
informal sector in order to solve the urban unemployment problem at that time. As such, the 
commercial logic of microfinance was embraced quite early. Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s have a culture of social assistance that dates as far back as the 1920’s and 
microfinance was the second form of social assistance to expand after 1990s. The growth and 
development of microfinance (and other social assistance schemes and policies) were 
significantly shaped and constrained by democracy and authoritarianism in this region 
(McGuire, 2013).  
Morduch and Rutherford (2003) believe that this environment in which microfinance 
developed is responsible for the Latin American industry being characteristically urban and 
its focus on profitably serving micro-enterprises rather than aiding poverty alleviation. As 
such, its target has always been poor people with established businesses looking for capital 
for growth. Microfinance in this region was a business opportunity not social responsibility. 
The Latin America Microfinance institutions that have gone commercial are more profitable 
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than not just other Microfinance institutions in other regions but in some cases are even more 
profitable than the traditional commercial banks in their areas  of operation (Christen, 2001).  
There have been technological advances in Latin America too. Several banks and MNOs have 
partnered and launched a number of mobile banking products with the primary targets of 
low-income users via mobile payments products, but have a long-term vision for providing a 
broader range of banking services on these channels down the road. Mexico, Colombia, 
Argentina launched in 2012 and Paraguay and Haiti have been operating earlier. This region 
has also seen the incorporation of other service offerings/products such as healthcare 
(Geissler and Leatherman, 2015). Diego et al (2013) looked at how macro, meso and micro 
territorial boundaries affect the loan repayment rates of female clients of mega microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) based in Latin America and the Caribbean. The study uses panel data 
(random effect analysis) comprising of data covering seven years and 407 MFIs of LAC. Their 
findings indicate that the repayment performance of MFIs’ female clients in the LAC region is 
meso- and micro- territorially bounded. It is positively influenced by the urbanization and 
gender inequality levels of the LAC countries, and by the number of loans per MFI loan officer.   
2.5.2 Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) 
According to the CGAP (2011) report on the region, The Eastern Europe and Central America 
region was the hardest hit by the global financial crises in 2009. The region relies heavily on 
government assistance, with the government funding most of the MFIs/ This region in one of 
the most regulated and policy makers involved in regulating to prevent quasi-deposit-taking. 
There is also a premium placed on consumer protection and consumer financial education. 
There is a call for more research  to  establish whether government funding of microfinance 
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is filling in gaps or undermining private sector players, or in essence, doing more good than 
harm.    
2.5.3 Middle East and North Africa 
The Middle East and North Africa also known as MENA make up only about 5% of the global 
population and is characterized by its large youth population (50% of its population is 
between the ages of 15 and 24) who at 24% have the highest unemployment rate globally.  
According to Findex2, the region has the lowest percentages of adults with a formal account 
(14%) and of poor people with formal access to financial services (9%). In many countries in 
this region, the government plays a role in financial access through social funds (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Yemen) or by strongly supporting the microfinance industry (Morocco). Reflecting 
the population share, microfinance coverage is of 3% of clients recorded on the MIX, with a 
remaining market estimated at about 19 million clients. The region counts both success 
stories and cases of severe crisis. According to the 2014 Findex figures and excluding Gulf 
countries, the region accounts for the highest percentage of financially excluded adults, with 
80% of the population or about 200 million not having access to an account, and 95% not 
having access to credit.  
Pearce (2010) offered the following insights into the characteristics of microfinance in the  
MENA region: 
 Microenterprises make up the majority of enterprises in the region and are key 
employer of labour. For example, in Egypt, microenterprises make 92.5% of the 
enterprises and about has a 64% share of private employment. 
                                                     
2 http://datatopics.worldbank.org/financialinclusion/region/middle-east1 
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 When compared to the other regions (apart from OECD countries and East Asia), the 
MENA region has greater financial depth3  
 With the improvement of the credit registries and the establishment of credit bureaus 
comes a subsequent improvement in the quality of credit information and availability 
throughout the region.  
 The MENA region is dominated by NGOs, state banks and postal networks and 
although a few countries within the region have passed legislation allowing other MFI 
legal charters, yet postal savings banks and post offices remain the primary service 
providers for savings and payment services for low income people in the region. 
Savings and loan cooperatives are not a major source of financial services in much of 
the MENA region.   
 With the exception of Asia, the MENA region has better depth of outreach in 
comparison to other regions, with a large percentage of women, at 63 percent of total 
microcredit borrowers (although only 31% employees of Sanabel member MFIs are 
female). The proportion of women microcredit   clients   ranges   from   as   low   as   
18   percent   in   Iraq,  where   female   workforce participation has declined.  
Brandsma and Chaouali (1998) identified social, cultural, or religious constraints as barriers 
to the development of microfinance in the MENA region. In certain Islamic groups for 
instance, charging interest rates on loans is considered to haram (forbidden by the Koran). To 
be able to penetrate these areas, it would be necessary to be innovative with the 
development of microfinance products which can be offered using Islamic banking principles 
such as musharaka (Equity financing where profits and loss are shared based on the 
                                                     
3 Measured as private credit as a percentage of GDP 
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proportion of capital invested by each party), murabaha (similar to western rent-to-own 
arrangements), or mudaraba (trust based contracts). Pearce (2010)Pearce (2010) confirms 
this, directly linking innovation in creating Islamic banking products for microenterprises to  
the success of financial  inclusion.  
2.5.4 East Asia and the Pacific 
The CGAP (n.d.) profile on East Asia and the Pacific highlight that it is home to 27% of the 
world population and 24% of its poor. It is made up of 25 countries and 3 major and 
significantly heterogeneous sub-regions and has enjoyed a high rate of economic growth over 
the past decade. East Asia and the Pacific has the highest percentage of adults with formal 
accounts, it also has several markets that are largely under served with less than 30% its poor 
people having formal access to credit. Governments play a prominent role at all levels of the 
financial system, and private microfinance has limited coverage (Duflos, 2012) . The region 
has several success stories in the area of regulations, retail models or branchless banking. The 
success of microfinance in this region has been linked to the innovations in the structuring of 
the of the microfinance institutions. In Indonesia for instance, the MFI BRI Unit desa has highly 
decentralized and semi-autonomous units and limit their staff number in order to keep their 
units small and focusing their operations. Their accounting system is designed to access the 
performance of each unit as a profit centre while their management information system is 
standardized to provide timely information on selected key performance indications to 
management (CGAP, n.d.). In Bangladesh, institutional innovation came in the form of the 
Palli Karma  Sahayak  Foundation  (PKSF),  which is public-private  apex  body  created to 
channel microfinance funds  to MFIs. In India, the institutional innovation was the concept of 
Self Help Group (SHG) Federations, formed in response to the problem Self Help groups were 
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having raising funds. SHGs Federations are made up of 20-30 SHG clusters, which are in turn, 
made up of 20 to 30 SHG groups (Parikh, Ghosh and Chavan, 2003). Having larger groups 
makes it possible to transfer funds across SHGs groups and to attract more funds from other 
sources such as institutional investors (Parikh et al., 2003). Other services provided by the 
SHG Federations include sector development, financial, livelihood and social intermediation, 
with the exact combination of services varying from place to place and evolving over time 
(Salomo, Rao and Kumar, 2010) 
On the customer side, this region is characterized by a rice culture where deficit production 
requires large numbers of house-holds to supplement food production with small-scale 
market-based activities such as petty trading; high population density; clearly defined 
property (including land) rights; and a network of regular and accessible markets 
2.5.5 South Asia 
Like their Eastern counterparts, there is a lot of diversity in the various forms of microfinance 
in South Asia and in the institutional systems that formed them. However, while their Eastern 
counterparts post positive returns on assets and equity and their earnings from their loan 
portfolios covers their much higher cost levels, MFIs in South  Asia post negative  returns  on  
assets  and  equity, even though their expense structures are some of the lowest in the world  
(Thapa, 2007). The region covers 15% of the MFIs reporting to the MIX database.  
The CGAP website also highlights the following characteristics of the region: 
 The accessibility of technology- this is encouraging the growth of branchless banking 
with several microfinance banks, mobile operators and more recently large 
commercial banks in Pakistan aggressively pursuing opportunities in this area. Other 
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countries are following suite with improved regulations from their central banks and 
substantial investments from multiple providers. Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Sri 
Lanka, Maldives and Nepal are all taking strides in the direction of branchless banking.  
 The Pacific islands governments are also encouraging the development of 
microfinance with the government of Fiji established a National Microfinance Unit 
(NMU) and the government of Papua New Guinea adopting microfinance policy that 
ties into international principles of sustainability and facilitator role rather than a 
delivery one for the government.  
The East Asia and the Pacific have their own unique set of challenges and the role of 
microfinance to their development challenges is unclear (Donaghue, 2004)  
2.5.6 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) in sub-Saharan Africa includes a broad range of diverse and 
geographically dispersed institutions that offer financial services to low-income clients: non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), non-bank financial institutions, cooperatives, rural 
banks, savings and postal financial institutions, and an increasing number of commercial 
banks. Overall, MFIs in Africa are dynamic and growing. Of the 163 MFIs that provided 
information for this study, 57 percent were created in the past eight years—and 45 percent 
of those in the past four. 2 African MFIs appear to serve the broad financial needs of their 
clients. Unlike trends in most regions around the globe, more than 70 percent of the reporting 
African MFIs offer savings as a core financial service for clients and use it as an important 
source of funds for lending. MFIs in Africa tend to report lower levels of profitability, as 
measured by return on assets, than MFIs in other global regions. Among the African MFIs that 
provided information for this study, 47 percent post positive unadjusted returns; regulated 
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MFIs report the highest return on assets of all MFI types, averaging around 2.6 percent. The 
microfinance sector in Africa is quickly expanding, and institutions have increased their 
activities. In fact, African MFIs are among the most productive globally, as measured by the 
number of borrowers and savers per staff member. MFIs in Africa also demonstrate higher 
levels of portfolio quality, with an average portfolio at risk over 30 days of only 4.0 percent. 
Still, African MFIs face many challenges. Operating and financial expenses are high, and on 
average, revenues remain lower than in other global regions. Efficiency in terms of cost per 
borrower is lowest for African MFIs. Technological innovations, product refinements, and 
ongoing efforts to strengthen the capacity of African MFIs are needed to reduce costs, 
increase outreach, and boost overall profitability. Overall, African MFIs are important actors 
in the financial sector, and they are well positioned to grow and reach the millions of potential 
clients who currently do not have access to mainstream financial services. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter traces the evolution of microfinance from the time of moneylenders to its 
informal existence as ROSCAs and the cooperative movement that swept across Europe and 
then North America. It also looked at the modern day renaissance of microfinance from its 
rebirth in the Grameen Bank and the subsequent movement championed by Prof Yunus 
Mohammed.  The environment and culture of the people has always affected the 
development of microfinance. For instance, it has been shown that interest rates and 
punishment for breaking of contracts varied from place to place and influenced heavily by 
things such as religion and the caste system (in India).  
Figure 2-6 shows the average loan balance/capita GNI across the six regions of this study. This 
is usually used as a rough indicator as to the income level of an MFI’s clientele.  The graph 
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indicates that although the balances vary from region to region, they all follow similar peak 
and trough patterns, reacting similarly to various events but to varying degrees. For instance 
the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the Global Financial Crisis in 2009, affected the average 
loan balance/capita GNI for the South Asian markets, increasing dramatically as they started 
lending to the richer poor and closer to the top of the poverty ladder. The Middle East and 
North Africa and Eastern Europe that have similar characteristics with the South Asian region 
(microfinance sector that is technology based) seem to mirror this trend while the other three 
regions do not. The other three regions -Africa, Latin America (and the Caribbean’s) and East 
Asia (and the Pacific) - seem to have more similar trends and responses than the other 
regions. 
Figure 2-1: Average Loan Balance/Per Capita GNI across All Six Regions 
 
This is the argument that this thesis is based on - certain factors seem to be peculiar to each 
region. The Asian regions account for the majority of MFIs and retain the highest volume of 
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savings and cred it while serving more members than any other continent. The East Asia and 
the Pacific and MENA regions have their institutional innovation and technology culture while 
(Quayes, 2015) indicates that MFIs operating in Africa and Asia have a poorer level of financial 
performance than MFIs from other regions. The history of social policies of the Latin America 
and Caribbean, the Islamic banking of the Middle East and North Africa, the level of poverty 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and so on. The question as to how much of these regional differences 
comes to bear on the lending practises of the MFIs operating within them is the focus of this 
study.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review literature pertaining to and relevant to this study. Specifically, this 
chapter will examine the key theories and arguments, which form the basis of this research 
framework and look at the empirical evidence supporting these studies. In so doing, this 
chapter will seek to explain how this framework was developed.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Following this introduction, the second section 
of this chapter (3.2) will examine the theories of microfinance that seek to explain the lending 
behaviour of MFIs. Section 3.3 discusses the various locational factors that affect the outreach 
of microfinance at the company, country, regional and global levels. Section 3.4 discusses the 
neo-institutional theory, tracing its development and major concepts. Section 3.5 links the 
neo-institutional theory to microfinance and develops the theoretical argument for this 
thesis. The chapter concludes with a summary of the main points.  
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3.2 The Theories of Microfinance 
The wealth pyramid of Dunford (2006)4 in Figure 3.1 graphically shows the  
 
target markets of the commercial banks, co-operatives and MFIs. The solid horizontal line 
separating the green region form the blue region represents an international poverty line and 
the dashed lines below it are the $2 and $1 -a-day expenditure per capita. The figure shows 
that commercial banks target clients at the top of the pyramid while credit unions by utilizing 
their principles and their lower cost structures are able to reach further down the pyramid. 
However, they generally do not reach below the international poverty line, even though there 
is a market of 4 billion people with an estimated purchase power parity of $5 trillion 
(Hammond et al, 2007). The theories of microfinance are based on the premise that the major 
problem that these poor face is their inability to access credit, and as such, if provided with 
                                                     
4 A modification of the economic pyramid of  Prahalad (2006) 
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access to loans, they would engage in entrepreneurial activities and thereby be able to escape 
poverty (van Rooyen, Stewart, & de Wet, 2012). This argument forms the core mission of 
microfinance institutions (MFIs): To lend very small sums to very poor (Mersland and Strøm, 
2010; Otero, 1999; Woller, 2002a). 
The four issues with lending to the poor were the issues of adverse selection, moral hazard, 
auditing costs and contract enforcement.  Adverse selection is the challenge in ascertaining 
the level of risk attached to a potential borrower. Moral hazard is the challenge of 
determining whether the potential borrower will use the loan, once made, for the purpose 
stated to ensure repayment. Auditing costs challenges are those associated with ascertaining 
how the project actually performed in case of the borrowers inability to repay and 
enforcement problems lie in finding ways of forcing a reluctant borrower to repay their loan 
(Armendáriz and Labie, 2011; M. Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Hermes and Lensink, 2007; 
Simtowe, Zeller, and Phiri, 2006). To mitigate these risks, traditional financial institutions 
demand that asset(s) are pledged by the borrower as collateral in the event of default. These 
assets could be property, machinery, real estate, accounts receivable or any other current or 
non-current assets as deemed fit by the lending institution (Berger & Udell, 1990; Blazy & 
Weill, 2013; Chan & Kanatas, 1985). However, because the poor lack the necessary collateral, 
they are not able to secure loans from traditional financial institutions (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2010). Microfinance Institutions have been able through various innovations such 
as group lending so as to create ‘joint liability’ (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Armendáriz de 
Aghion & Morduch, 2000; Dunford, 2006) , regularly scheduled repayments (Armendariz & 
Morduch, 2010; Dunford, 2006; Jain and Mansuri, 2003) and targeting women (Aggarwal, 
Goodell, & Selleck, 2015; Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; Dunford, 2006) to overcome these 
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challenges and extend small loans to the poor. These innovations have been shown to be 
effective in several instances. Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) found the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, BancoSol in Bolivia and Compartamos in Mexico to be profitable lending average 
sums of 69, 1,571 and 440 USD respectively. Navajas et al  (2000) looked at five Microfinance 
organizations (BancoSol, PRODEM, FIE, Caja Los Andes and Sartawi) all based in Bolivia but 
from different geographical locations and using different lending methods. What they all had 
in common was that they all work in niches untouched by traditional banks; all grant small 
loans to first-time borrowers and make bigger loans to repeat borrowers; all of them charge 
high interest rates and yet all five have been able to keep arrears and loan losses low and 
have all made progress toward sustainability.  
Further support for the profitability of microfinance as a service and product can be found in 
the abundance of evidence and research on capital gains amongst microenterprises carried 
out by McKenzie and/or Woodruff. McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) used data from the 
Mexican National Survey of Microenterprises (ENAMIN) to estimate the returns to capital 
among the smallest urban Microenterprises in Mexico. Their results indicate that 
microenterprises that invested less than $200 had returns of between 10-15% per month, and 
an uncompounded rate of 180% per year. For those with capital stock above $500, the returns 
fall to around 40-60% per year. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) used randomized 
grants to generate shocks to capital stock for a set of Sri Lankan microenterprises. They found 
that the average real return to capital in these enterprises came to about 4.6-5.3% per month 
(55% - 63% per year), amounts substantially higher than the prevalent market interest rates 
at that time. McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) repeated their 2006 research but with a sample 
of microenterprises in Mexico with less than $900 of capital stock. They found return on 
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capitals this time to be in the range of 250%-360% per year, higher than the cross-sectional 
estimates in their earlier work. Udry and Anagol (2006) estimate the average rate of returns 
in a sample of small scale of agricultural farmers in Ghana. Their sample data was made up of 
inputs and outputs collected over two years at the plot level for 1.659 plots cultivated by 435 
farmers in four village clusters. The data was collected at six-week intervals over the survey 
period to increase the accuracy of recall by the farmers especially in the area of the use of 
household labour and continual harvest of staple crops. Their results show the returns to be 
50% per year among those producing traditional crops on a median-sized plot and 250% per 
year among those producing non-traditional crops on median sized plots. These results 
provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that the poor are able to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities and pay back their loans, even with high interest rates. 
Despite these instances where MFIs have successfully and profitably reached the poor as cited 
in the above examples, there are still cases where credit is not trickling down and this will be 
discussed next section.  
3.2.1 Mission Drift 
The success of the early Microfinance Institutions gave credence to the arguments of  
Prahalad (2006) and (Dunford, 2006) as to the potential of the 4 billion poor people lacking 
access to credit. The arguments were not just as to the social benefits but also to the 
economic benefits of serving the poor- indicating that profits and social service are not 
mutually exclusive (Woller, 2002b). However, serving the poor comes at a cost  (Hermes & 
Lensink, 2011) and the with the United Nations declaring microfinance as a vital tool in 
realizing the MDGs, focus turned to how to make it more sustainable and to enable it meet 
its demand (Quayes, 2015; Woller, 2002b). Commercialization of MFIs has been promoted 
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(amongst other things) as a means allowing MFIs take deposits so as to increase their capacity, 
provide for better supervision and to adopt ‘better’ management practises (CGAP, 1996; 
Woller, 2002b). Commercialization can be defined as the implementation of a profit-seeking 
approach by MFIs in  delivering their services (Woller, 2002b). However, there are those of 
the school of thought that the call for commercialization will lead to MFIs abandoning their 
social mission of focusing on lending to the poor in favour of profiteering. This divergence 
from an organizations original mission  is what is known as mission drift (Cornforth, 2014).  
Sebstad and Cohen (2001) after examining the activities of 5 MFIs in Kenya- Kenya Rural 
Enterprise Programme, Pride Kenya, NCCK-Small Scale Enterprise Division, CARE-WEDCO and 
Kenya Women Finance Trust, Kashangaki, Hulme, and Mugwanga (1999) found that most of 
the MFIs were seen to be assisting the poor and not so poor5 while the very poor relied on 
friends, family or ROSCAs. Furthermore, in an examination of 18 studies covering 20 
microfinance programs, Sebstad and Cohen (2001) looked at the percentage of clients in or 
outside of the study-defined poverty groups and found that 11 of the 20 had a majority of 
clients outside the poverty group. Examples like these have raised alarm and seem to support 
the mission drift theory.  
Mersland and Strøm (2010) theoretically analysed mission drift based on the assumption that 
in order to remain in business, that all Microfinance Institutions have to be financially 
sustainable and that this is the key driver in their choice of market segments.  Focusing on the 
profit function alone and disregarding governance issues, they assumed that the MFI’s risk 
averse with an exponential utility function  
                                                     
5 They used the Using ACCION International classifications of poorest, very poor, poor, moderately poor, 
threshold level and non-poor which uses different distinguishing proxy characteristics for income – single status, 
low level of education and the level and type of business 
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𝓾(𝝅) =  −𝒆−𝝆𝝅          (𝟑-𝟏) 
Where 
 𝜋 is the MFIs profits and 
ρ is the measure of risk aversion.  
When profits are normally distributed, the expected utility of profits may be written as: 
𝜠(𝓾(𝝅)) = 𝒖 (𝝅 −
𝟏
𝟐
𝝆𝝈𝟐) = 𝒖(P)             (3-2) 
Where 
𝜎 is the risk of profits 
𝜋is the banks profit function 
As such, in a bid to maximize the expected utility, Microfinance Institutions would seek to 
maximize P. To arrive at an estimable function, P would have to be specified, so they 
hypothesized that profit per credit client is correlated with average loan amount. 
𝝅 (𝑫, 𝑳) = (𝒓𝑳 − 𝒓)𝑳 + (𝒓(𝟏 − 𝒂) − 𝒓𝑫)𝑫 − 𝑪(𝑫, 𝑳)            (𝟑-𝟑) 
Where 
 𝑟𝐿 is the rate of loans 
𝑟𝐷 is the rate of deposits,  
r is the rate on the interbank market,  
L is loans,  
D is deposits,  
𝑎 is the percentage of deposits for compulsory reserves and  
C (D, L) is the production function or management costs. The banks profit would then be the 
sum of intermediation margins on loans and deposits, net of management costs, while the 
risks of profits consists of risk in the intermediation margins, changes in the demand for loans 
and supply of deposits, the repayment on loans, and management cost risk. The assumption 
they make here is that for any given Microfinance Institution, the major risk lies in repayment. 
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As such, they nullify three arguments- the first, the MFI may be able to maintain near constant 
intermediation margins, even though the loan rate on the interbank market is variable. This 
is the case when the MFI is the sole provider of financial services in its area, and therefore, 
has some degree of monopoly power over customers. Then the MFI is able to control its own 
risk level (Freixas & Rochet, 2008, pp. 89–91). Furthermore, relationship banking is a 
characteristic of microfinance. In such a setting, the customer becomes locked in with the 
bank (Mersland, 2009; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). The MFI has some power to fix deposit 
and lending rates, and is therefore able to neutralize changing rates on the interbank market. 
Second, because MFIs management cost is primarily related to labour, it should be 
predictable and as such possess very little risk. Thirdly, repayment costs are likely to be risky 
even though microfinance observers find that the poor repay their loans. MFIs try to minimize 
their losses by making small loans with short maturity terms; by making group loans, so that 
peers control each other; and by differentiating between individuals based on their 
reputations as their individual credit histories accumulate (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). 
However, repayment seems to be the chief risk element in microfinance, since an MFI is often 
unable to differentiate between good and bad risks and to monitor a client’s performance 
(Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). The outcome is that the only risk remaining is the 
repayment risk and this now gives:  
𝑷 = (𝒓𝑳 − 𝒓)𝑳 + (𝒓(𝟏 − 𝒂) − 𝒓𝑫)𝑫 − 𝑪(𝑫, 𝑳) −
𝟏
𝟐
𝝆𝝈𝟐(𝑳)              (𝟑-𝟒) 
Where 
1
2
𝜌 is a constant. P is a risk-adjusted profit measure and the management cost function 
is assumed to be linear. By a simple rearrangement of the last equation and a division by the 
number of credit clients, CC, the average loan L may be written as: 
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The right-hand side of equation 5 shows (risk adjusted) profit, deposits, management costs, 
and loan risk per credit client. Based on this model, the prediction would be that the higher 
the profits, the more the average loan size will increase; deposits would decrease, 
management costs, and the risk per credit client would go up. If coefficients differ but the 
signs are equal, the average profit or the average cost will be the more significant variable. 
The prediction for risk indicates that higher risk per customer may lead to mission drift, since 
the bank may then favour higher loans to members of society who are better off. This is a 
mission drift hypothesis.  
Several empirical studies seem to support this theory. Olivares-Polanco (2005) using data 
from 28 Latin American MFIs and a multiple regression analysis, tested for mission drift and 
other factors that available literature indicated could affect size of loans. His results indicate 
that the type of institution, (whether it is an NGO, Credit Union or MFI), whether regulated 
or not, does not effect on the size of loan size and that most of the MFIs, whether they are 
NGOs or banks were not reaching very far down the poverty spectrum. What he found that 
did affect loan sizes were the age of the institution and competition. This led to the conclusion 
that the more intense the competition, the larger the loan sizes and less depth of outreach, 
claiming support for the mission drift theory.  
There however, exist several issues with assuming the mission drift theory is responsible for 
the lack of depth of outreach. Examining equation 5, a risk exposure argument would result 
in the opposite prediction. When risk per customer increases, one would expect MFIs to 
reduce the average loan size as this is one of the ways bank limit risk exposure to particular 
customers. This is a risk exposure hypothesis. Thus, the risk prediction in the last equation is 
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not clear-cut. In addition to the model variables, a MFIs time in business may induce it to 
accept smaller loan sizes. This time variable is important, since the mission drift argument 
implies that the older an MFI, the more it will drift toward higher income segments. The data 
of  Mersland and Strøm (2010) showed that the average loan size for all MFIs does not 
increase with MFI age. Two effects pulling in the same direction may be at work here. The 
first is a cost effect in which operating costs may drop over time as an MFI expends less effort 
to promote microloans and to ensure their repayment. The second effect stems from the fact 
that a repeat relationship with the same customer segment reveals its typical 
creditworthiness. An MFI may be willing to increase loans and move deeper into a segment 
with a good record. The initial low-risk customers in a given segment may establish a good 
reputation, which benefits followers with lower loan demands. An experienced MFI is more 
likely than a newer MFI to obtain such customer information and to risk lending to smaller 
customers. Thus, the older and more experienced the MFI, the more likely it will be to go 
down the poverty spectrum, and thus annulling the theory that pursuance of profits 
negatively affects outreach. 
There are other issues with the premise of this hypothesis. First of all, governance factors 
have been shown to exert considerable influence of organizational decisions and outcomes 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and ignoring them raises doubts as to the practicality of the 
hypotheses.  Another key issue is its assumption that an MFI has to focus on either profits or 
depth of outreach, that both goals are mutually exclusive. Supporters of the ‘double bottom 
line’ and the profitability at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ suggest that they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive and could be attained simultaneously (Cull et al., 2009; Prahalad, 2006; 
Rosenberg, 2007).  
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The evidence offered by Olivares-Polanco (2005) seems to support the mission drift theory. 
However, this observation could be local to Latin America and may not be universally valid. 
Also, his original sample of 30 (11 NGOs and 19 banks or nonbanking financial institutions), 
with almost all of them regulated (Only 3 of the NGOs were unregulated) is far from 
representative of Microfinance banks in developing countries- a fact he acknowledges in his 
paper. This research takes a cross-country approach. Surprisingly, he found the NGOs less 
likely to reach down the poverty spectrum than the banks or nonbanking financial institutions. 
I do not believe that an increase in average loan size with an increase in market share (his 
proxy for competition) does not necessarily imply a mission drift as he states. Other 
explanations could account for this such as repeat customers taking larger loans. Information 
on the ratio of ‘wealth poor’ to ‘very poor’ might have shed more light on this but it was not 
included. In addition, in a situation where the largest MFIs are actually targeting wealthier 
clients, competition does not necessarily explain this as it has not been shown that the very 
poor are unprofitable. Besides, it could also be a socio-cultural phenomenon or the largest 
MFIs are making those choices because of the same influencing factors common to all of 
them.  
My theory finds support in the work of Hishigsuren (2007) whose research looked at the 
effects of a MFIs scaling up on their outreach, using field research to analyse these effects on 
Activists for Social Alternatives (ASA), a microfinance organization servicing poor women in 
rural India. The results from his research indicate that after their expansion ASA’s percentage 
of rural members decreased from 80% to 55%. However, this he explained was largely 
because new branches were opened in urban and semi-urban areas. The results showed that 
the absolute number of rural members had grown and the decrease was in relation to the 
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ratio of them in the total pool of ASAs customers, because of the relatively larger number of 
urban members. He used average size of first loans as a percentage of GDP, Housing Index, 
monthly household income per capita, the caste the customer belonged to, geographical 
distribution of membership and sectoral distribution of loans to measure the depth of 
outreach or poverty level. As ASAs mission statement lay emphasis on the importance of 
economic, social and political empowerment of the poor, he used the number and type of 
financial and nonfinancial services before and after scaling up to determine if there were any 
changes in the scope of the services rendered. Several variables were used to determine and 
measure any changes in the quality of outreach. These variable included, the level of 
members’ overall satisfaction with the organization; the average number of hours available 
for working with each member and the number of members per Financial Officer. The quality 
of member services such as personal attention and business counselling (as perceived by 
members) and the ratio of people who dropped out due to reasons connected to the MFIs 
expansion were also included. In conclusion, he proposed that mission drift is not a result of 
deliberate decisions by the management or board but rather is a result of the challenges 
posed by the expansion and the process of scaling-up.  
As the evidence offered by the mission drift theory does not conclusively explain the problems 
with depth of outreach, the next section will look at other studies that have looked at factors 
that affect outreach.  
3.3 Factors Affecting Outreach 
In order to meet the research objectives and answer the research questions, the study has 
grouped the factors into the following: 
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3.3.1 Company level factors 
Based on the argument that the function of governance is to achieve corporate goals and that 
for most MFIs there is a duality of goals- to contribute to development (and lend to the poorer 
population) and to do this in a financially sustainable manner independent of donors, 
Mersland and Strøm (2009) look at governance and its effects on outreach. The data they 
used came from five micro lender-rating agencies; all approved as official rating agencies by 
the Ratingfund of the C-GAP. The agencies are MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil, 
and M-Cril. Average loan size and the number of credit clients (used as a proxy for outreach) 
were regressed over variables representing board characteristics, MFI innovations, and 
external variables covering a period of four years. These variables were CEO/chairman duality, 
presence of international directors, internal board auditor, board size, Shareholder owned 
firms, female CEO, individual loan sizes, competition, bank regulation, urban market, MFI 
experience, portfolio at risk (30 days), firm size, human development index, and firm years. 
Their results indicate that governance mechanisms generally have little impact on outreach. 
The only variables with any significant effect were CEO/chairman duality and individual loan 
implying that the CEO/chairman can increase the number of customers (Mersland & Strøm, 
2009). This is similar to results from an earlier study of theirs (Mersland & Strøm, 2008) in 
which MFI type (NGO or Self Help Group) were used in a logit regression, regressed against 
Cost (Debt cost, Operational cost, Loan losses, equity costs), depth, breadth, length and 
scope. The proxies for depth were average loan amount (gross outstanding portfolio/number 
of active credit clients), gender bias and the percentage of female borrowers.  
This is disputed however by the work of Barry and Tacneng (2014) who also looked at the 
impact of governance factors and institutional quality on the outreach of MFIs but with a 
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focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. The study looked at 1400 observations drawn from 200 MFIs 
from 30 Sub Saharan African countries over a seven-year period (2001-2007), examining both 
the financial and social performance of MFIs. They looked at financial performance from two 
perspectives- profitability and efficiency. Profitability they measured using Return on Assets 
and the adjusted rate of Return on Assets. Efficiency was measured using the ratio of 
operating expenses to total loans.  For social performance, the study looked at both the depth 
and breadth (outreach) of service delivery. Their proxy for outreach was the log of active 
borrowers and clients while for depth they used the average loan balance over GNI per capita 
and the ratio of their female borrowers to total borrowers. The governance indicators they 
looked at were the MFI types of Non-Governmental Organizations, Cooperatives, Banks and 
Non-Banks. Control variables were size (natural log of MFI tot assets), age (natural log of age 
of MFI), loan (gross loan port: total assets), growth: log of real GDP per capita). The results of 
the study indicate that return on assets for NGOs is higher when compared to the other MFI 
forms but rank lower than Banks on adjusted return on assets. The results also indicate that 
NGOs outperform cooperatives and non-banks in converting expenses to loans. In term of the 
perspective, the results of the study indicate that NGOs reach deeper down the poverty line 
and have a larger proportion of female borrowers than the other MFI form. However, even 
though the NGOs attract more clients than cooperatives, results indicated that banks are able 
to cater to more people, apparently because they are able to take deposits. 
3.3.2 Country-level factors 
The country level factors usually fall into groups- macroeconomic and institutional quality. 
Vanroose (2008), used a cross-country analysis (a dataset covering 115 countries) to identify 
what factors explain why microfinance institutions are reaching more clients in some 
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countries than in others. The dependent variable used is the number of clients divided by the 
population. The independent variables used spanned three major areas: Policy, Geographical 
and Institutional. The policy variables he used were- GNI per capita, level of inflation, amount 
of international aid per capita (to proxy the international support), level of industry value 
added (to proxy the level of industrialization). The geographical variable was population 
density while the institutional variables were literacy rates (to approach the level of 
education) and colonial background dummies. As his control variables, he used the level of 
political stability and a corruption. His major data source used to assess the number of MFIs 
and the number of clients served by these institutions was the CGAP database in the time up 
2003. This dataset was augmented with data from the following agencies the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) and three other microfinance-rating agencies listed by the Rating 
Fund- MicroRate, PlaNet Rating and Microfinanza. This brought the data set to 2677 serving 
278,243,699 clients. His results indicate several things. First is that the microfinance sector is 
more present in the richer countries of the developing world than that of the poorer ones. In 
addition, microfinance reaches more clients in countries that receive more international 
support and that population density has a positive influence. This might explain why the 
sector is still underdeveloped in rural areas and that the level of industrialisation and inflation 
do not seem to influence microfinance outreach, while regional dummies do. 
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) in a cross-country survey using data for 114 MFIs from 62 
countries looked at the impact of regulation on MFI performance.  They used an empirical 
model specifying performance as a function of MFI-specific, regulatory, macroeconomic and 
institutional variables. Their result does not find any direct link with regulation to outreach. 
In other words, a MFIs being regulated or not does not affect its outreach.  
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Ahlin et al. (2011) investigated whether the success of MFIs is dependent on macro-economic 
and macro-institutional factors that are country specific. The focus was on operational self-
sufficiency and the loan portfolio growth of MFIs and the study used a broad range of 
variables to measure these. Operational Self-sufficiency was further broken down and the 
three variables used (and their proxies) are- financial revenue versus costs (operational self-
sufficiency, average interest rate, interest mark-up), default costs (loan loss expense rate and 
Portfolio-at-risk 30 days) and operating costs (cost per dollar loaned and cost per borrower). 
The variables for portfolio growth (and their proxies) were extensive growth (number of 
borrowers) and intensive growth (average loan size). These were used in a series of 
regressions, run against 21 independent variables chosen to represent the macro-economic 
and macro- institutional environments. The macro economic variables were: 
  Income,  
 Real per capita growth, 
  The workforce participation,  
 Manufacturing value-added to GDP ratio,  
 Private credit (domestic credit to the private sector divided by GDP),  
 Gini coefficient of inequality,  
 Inflation,  
 Net foreign direct investment inflows and remittances, as percentages of GDP; 
 The percent of population in rural areas and  
 The share of GDP from agriculture, services, and industry, respectively.  
To represent the macro-institutional environment they used private credit bureau coverage; 
2 variables from the World Governance Indicators- political stability and control of corruption 
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(estimates); 7 from Doing Business - procedures to start business, cost to start business, time 
to enforce contract, procedures to register property, time to register property, credit rights 
index and credit information index. The control variables were MFI institutional type, MFI age 
and three variables indicative of the MFI size via number of borrowers, average loan size and 
assets-to-loans ratio.  Their dataset was 2278 observations drawn from 373 MFIs from 74 
countries for 4 years (2004-2007). Of the six institutional factors, only two were found to have 
any significant effect on the social performance of MFIs. Greater government efficiency was 
shown to lead to smaller loan sizes while hampering increase in the number of clients or 
breadth of service. Control of corruption was found to lead to an increase in client base but 
seemingly had no effect on loan sizes. 
Muriu (2011) also explored the question as to whether the institutional environment of a host 
country, influences the performance of the microfinance Institutions in it. The study used a 
dataset of 2,004 observations drawn from 167 MFIs from the MIX for a 12-year period 
covering 1997 to 2008. To evaluate this, Return-on-Assets were regressed against a set of 
institutional variables. The institutional variables were estimates of the six World Governance 
Indicators already described in previous chapters of Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Rule of Law and the Control of 
Corruption. To gauge the complementary business environment, the study used two variables 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators- business freedom and Property rights. The 
MFI-specific control variables were capital (capital/assets), debt to equity ratio, deposits to 
assets, portfolio to assets, age of the MFI in years, MFI Size, Portfolio at Risk, Efficiency, Loan 
size, share of lending to women. The country specific control variables used were inflation 
expectations, per capita income growth, domestic credit to private sector and the rural 
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population Political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality, control of corruption and 
government effectiveness all showed strong, significant relationships with MFI profitability 
while Voice and Accountability did not. The results of the regressions/GMM Estimator 
generally indicate that a country’s institutional environment has significant impact on the 
profitability of MFIs operating in them. Specifically, the results indicate that on average, 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) are more profitable when there is political stability. Upon 
interaction with MFI age, the study indicated that political stability could make it more 
conducive for young MFIs to form relationships with reliable new borrowers. Rule of law was 
associated with greater MFI profitability while corruption makes it harder for MFIs to realize 
profits, irrespective of age. Well-developed institutions may therefore make it less costly for 
MFIs to operate in a fully compliant way. 
Whereas previous studies had looked at institutional quality as a side effect or in the context 
of different research questions, or used one or two elements to gauge the quality of 
institutions, the study by Müller and Uhde (2013) explicitly focuses on the impact of a broad 
set of institutional factors on the social and financial goals of MFIs. Their study examined 558 
MFIs drawn from 80 developing countries over a period of 6 years (2002-2007) giving 3348 
year end observations. Return on Assets (ROA) was the proxy for profitability, Operational 
Self Sufficiency (OSS) was the proxy for sustainability and the outstanding loan size per 
borrower/GDP per capita was the proxy for social success/outreach. The measures for 
external governance quality used were the estimate values (ranging from   -2.5 to +2.5) of the 
six World Governance Indicators. The control variables were GDP growth, annual inflation 
rates one period lagged, interest rates, British Legal origin, age, size and sources of funding. 
Their results as it relates to the size of loans first indicate a significant positive relationship at 
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the five-percent level. This implies that the better the institutional quality, the larger the size 
of the loans becomes. Secondly, they looked at the six governance indicators individually. 
They found significant positive relationships between four of these variables and profitability 
and sustainability. These are political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and government 
effectiveness. Of these four, three were to found to impact on loan size (outreach). These 
were political stability (at ten percent confidence level), regulatory quality (at ten percent 
confidence level and rule of law (at one per cent confidence level). No relationships were 
found between voice and accountability and control of corruption and any of the dependent 
variables. Another important outcome of their regression analysis was the effect of some of 
the control variables used on loan size.  The control variables found to impact on loan size 
were- competition, deposits, size and loans. The relationship with loan size and competition 
was found to be negative, implying that with an increase in competition, the smaller the loan 
sizes become. This, they said was as a result of larger financial institutions crowding out MFIs 
and leaving them to fight for ‘crumbs’, thereby reaching down to the poorer, unwanted or 
unserved clients. Microfinance institutions that accepted deposits were also found to be more 
likely to give out smaller loans. The authors suggested that providing savings accounts could 
principally be a means of attracting wealthier clients while rationing credit to the larger 
number of poorer clients.  Size had a significant positive impact on loans sizes with older MFIs 
tending to give larger loans. No explanation was offered for this observation by the authors. 
The control variable loans also led to larger loan sizes but it was not explained what this 
variable was (apart from that it was used as part of the business orientation matrix alongside 
capital ratio and deposits - to control for the differences in MFIs business concepts) nor the 
implication of its relationship on loan size. The variables of sources of finance, regulation, 
services and British legal origin although found to have some relationship with the 
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independent variables, the relationships were not found to be insignificant. As mentioned 
earlier, Barry and Tacneng (2014) looked at how governance and institutional quality factors 
affect MFI social and financial performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The proxies they used for 
institutional quality were government effectiveness, and rule of law from the World 
Governance Indicators and information sharing measured by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 
(2007).  Their results indicated that NGOS tend to lend to more people and lower down the 
poverty line than other MFI types, in environments where government effectiveness is low 
and there is weak rule of law, possibly because weak rule of law favours relationship-based 
transactions. However, when the institutional quality is strong, no difference was found 
between NGOs and other MFI governance types in terms of social performance. The average 
rule of law index is Sub-Saharan Africa was found to be negative and the NGOs were found to 
be better suited to lending in this environment as the average loan sized increased for the 
other governance types with lower values of the rule of law index.  
Manos and Tsytrinbaum (2014) looked at the role of culture in determining MFI financial and 
social performance looking at 852 MFIs (4545 observations) from 30 countries from between 
2000 and 2010. Financial performance was measured using the return on assets and 
operating self-sufficiency indices provided by MIX market and two proxies’ average loan 
balance and per cent of female borrowers. To gauge culture the study used the Global 
Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) indices of performance 
orientation, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, institutional collectivism, humane 
orientation, in-group collectivism, gender egalitarian and assertiveness. The used three sets 
of control variables- a set of institutional, a set of country and a set of complementary 
variables. The set of institutional control variables included age, regulation, profit status, 
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debt/capital ratio, PAR (30 days) and total expense/assets. The national control variables 
were GDP/capita growth, log GDP/capita, rural population share and regulatory quality and 
the complementary variables were used to control for financial performance and were 
operational self-sufficiency and return on assets. Depth in terms of average loan size was 
found to negatively relate to power distance, institutional collectivism and performance 
orientation are positively and significantly related to human orientation. This implies that in 
cultures with higher values of power distance, institutional collectivism and performance 
orientation, MFIs tend to reach lower down the poverty line and in cultures with higher 
human orientation ratings, MFIs look for richer clients.  Depth in the context of the percentage 
of women borrowers was found to be positively and significantly related to performance 
orientation and negatively and significantly related to in-group collectivism, performance 
orientation, gender egalitarianism, assertiveness and the control variables of regulation and 
profit status. 
3.3.3 Regional-level factors 
To the best of my knowledge, no study has focused on how regional factors affect lending 
practises of MFI’s. A major reason for this could be that it is difficult to isolate any factor as 
being specifically regional. The study by Vanroose (2008) had used regional dummies in the 
study of factors affecting breadth of microfinance, finding that regions that MFIs find 
themselves in determines their breadth of their services (i.e. how wide in terms of number of 
people they are able to reach).   
3.3.4 Global-level factors 
The fact that microfinance is a global phenomenon has seen Microfinance Institutions turn to 
both commercial banks, domestic and international capital markets, and international 
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investors to raise their funds. As such, microfinance institutions are no longer insulated from 
mainstream and global finance and their shocks (El-Zoghbi et al. 2011).  
Of the various global factors available such as wars and oil prices, the global financial crises of 
2007-2009 has been the one linked with microfinance.  Wagner and Winkler (2013) examined 
655 MFIs in 80 countries over the period 2000 – 2009 and found a significant strong negative 
relationship between the global financial crises and credit growth of MFIs especially those in 
the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region.  Furthermore, Wagner and Winkler (2013) point 
out that the effects of the recession that followed the last global crises were so deep and far 
reaching that even the flexible micro-entrepreneurs were seriously affected by it. Again, to 
the best of my knowledge, no study had linked the global factors to microfinance depth of 
outreach, a gap that this study will try to bridge.  
However, to understand why MFIs are not reaching down the poverty line and to gain better 
insight into what is being explained as ‘mission drift’ while taking into consideration 
environmental and other factors, a more appropriate theoretical framework would be 
required. One theory that fits this bill and has been used to explain mission drift, especially 
for social enterprises- is the institutional theory (Christopher Cornforth, 2014; Laville & 
Nyssens).  
3.4 Neo-Institutional Theory 
There is a need to understand how and why organizations (in this case MFIs) behave in a 
certain manner and the consequences of these behaviours and the field of study that seeks 
to answer these questions is organizational theory (Greenwood et al, 2013). Within the field 
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of organizational research, institutional theory covers the social context in which they operate 
and how they are influenced by their environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 2012). 
Over the past two decades, several strands began to evolve looking at the dynamics between 
the organizations and its environment from different perspectives. Such perspectives include 
the ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional theories (DiMaggio & Powell, 2012; Selznick, 1996). Even 
though the two schools of thought share basic, fundamental premises, such as the recognition 
of the significance of the environment in which an organization operates and the restrictions 
placed by institutions on the ability of organizations to behave rationally (DiMaggio & Powell, 
2012), they still differ in certain key areas relevant to this study. DiMaggio and Powell (2012) 
outlined some of the key differences between what has come to be known as the ‘old’ and 
‘new’ institutional theories. One of the key differences is that whereas the ‘old’ institutional 
theory places more emphasis on irrational informal structures and inter-organizational 
politics to explain why organizations act parochially, the new institutional theory explains 
these using the irrationality found in the formal structures. Also, in the old institutional 
theory, the organization is taken to be the unit as well as the loci of institutionalization and 
thus focuses on the characteristics of individual organizations while the new institutional 
theory on the other hand takes the sector or society to be the loci of institutionalization and 
looks at the similarity in formal structures across organizations. Essentially, the old 
institutional theory is definitional and focuses on more on markets and market forces while 
the new institutional theory looks at social actors and factors to explain how 
institutionalisation occurs (Scott, 1987).  
As this study is interested in comparing behaviour across societies, it leans more towards the 
new institutional theory, looking at the explanatory capacity of isomorphism to examine and 
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explain the problem of depth outreach in microfinance. However, as much as there appears 
to be transient differences in focus between the old and new institutional theories (Selznick, 
1996), institutional theory is still maturing and more analysts recognize the relevance and 
significance of meaning systems, symbolic elements, regulatory processes, and governance 
systems. There is also the recognition that there are overlapping similarities (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 2012; Samuels, 1990) and at some points, they converge (Scott, 2014) and this 
convergence around multiple themes is what Greenwood and Hinings (1996) called ‘neo-
institutional’ theory.  
Seen from the perspective of neo-institutional theory, the influence of the environment on 
the organization is subtler and unconscious to the organization, it permeates the organization 
and creates the lens through which its actors view the world and influences their thoughts 
and actions (DiMaggio & Powell, 2012). In neo-institutional theory, an institution refers to a 
set of common conceptions about what reality is and how different actors in different 
situations are expected to act. An institution is made up of well-established habitual systems 
that seldom are questioned. Additionally, institutions define identity and help in categorizing 
and classifying phenomena. Institutionalization describes how social processes, obligations or 
actualities become rules and norms in social thought and action (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Organization institutionalism is concerned with institutional processes at both the 
organizational level and the institutional level (Greenwood et al., 2013). 
Neo-institutional theory emphasizes the role of socio-cultural factors in legitimizing and 
defining what ideas and behaviours become acceptable to an organization, particularly deeply 
engrained ones (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  The social context within which an organization finds 
itself exerts influence on the organization. That context contains strong institutional rules that 
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will shape and define what would become appropriate and acceptable forms of behaviour for 
the organization. As such, to understand why an organization behaves in a certain way, the 
influence of this institutional context must be taken under consideration. Granovetter (1985) 
shows that markets are rooted in their local cultures and are a reflection of the value systems 
and historical background of these societies.  
These infusion of values is not a random act or process, especially when it happens within an 
organizational sector or as (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) calls it- organizational field. An 
organizational field is made up of key suppliers, product and resource consumers, regulatory 
bodies and other organizations offering similar products or services that when put together 
make up a recognised area of institutional life. Incongruent organizations come together to 
form these structural fields via a four-part process of structuration. In this process, there is 
first an increase in the level of interaction between the organizations in the field from which 
visible patterns of coalition and inter-organizational structures of dominance emerge. This is 
then followed by an increased load of information that the organizations have to deal with 
and cumulates with the organizations in this field having a sense of mutual awareness of the 
set of organizations involved in a common enterprise (DiMaggio, 1982;  DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). 
Following the formation of these organizational fields, the neo-institutional theory explains 
that forces arise that compel these organizations to behave in the same way – become 
homogenized. The extent of homogenization is such that even when an organization with the 
aim of improving performance introduces some form of innovation to set itself apart, two 
things happen. One is that the new practise becomes imbued with values that go beyond its 
predefined aims. The other is that as other organizations within the institutional field begin 
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to adopt the innovation; a threshold is reached beyond which adoption does more to provide 
legitimacy to the organization than it does to improve performance (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
It is a logical argument that competitive advantage that comes with the adoption of 
innovation is lost as the innovation spreads across the industrial field, however, its spreading 
is what makes it become ‘normal’ that organizations within that field adopt it and as such the 
cumulative effect of all the individual change is that they all remain similar. Innovation or 
organizational changes as used within this context refer to the organizational culture, goals, 
program, formal structure or mission and not necessarily technical change.  The process by 
which this homogenization occurs is called isomorphism of which there are two types- 
competitive and industrial. Competitive isomorphism is more interested in market 
competition and fails to holistically explain the modern world of organizations. As such it is 
better applied in studies looking to explain early adoption of innovation. Industrial 
isomorphism on the other hand,  which makes it appropriate for examining the political and 
ceremonial aspects of organizational life which this study is interested in. Industrial 
isomorphism occurs via three mechanisms- coercive, normative and mimetic.  
3.4.1 Coercive isomorphism:  
Coercive isomorphism is said to occur when external organizations or bodies (usually 
powerful agencies of the State) either persuade or compel organizations to adopt 
organizational elements or behave in a certain way ( DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Greenwood 
et al., 2013). This could be in the way of regulatory controls, or requirements imposed by 
suppliers or other members of the organizational field. Apart from the coercive changes 
arising from legislation, organizations could also make structural changes or alter practises as 
an organic response to changes in societal preference ( DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Even 
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though these organization changes due to coercive forces can to a large degree be 
ceremonial, they are still very significant as they signal to the various stakeholders in the 
organization that the organization is responsive to the preferences of the society in which it 
operates. By adhering to societal preferences, the organization is able to secure economic 
resources, influence and power (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Examples of coercive pressure and 
organizational responses are highlighted in Table 3-1 below.  
Table 3-1: Examples of coercive pressure and organizational responses include 
      Coercive Pressure Organizational Responses 
Government environmental regulations 
Manufacturers adopt new pollution control 
technologies to meet new standards 
New tax requirement 
Non-profits hire accountants and start maintain 
books 
Societal outcry on discrimination 
Organizations employ affirmative action officers 
to fend off discrimination allegations 
Societal concerns on ethical production 
Organizations such as Fairtrade to demonstrate 
ethical and sustainable behaviour 
 
3.4.2 Normative isomorphism:  
Normative isomorphism involves the diffusion of societal and organizational norms through 
training and socialization as well as the networks professionals develop through practise 
societies, educational activities, and common knowledge bases (Campion & Gadd, 2009). It 
occurs because organizations are driven to respect societal obligations (Greenwood et al., 
2013) and attempt to appear to be more professional or to conform to what is perceived and 
widely held as acceptable standards of professionalism ( DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) identified two major sources of normative pressures-universities and 
professional associations. 
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The universities ability to exert normative pressure is because they lay the foundations and 
define the norms and values of practise for each profession. Professional associations 
comprise of like-minded professionals who often determine what proper or ethical and 
professional behaviour is for their members (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). When 
organizations recruit managers from these universities or their managers belong to the same 
professional associations, they would be inclined to see the world through the same lens, 
accepting the same policies, structures and procedures and basically approaching decisions 
in the same way ( DiMaggio, 1991) 
Normative pressures stemming from professionalism are also diffused through the 
organization via the hiring practise of organizations- when they hire from the same pool or 
group of individuals. For instance, elite law firms, investment banks and consultancy firms in 
the United States recruit only from what is considered the top five universities- Harvard, Yale, 
Princeton, Stamford and Wharton, even though some of those responsible for recruiting were 
critical of the education offered by these elite schools (Rivera, 2011)– atypical case of culture 
and norms overriding logic and reason. 
3.4.3 Mimetic isomorphism:  
Mimetic isomorphism is driven by organizational uncertainty (Selznick, 1996) or by an 
organizations motivation by what they interpret to be the behaviour of other successful 
organizations (Greenwood et al., 2013). Certain organizations as a safety measure would tend 
to mimic what they believe to be rational behaviour in a bid not to appear out of touch 
happens as a result of uncertainty. Certain organizations as a safety measure would tend to 
mimic what they believe to be rational behaviour in a bid not to appear out of touch 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), implying the possibility that organizational adaptation is likely 
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more irrational than rational (Selznick, 1996). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three 
levels of uncertainty 
 When the technologies that am organization use are not properly understood 
 When the organizational goals are ambiguous and 
 When the environment creates symbolic uncertainty 
American manufacturers copying the management styles of Japanese manufacturers in 
attempt to improve their fortunes after a period of depression and the adoption of their 
colonial masters’ form of government by West African countries are two good examples of 
mimetic isomorphism. 
This typology is for analytical purposes and these three mechanisms are not always distinct 
empirically. Each of them occurs via a separate process, but it is possible for two or even three 
of them to occur simultaneously and their resultant effects may not always be clearly 
distinguishable (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). 
3.4.4 Neo-institutional Theory and Microfinance  
Understanding the relationship between MFIs and the environment they find themselves in 
would enable a more informed evaluation of MFIs and can help determine the role of 
microfinance in the bigger picture of economic development (Ahlin et al., 2011). Coercive, 
normative and mimetic isomorphic forcers are found in the institutional field of Microfinance.  
Coercive forces exist in the way of regulation for various countries. Regulations are developed 
with the aim of creating order and minimizing the effects of market failures. It does this by 
putting forth enforceable rules restricting or directing the actions of participants and 
consequently, altering the outcomes of their actions (Arun, 2005). Research looking at the 
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effects of regulation of MFIs and various measures of their performance yield varying results. 
For instance, the study of 2 regulated MFIs in Latin America indicated the benefits outweigh 
the costs while another study of regulated MFIs in Ghana observed the cost of regulating MFIs 
in that country exceeded the benefits (Steel & Andah, 2003). Yet, developing countries simply 
copy certain ‘best practises’ that are used by developed countries (Arun, 2005) even though 
has been shown that following these best practises does not mitigate the probability that a 
country would face a banking crises (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2004). This copying of what is 
perceived as best practises by MFIs in developing countries can also be ascribed to mimetic 
pressure if it is in response to uncertainty of what to do and a need to appear ‘in the know’. 
The argument that this thesis puts forward is that there are several distinct organizational 
fields that can be identified within the microfinance industry and these can be seen across 
the various geographical areas highlighted in the last chapter. The  premise of this research is 
that microfinance institutions and markets are entrenched in their local social norms and 
support socially acceptable positions. Therefore, the decision of what segment to lend to is 
not strictly a profit versus depth issue but one linked more towards the isomorphic forces at 
work in the organizational field. The next section will identify some of these forces from 
literature.  
3.4.4.1 Corporate Governance (Legal Charter/Governance Structure) 
As microfinance continues to grow globally, focus has been drawn to several issues. One has 
been the issues of contracts- innovative contracts were key to the early success of 
microfinance and are still key in its success in many places (Armendariz & Morduch, 2010; 
Conning, 1999; Navajas et al., 2000). There is also a need to protect investors and 
stakeholders as microfinance funds begin to run into millions of dollars (Hartarska, 2005) and 
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along these lines, regulation plays a key role (Hardy, Holden, & Prokopenko, 2003; Van 
Greuning, Gallardo, & Randhawa, 1998). These areas touch on mechanisms of corporate 
governance. The call for the sustanability of Microfinance Institutions has led to an increased 
interest in how they can be better managed to reach their goals of outreach and  good 
governance has been identified as a key driver for success (Rock, Otero, & Saltzman, 1998) 
and the lack of it as a major deterrent to its growth (CSFI, 2008; Labie, 2001).   
The goal of corporate governance is to inspire market confidence in the organization and it 
focuses on the political-legal frameworks by which the organization operates, legislation 
prohibiting certain behaviour and the capacity of frameworks to ensure compliance (Harrow, 
2011). In the context of NGOs, it can is can be defined as the structures for directing, 
controlling and holding organizations accountable (Cornforth, 2003). Generally, whether the 
organization is profit oriented or socially motivated, its corporate governance and its 
mechanisms are designed to ensure that shareholders and stakeholders are able to ensure 
their principal’s achiever the organizations missions (Hartarska, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). The affect of corporate governance on organizational performance via its various 
mechanisms (board size, ownershio strucutre etc) has been well dcoumented in research 
literature6.  
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007) explain that the lack of well-developed theory about 
the multi-dimensional and complex nature of corporate governance makes it difficult to 
determine the suitable structural models to use and whether the corporate governance 
mechanisms included in the model are the relevant ones. However, even though there is a 
                                                     
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provides a more comprehensive review of literature looking at the effects of 
corporate governance 
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debate as how best to capture the workings of corporate goeverance (Larcker et al., 2007), 
legal or ownership structure is of particular interest in the area of microfinance. This is 
because the decision-making strategies, policies and governance mechanisms of MFIs are 
determined by their ownership structure (Barry & Tacneng, 2014). These structures have 
evolved over time in response to the need to find a solution for access to finance for the poor. 
These legal charters covered in chapter 2 are the organizational forms that have been 
involved in microfinance and have come to be formally and legally recognized by 
governemnts. It can also be argued that the conceptual basis for using ownership structure 
lies on:  
 Modern microfinance started with NGOs with a social mission and the calls for 
adopting commercial logics makes a case for mission drift. It has been argued that 
NGOs are better suited to reach lower down the poverty line because they emphasize 
their social role over their financial performance (Dichter, 1996; Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
Serrano-Cinca, & Mar Molinero, 2009) 
 The policy and regulatory changes occurring in the industry are geared towards and 
directly affect ownership structures.  
 With neo-institutional theory, an organizations form is not seen as a rational system 
for coordinating activities or explained using transaction costs theories. Instead, it is 
seen assumed that the formal structure is a product of institutionalization from 
internal and external forces and is a reflection of predominant societal concepts as to 
how work should be organized (Scott, 1987; Selznick, 1996). Thus the effects of 
isomorphic forces would be best captured by ownership structure.  
  
85  
  
There is a push to have ‘best practises’ styles of MFI governance adopted internationally  and 
by developing countries in particular (Helms, 2006b; Otero & Chu, 2002; Rock et al., 1998). 
This push to copy the governance structures and mechanisms of developing countries leads 
to  mimetic pressures on MFIs and the push for more regulation exerts coercive presures. 
Organizations within the microfinance institutional field are also exerting isomorphic 
pressures on MFIs. A typical case are the activities of the Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP). CGAP is an organization formed by the largest aid agencies in conjunction with 
partner networks, funders, and microfinance institution has by using training, publications 
and advocacy built an almost universal consensus around certain microfinance issues such as 
regulation and supervision, financial reporting, disclosure and product pricing (Gutiérrez-
Nieto et al., 2009; Helms, 2006b). Combining this with their research and operational tools, 
they have helped professionalize microfinance across the world  Their Key Principles of 
Microfinance have been recognized and supported by governments all over the developing 
world and as well as by the Group of 8 industrial nations. It is the CGAP that created the 
Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), for MFIs to report their perfomance and metrics 
to create a picture of transparency, sustainability, and growth. As a result of the success of 
MIX, mainstream rating agencies themselves are starting to include  microfinance institutions 
in their reviews (Helms, 2006b). By facilitating the professionalization of the microfinance 
industry, CGAP has become an instrument of normative isomorphic pressure and by 
influencing national governments to adopt some of its policy recommendations, has also 
become an instrument of coercive pressure.  
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3.4.4.2 Culture 
Erez and Early (1993) point out that the sociocultural dynamics formed within an organization 
that become its culture are not formed independently of external sociocultural influences. 
Rather, organizational culture develops as a function of the societal cultural values, norms, 
and codes of communication. Zucker (1977) and Zucker (1983) mention pressure from 
implemented institutional elements coming from within the organization itself or from 
imitating other similar organizations. The neo-institutional theory explains how culture by 
way of isomorphism shapes organizational behaviour via cultural scripts, beliefs, symbols and 
rituals, and the like (DiMaggio, 1982;  DiMaggio, 1991;  DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987). 
Suchman and Edelman (1996) go further to say that organizations, just like humans, could 
develop habits, experience shame and stigma, respond to ethics and customs or consider the 
legality of their actions.  
Microfinance is deeply rooted in the cultural contexts of where it is being practised. Chapter 
2 traced the development of microfinance pre-Yunus/Grammeen Bank and illustrated the rich 
cultural contexts of religion, tribal practises, economic contexts and socio-economic 
stratifications that affected interest rates, loan products, punishments for defaulters and 
service delivery. Post Yunus/Grameen Bank, microfinance institutions across the world have 
tried to apply the Grameen Bank model. However, the cultural context in which the Grameen 
Bank was developed and deployed is different than that of a lot of other countries and as 
Auwal (1996) showed, the model had to be adapted culturally to be able to work in the United 
States (The Good Faith Fund) and Malaysia (Amanah Ikhtiar).  The Good Faith Fund for 
instance made several changes- making the group size flexible, changing the loan period from 
a one-year period to three months, six months and one-year loans (repaid at the market 
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interest rates). They also did away with the gender segregation, allowing members to have 
one immediate relative their group and meeting bi-monthly instead of weekly (Auwal, 1996). 
In the Gonja community of Ghana, the problem with microfinance is the change it brings to 
gender roles, which are culturally and religiously constructed through socialisation, with men 
having a higher social standing than women do. In such areas, anything that would lead to a 
change in the status quo, which is likely to affect men, would be difficult to accept (Kessey, 
2005). Epstein and Yuthas (2010) identified that some regions have cultures of non-
repayment, thereby making them more difficult to lend to and requiring that different 
management strategies be developed that takes into consideration the unique characteristics 
of these regions. 
To be able to compare differences in the elements of culture, and to determine what 
elements affect the delivery of microfinance, standard measures are needed. This is where 
cultural dimensions come in.  
3.4.4.2.1 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory 
Aristotle in his Politika published in 328BC said: 
“Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is unsocial naturally and 
not accidentally is either beneath our notice or more than human. Society is 
something that precedes the individual. Anyone who either cannot lead the 
common life or is so self-sufficient as not to need to, and therefore does not 
partake of society, is either a beast or a god” 
Twenty-five centuries after this statement was made, man’s social nature has been observed 
and measured through different sciences. Neuroscience has shown that there are mirror 
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neurons in the brain whose sole purpose is to improve man’s awareness of others by either 
sharing feelings or learning by imitating. Physiology and biology offer evidence that the 
human ear is tuned more to human voices than to any other sound, that facial muscles 
common to every human being are those required to for communicating the basic six 
emotions of sadness, happiness, disgust, anger, surprise and fear. Additionally, the human 
sciences explain how our perception of the world is governed by our social interactions and 
how, by attaching social meaning to modes of informal communication, our day-to-day 
behaviour is shaped. These thoughts are echoed in the works of anthropologists who believed 
that societal groups (whether they be modern or traditional) all face the same basic 
challenges and differ only in the way they solve these issues. A sociologist and psychologist, 
Inkeles and Levinson (1954) identified the following as the basic global challenges faced by 
every society as well as the groups and individuals in them: 
 How they relate with authority 
 How they perceive themselves especially their relationship with the larger society and 
how they perceive masculine and feminine behaviour.  
 How they deal with issues of conflict, include how they express feelings and control 
aggression.  
These assumptions formed the premise of the research on national culture carried out by Dr. 
Geert Hofstede in 1980.  
Based on Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010) culture can be defined as the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people 
others. Markus and Kitayama (1991) explain that people from different cultures are likely to 
have distinctively different views on the concepts of self, others, and of the interdependence 
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of the self with others. These views or constructs tend to influence, and in many cases actually 
determine, the very nature of the individual’s experiences in life including the cognitive, 
emotive and motivational learning processes of learning from their experiences. To further 
illustrate the point of how different cultures shape the behaviour of different people, Markus 
and Kitayama (1991) gave an example of the Asian and American cultures. They noted that 
most of the Asian cultures idea on individuality emphasises on attending to others, fitting in, 
and harmonious interdependence with each other. The American culture on the other hand 
is quite the opposite. The culture does not support or encourage such closeness between 
individual members of the society but instead people within this culture tend to preserve their 
own independence by focusing on themselves and on discovering and expressing their unique 
inner characteristic traits.  
As people became more aware of the effect of culture on people, groups and organizations 
there grew an increasing need to develop a framework to allow of studying it and undertaking 
cross-cultural national and organizational studies. One of the most significant and pioneering 
solutions to this was the Hofstede Cultural Dimensions. The data for the Hofstede research 
came from a database of questions from an IBM staff survey containing 116,000 
questionnaires administered twice (first in 1968 and then in 1972) to matching samples of 
IBM employees based in 50 countries in 3 regions. The questionnaire contained 150 questions 
out of which only 32 standardized attitude and value survey questions were utilized for the 
analysis. The questions chosen were those that focused on the respondent’s worldview and 
those that highlighted the differences in the countries in the two time periods in which the 
questionnaire was administered. The questionnaire was then administered to several 
occupational groups (managerial, technical, professional, and clerical) within each country 
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and scores determined for each question based on answers collected from a constant mix of 
seven questionnaires drawn from these groups. The average score was then calculated from 
the two time periods. The unit of analysis was at the country level and so 40 different groups 
of questionnaires were examined using both relevant theories and statistical relationships. 
The results yielded four dimensions that were expressed as indices. There were originally 67 
countries in the data bank, but 27 were left out of the analysis because more than half of the 
necessary occupational data was from fewer than eight respondents. Also, each country had 
to have a minimum of 50 respondents to qualify for the analysis, for each of the two survey 
rounds, so this reduced the initial data set of 67 countries to 40. 10 more countries were later 
added when they met the minimum requirements at a later stage bringing the country count 
to 50.  
The results confirmed the theory put forward by Inkeles and Levinson (1954), with 
respondents indicating that the common problems faced by them all were issues surrounding 
 Their relationship as individuals with the larger groups they found themselves in 
 How they relate with authority and issues of social inequality 
 The implications (social and emotional) of being born male or female within that 
society and their perceptions of gender and gender roles and characteristics.  
 How they handle ambiguity and uncertainty. These in turn are linked to how they 
express their emotions and how they control aggression.  
These findings were grouped into what has come to known as the four basic dimensions of 
culture- power distance (ranging from small to large), individualism (versus collectivism), 
uncertainty avoidance and masculinity (versus femininity) and are explained below. 
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Power Distance Index (PDI) 
This describes the degree to which inequalities are accepted by the citizens of a 
country. In those countries that have a higher degree of power distance, these 
inequalities are expected and accepted by the less powerful members of that society. 
On the other hand, in countries where the power distance index is low, the people 
believe in minimizing these inequalities and strive for equal power distribution, 
demanding justification for inequalities of power. Societies with high power distance 
would be more stratified economically, socially, and politically with those with power 
or authority expecting, and receiving, obedience. As such, organizations within these 
societies would be characterized by the by the abuse and use of power for personal 
gain, a lack of equal opportunities for minorities and women, and a lack of 
opportunities for personal or professional development for their staff (Abate, Borzaga, 
& Getnet, 2014). Managers in high power distance countries are less likely to consider 
people of lower ranking to them or the concerns of the public. On the other hand, 
research indicates that social enterprises are more likely to develop in cultures with 
low power distance (Dorfman et al, 2012).  
Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV) 
The individualism index looks at the level of integration between the people within 
any given society.  Countries with high individualism scores place more emphasis on 
themselves and their immediate families while those with low individualism scores 
(otherwise said to be collectivistic) live within a tightly knit social framework. Erez and 
Somech (1996) pointed out that residents in urban areas tend to exhibit more 
individualistic behaviour than those in rural areas which Griffin (2010) highlighted as 
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a hindrance to joint lending as It is easier to overcome adverse selection in rural areas 
where people have better information on their neighbours due to the more 
collectivistic culture. However, the research of Postelnicu and Hermes (2015) indicate 
that individualism is positively affects both the percentage of female borrowers and 
depth of outreach using average loan size. 
Masculinity versus Femininity (MAS) 
This index captures the differences in gender roles and expectation as expressed by 
different societies. Countries with high masculinity scores tend to exhibit traits that 
are more assertive and competitive, celebrating achievement and abhorring failure 
whereas countries with low masculinity scores (said to be feminine cultures) place a 
higher value on modesty, caring and nurturing and encouraging affiliation. This index 
is seen in countries that emphasize competition and offer opportunities for increased 
pay, promotion and recognition on a merit based system (Newman & Nollen, 1996)  
High masculine cultures emphasize the differences between gender roles, men having 
stereotypically masculine roles and women, feminine ones. In high masculinity 
cultures women may not be treated as equals and hence they may not be allowed to 
take on roles the culture considers masculine. 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) 
Uncertainty avoidance (and research using this index) look to measure the level of 
discomfort that members of a society associate with unpredictable or unknown 
situations (Dorfman et al., 2012; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010) and how they 
behave within such an environment. It has been shown that the higher the level of 
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uncertainty (countries with high uncertainty avoidance scores) the more averse to risk 
the members of that society would likely be and to alleviate this uncertainty would 
follow engage in such behaviour that would provide greater stability (Hofstede, 1991).  
In 2010, working with Michael Minkov, the third edition of third edition of Cultures and 
Organizations: Software of the Mind (Hofstede et al., 2010) was published with the addition 
of two more indices were added to the original cultural dimensions 
Long Term Orientation (LTO) versus Short Term Normative Orientation  
The measure of Long term orientation was added to gauge how members of a society 
plan and deal with the future. With cultures that have high values of long term 
orientation, they are more comfortable and certain, prioritizing long term planning 
over short term concerns, taking actions that improve their future prospects. Cultures 
exhibiting long term orientation shun quick fixes and place value on patience, 
persistence, obedience, a sense of duty, seeking the greater good and respecting 
elders and ancestors (Newman & Nollen, 1996). However, for countries with low long 
term orientation scores (otherwise known as short term normative orientation), the 
struggle is to survive and as such they focus on short instead of long term investments 
and show a preference for immediate (as opposed to long term) returns.  
 Indulgence (IND) versus Restraint  
This index is relatively complementary (weakly negatively correlated) to Long term 
Orientation and looks at the degree to which a society permits its members the comparative 
freedom to pursue the gratification of basic and natural human desires associated with the 
enjoyment of life and pleasure. In countries that are highly indulgent, people are free to 
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pursue pleasure and gratification while in countries that have lower indulgence scores 
(restraint), gratification is controlled and/or regulated via strict societal norms and 
regulations (Hofstede, 2011; G. Hofstede et al., 2010) 
Some level of correlation was found between power distance and individualism, although 
negatively correlated (r = 0.67 across 40 countries), have been maintained as separate 
dimensions for conceptual reasons. When, later, ten more countries and three regions were 
added, the index scores for these supplementary units were calculated according to the 
formulas derived from the first and larger 40 units. Adding these new units did not 
substantially change the structure of the dimensions (Hofstede, 1983). 
The index scores of the countries on the dimensions have been validated based on the 
significant correlation found to exist between them and the results of about 40 other existing 
comparative studies. The four dimensions considered are related to very fundamental 
problems which every human society or group faces and to which they have found different 
answers to. They are used to explain  
 The different ways of in which organizations or nations are organized.  
 The various innovations within organizations, and  
 The various challenges that people and organizations face within their society.  
The questionnaire used for the IBM study (now improved on and updated and known as the 
Values Survey Modules or VSMs) has been used in various other studies trying to replicate 
the work of Hofstede and these studies confirm his findings and the cultural dimensions. The 
original country list has been updated from 40 to 93 and three regions were also added- Arab 
speaking, West Africa and East Africa (Hofstede, 1982, 1983; G. Hofstede et al., 2010) 
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3.4.4.2.2 Criticisms of Hofstede Cultural Dimensions 
The IBM survey carried out by Hofstede was the first study on culture carried out on that scale 
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1997) highlighted several criticisms of Hofstede’s 
research and the cultural dimensions. Using the United States of America for an example, an 
Individualism score on the Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions of 91, would imply that country is 
a highly individualist society and as such not group or community oriented. However, this 
could be misleading as Americans tend to form more voluntary associations than any other 
country in the world, have more publications centred on team work and of the developed 
nations, has the largest church membership. As such, argue that culture is not as linear as 
Hofstede (1980) makes it out to be but is rather circular.  
In spite of all these criticisms, Hofstede Cultural Dimension theory continues to be of 
relevance and used in research. It is usual that after a publication has been put out for the 
number of citations it has to peak in the 3rd to fifth year after its publication date and 
subsequently declining till it gets to a steady state which is usually about 10 years after 
publication (Gamble, O'Doherty and Hyman, 1987). Baskerville (2003) analysed the Hofstede 
(1980) work and found that instead of declining, and in spite of the heavy criticism it has come 
under, there seems to be no decrease in the citation rate. On the contrary, it seems to be 
increasing, mostly in areas outside the mainstream social sciences such as the areas of 
organizational studies, psychology, management and the behavioural sciences. This is likely 
an indication that it meets a certain need in these areas where it is used. Baskerville (2003) 
further highlighted that these areas focus on how individuals respond to problems or stimuli 
and as such are frequently embroiled in debates of the nature vs nurture kind. This is 
reflective of the nature of this study and informs the belief that the Hofstede Cultural 
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Dimensions is a reliable tool for measuring the effects of culture within the context of this 
study. 
3.4.4.3 Institutional Quality 
The institutions and the institutional environment are key concepts attached to institutional 
theory. Institutional elements are usually external to the organizations and are strong enough 
to cause change in organizations (Zucker, 1987). Institutions are symbolic and social systems 
that collectively form regulatory mechanisms that define human interactions and structures 
the incentives in their political, social and economic exchanges (Aagaard, 2011; Henisz & 
Delios, 2015; Law & Azman-Saini, 2012; Levchenko, 2007; Scott, 2014) and is formed naturally 
as a result of social needs and pressures (Selznick, 1957).  The institutions could be either 
formal or informal, with formal institutions creating the formal rules -laws, constitutions and 
property rights- and the informal institutions creating codes of behaviours (such as norms), 
conventions, traditions, taboos and customs (Law & Azman-Saini, 2012). 
The institutional environment exerts regulatory and normative pressures applied on 
organizations by professions and the state or society. It includes political institutions such as 
the national structure of policymaking, regulation and adjudication; economic institutions 
such as the structure of the national factor markets and the terms of access to international 
factors of production; and socio-cultural institutions such as informal norms (Wade, 
Swaminathan, Wade, & Swaminathan, 2015). These institutional environments define and 
restrict the social reality of the organizations operating within them creating a need for the 
organizations need to conform to the characteristic rules and requirements of these 
institutional environments in order to obtain support and legitimacy. Not taking their 
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influence into consideration is to ignore significant causal factors that shape organizational 
structures and practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987).  
The overall political and economic environment of a country affects how microfinance is 
provided in that country as the economic and social policies of the government influence 
microfinance organizations in the delivery of financial services to the poor (CGAP, 1996). For 
instance, the regulatory frameworks exert coercive pressure on microfinance institutions that 
could be either positive or negative.  Regulation is the implementation of public policies by 
coercive government power that affects market outcomes (Chaves & Gonzalez-Vega, 1994) 
and the regulatory framework are mechanisms put in place to protect depositors, avoid 
financial crises and to encourage competition and efficiency within the sector (CGAP, 1996; 
Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1994). However, when the regulatory framework leads to 
imposed interest rate ceilings and tax structures that discourage investments; this could 
result in financial repression (CGAP, 1996). Five key things recommended as the barest 
minimum issues to be considered when supervising or regulating MFIs by CGAP (1996) - 
Minimum capital requirements, asset quality, capital adequacy, liquidly requirements and 
portfolio diversification. Enforcing these puts both coercive (in form of regulation), mimetic 
(copying of best practises) and normative (CGAP encourages professionalism) pressures on 
MFIs.  
The capacity of the legal framework to ensure effective contract enforcement is key to the 
delivering of microfinance. Even though most MFIs do not require collateral and as such are 
not particularly concerned with the ability to repossess a defaulter’s assets, a strong legal 
system that allows defaulters to be prosecuted can act as a deterrent for would be defaulters. 
The ability of courts to uphold and enforce these contracts also facilitates lending 
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(Ledgerwood, 1998). Also, properly articulated property rights and good contract laws helps 
to reduce the costs of both exchange and production transactions, which in turn frees up 
resources that can be invested in areas where it is needed (Gwartney, Holcombe, & Lawson, 
2004; Ledgerwood, 1998). Politically, general instability, corruption, civil war, party or tribal 
rivalries affect the country economically. There are also psychological and social effects -their 
future outlook, where they want to invest, what they are willing to invest in and their attitude 
to risk are all affected by the political institutional environment (Ledgerwood, 1998). 
The quality of these institutions varies from country to county and from region to region and 
has been shown to account for cross-country differences in various areas. These areas include 
flow of trade (Levchenko, 2007), income and growth (Gwartney et al., 2004), Monetary 
policies for developing countries (Huang & Wei, 2006), Bilateral Trade Patterns (De Groot, 
Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 2004) and the adoption of organizational practices by the 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (Kostova & Roth, 2002).        
3.5 Hypothesis Development  
The institutional environment via coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism influences 
the behaviour of organizations (DiMaggio, 1982;  DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 2012). Connecting 
the empirical evidence with the theoretical arguments,  
This thesis proposes the following hypotheses to answer the research question: 
3.5.1 Hypothesis 1: Global Effects 
Financial stress, defined as periods of impaired financial intermediation, has been shown to 
transmit from developed countries to emerging economies, with the extent of transmission 
associated with the depth of financial linkages between the developed and developing 
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economies (Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag, & Tytell, 2011). With funds for MFIs coming 
from both domestic and international capital markets and with the lack of insulation from 
mainstream and global finance and their shocks (El-Zoghbi, Gähwiler, & Lauer, 2011), the first 
hypothesis postulates that 
H1: Global Factors affect the depth of outreach 
H1a: H1 is not true 
3.5.2 Hypothesis 2: Regional Effects 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor is a global partnership made up of over 30 leading 
organizations with the aim of advancing financial inclusion. They do this by developing 
innovative solutions through practical research and active engagement with financial service 
providers, policy makers, and funders (CGAP, 2018).  They have grouped the developing 
countries into regions that share similar cultural and religious (like the MENA areas) and 
historical traits. CGAP exerts pressure by influencing policy across these regions. As such:  
H2: The Region an MFI is located affects its depth of outreach 
The developing countries used in this study are grouped into six regions. Each region has its 
own unique set of characteristics and the argument is that each region exerts different forces 
on the MFIs in them. As such, it is expected that the behaviours of these MFIs will differ. 
Breaking down the second hypothesis across regions gives six sub-hypothesis 2a to 2f 
H2a: Locating an MFI in Africa affects its depth of outreach 
H2b: Locating an MFI in East Asia and the Pacific affects its depth of outreach 
H2c: Locating an MFI in Eastern Europe and Central Asia affects its depth of outreach 
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H2d: Locating an MFI in Latin America and the Caribbean affects its depth of outreach 
H2e: Locating an MFI in Middle East and North Africa affects its depth of outreach 
H2f: Locating an MFI in South Asia affects its depth of outreach 
H2g: Alternative to any of the above is true 
3.5.3 Hypothesis 3: Country Effects 
According to the neo-institutional theory, organizations would adapt to their environment, 
therefore, MFIs in a corrupt country will find a way to survive and respond differently than 
those who have less corruption. The isomorphic forces are exerted by formal institutions 
expressed as laws, constitutions and property rights, (Law & Azman-Saini, 2012) and 
organizations conform to them in a bid to gain legitimacy (Scott, 2014). Vanroose (2008) 
found the microfinance sector stronger in developing countries with stronger economies, 
Ahlin, Lin, and Maio (2011) found the efficiency of the government and the control of 
corruption to affect size of loans, Muriu (2011) found political stability, corruption and rule of 
law all affecting MFI profitability. (Müller & Uhde, 2013) found political stability, regulatory 
quality and rule of law to affect depth of outreach. This leads to the hypothesis: 
 As such, the hypothesis:  
H3: The Country an MFI is located in affects its depth of outreach 
H3a: H3 is not true 
 
 
  
101  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MFI 
LENDING 
DECISION 
Low End Market 
(Microenterprises) 
High End and Small 
Business Markets 
Broad End Market 
GLOBAL 
FACTORS 
COMPANY 
FACTORS 
COUNTRY 
FACTORS 
REGIONAL 
FACTORS 
Coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphic pressures 
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3.6 Conclusion 
The primary aim and mission of MFIs from their inception was to provide small loans to the 
poor, to reach the unreached. With evidence indicating that these loans are not flowing down 
to those who need it, there has been research devoted to understanding why. The reason 
proffered vary and are inconsistent.  Some place the blame on the call for MFIs to adopt 
commercial logics in order to be more sustainable while others look to the restrictiveness of 
regulatory rule. However, adopting the neo-institutional theory as a framework for this 
research highlights the following factors: First, that there are distinct institutional and socio-
economic forces combining to apply pressure on Microfinance Institutions internally and 
externally, that have the power to override what would appear to be logical business 
decisions or organizational logics. Secondly, that these coercive, normative and mimetic 
pressures occur through separate processes, they and their resultant effects are not always 
empirically distinguishable and two or even three of them might even occur simultaneously ( 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Equally, the governance structures, national 
cultures and institutional quality of various countries have been identified as sources of 
isomorphic pressure and influence MFI behaviour but also may not always independently. For 
instance, CGAPs push to have the governance structures and mechanisms of MFIs in 
developing countries copied exerts mimetic pressures on MFIs and when these polciies are 
adopted by governments, coercive presures is exerted on MFIs. CGAP also carries out training 
programs and tries to set the standard for professional conduct i.e. normative pressure. All 
these take place against a cultural backdrop that varies from region to region. Neo-
institutional theory allows us to take into consideration these various levels and areas in 
which pressure is being applied to MFIs to behave in a particular way and as such lends itself 
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as an apprpriate tool to understand why they are not reaching lower down the poverty line 
and the determinants of microfinance outreach.    
This chapter also reviewed the empirical evidence examining the factors affecting depth of 
outreach and found these studies lack a consensus in their findings. The empirical review also 
highlighted that although there have been several studies looking at how global factors such 
as the financial crises of 2007-2009 affects growth of credit and regional factors affect breadth 
of outreach, there has been no study linking these directly to depth of outreach- studies have 
been concentrated on company and country specific factors. The hypotheses for this research 
were then developed using the neo-institutional theory with an understanding of how the 
environment exerts pressure on organizations (specifically MFIs) and the nature of these 
forces. These factors were grouped into company, country, regional and global factors. The 
next chapter explains what variables have been chosen to proxy these factors/forces and how 
they will be used to answer the research questions.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
Building on the proceeding chapters’ review of empirical literature and the hypothesis 
developed, this chapter discusses the methodology and data by which the hypotheses will be 
tested. It makes an argument for an objectivist ontology and positivist epistemology in the 
analysis of depth of outreach, and for a micro-ethnographic methodology to answer the 
research questions. It argues that ethnographic methods will best enable the role of social 
norms within the microfinance market to be explored in depth, as well as provide the market 
participants’ perspectives on the effectiveness of the formal constitutional and operational 
rules.  
The chapter is subdivided into seven sections. Section 4.2 looks at the other research methods 
that used in related studies and the problems with them. Section 4.3 discusses the design of 
this thesis by exploring the ontology, epistemology, research methods and describing the 
model used for this study. Section 4.4 then looks at the data used for the study, breaking it 
down to source and some descriptive statistics. Section 4.5 then explains the dependent and 
independent variables, section 4.6 looks at the Robustness tests and other tests and statistical 
methods used in this study and section 4.7 concludes this chapter.  
4.2 Research Methods in Microfinance 
Several methods have been employed in research examining the factors that affect the depth 
of outreach. Hartarska (2005), Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), Mersland and Strøm (2008),  
Vanroose (2008), Ahlin et al. (2011), Muriu (2011),  Müller and Uhde (2013),  Assefa, Hermes, 
and Meesters (2013), Barry and Tacneng (2014), Manos and Tsytrinbaum (2014) all use 
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regression analysis. The regression analysis is used to try and determine if a relationship exists 
between two variables (Wooldridge, 2015).  Gujarati (2003) explains that the relationship 
explored is usually one of dependence and regression analysis is to enable the prediction 
and/or estimation of the mean of the dependent variable in terms of the known or fixed 
values of the independent variable. These studies all sought to establish causal link to depth 
of outreach and have looked at several factors – governance, institutional, macro-economic, 
cultural and so forth.  Hartarska (2005) and Barry and Tacneng (2014) used random effects 
models while Ahlin et al. (2011), Muriu (2011) and Assefa et al. (2013) used linear regressions 
all with single dependent variables. Mersland and Strøm (2008) used a logit model to look at 
the ownership effects on a range of MFI performance indicators (including depth of outreach). 
However, the use of the one dependent variable to measure depth of outreach in their 
research has led to a problem of explaining their results as there exists explanation outside 
their model that can explain their results- upscaling of customers, urbanization etc. 
This study along the same vein is exploring the dependent relationship but instead of using 
loan size as the singular dependent variable, this study will use target markets in a logit 
regression to determine the probability that an MFI would lend to a certain group above 
another. This solves the problems highlighted by Schreiner (2001) in the use of loan size as a 
measure of depth of outreach in that even though the use of target markets are still based on 
loans size, it is no longer as an absolute measure of poverty but a relative measure. The results 
of using the target market as ordinal scales in a logit regression will be the probability of an 
MFI picking one sector above the others.  
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4.3 Research Design  
In designing research, there are four main things that need to be considered- the 
epistemology, the philosophical position, the methodology and the procedures and 
techniques used in collecting the data for the research (Crotty, 1998). Closely associated with 
the epistemology is a fifth consideration- the ontology. Following is a description of all five as 
they relate to my research. 
4.3.1 Ontology 
The ontological questions of any research arise in an attempt to understand the nature of the 
subject matter or phenomenon under examination.  It evaluates whether it is possible to 
examine social constructs separately and objectively and their reality evaluated independent 
of the realities of the researcher. The two main ontological positions identified by Bryman 
(2012) are objectivism and constructionism. An objectivist position believes that social 
phenomena and their meaning exist independent of social actors or according to Crotty 
(1998, p. 8) “That tree in the forest is a tree, regardless of whether anyone is aware of its 
existence or not”. This study holds it that organisations are real objects with a reality external 
to the people that form it and it can influence the behaviour of the people in it to act in a 
certain way. This view is held by objectivists regarding culture, which is considered to be 
sources of generally shared values and customs. Culture and societies, like organisations, are 
considered to have the characteristics of an object and therefore have an objective reality 
(Hatch, 1993; Moran).  In this study, meaning is derived from the measurement of the data 
collated, believing that the meaning of truth and knowledge lies in the objects themselves 
and is not subject to interpretation (Crotty 1998).   It has nothing to do with the interaction 
between participants and their experiences. As such, the epistemological stance for this 
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research approach was objectivist, as the focus is more on measurements than the meaning 
people derived from their interactions as would be the case if a constructivist view was 
adopted.   
4.3.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology provides a philosophical foundation to help in deciding what kinds of 
knowledge are possible (Crotty, 1998; Maynard, Maynard and Purvis, 1994) and relates to 
what the researcher considers knowledge to be (Collis & Hussey, 2009; Crotty, 1998). The 
epistemological stance of a research affects how it is designed, its data collection methods 
and how its outcomes are interpreted.  An objectivist ontology is usually linked with a 
positivist epistemology. The positivist epistemology applies the methods of natural science, 
assuming that the external world is objective, existing independent of human observation and 
pliable to measurement (Bryman, 2015; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011). The positivist 
approach works on the belief that the researcher is objective, not personally involved, does 
not influence the outcome in any way but rather is limited collecting, measuring and 
interpreting data. This process is easily observable and when repeated will give the same 
results. The data used for this research is historical data of a quantitative nature and 
econometric analyses will be used to test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter- 
all falling within the positivist sphere. 
4.3.3 Research Methods 
Creswell and Creswell, (2017) highlight that often times the nature of enquiry and/or the 
nature of the data determine the method of inquiry or procedures in which the phenomenon 
is addressed. In the post positivist scenario this study finds itself, the procedure involves the 
  
108  
  
development of a hypothesis and the collection of data to support or refute the hypotheses 
and analysis using statistical procedures (Creswell, 2017).  As the nature of the study is to 
establish a relationship between two variables (geographic locations and depth of outreach), 
a regression would be appropriate.  
With simple and multivariate linear regression models, it is assumed that the relationship 
between independent and the dependent variables (or explanatory and outcome variables) 
is a linear relationship. In other words, for every unit increase in the independent variable, 
there would be a change of some fixed number of units in the dependent variable. As related 
to this study, it would imply that for every unit microfinance institution located in a specific 
geographic location, that the number of people receiving loans would either increase or 
decrease by a set number.  
(Dey, 1993) have made an argument for the suitability of linear regression analysis. They 
argue that it has found a much more wider use and is better understood method than either 
probit or logistic methods and that it is known to be robust under  widely  varying conditions 
where its classical assumptions have been violated. They also argue that computer software 
available for regression analyses generally has more extensive and sophisticated options than 
can be found in software designed for running probit analysis or logistic regression. As valid 
as these reasons might be, the main issue here is that the dependent variable in this study is 
a discontinuous categorical variable and not a continuous variable, and as such, a linear 
function cannot be used. Of the non-linear functions available – logit and probit regressions 
lend themselves to use in dichotomous responses.  Logit regressions let researchers perform 
regressions on data when the dependent variable is either qualitative in nature or not a 
continuous interval level variable (Walsh, 1987). 
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In addition, using a linear regression, there is a possibility of violating basic probability 
assumptions. That is, estimated probabilities could be higher than 1 or less than 0 (e.g.  
Wooldridge (2015, p 526)). Logit model employs a logistic transformation to ensure that the 
estimated probabilities do not violate basic assumptions and fall within acceptable range. An 
alternative approach would be employing a probit model, which employs a different 
transformation technique to keep probabilities within the appropriate range and delivers 
similar results.  
The use of the logit regression does not come without its drawbacks. For one, the results from 
this study may not be comparable with other studies and secondly, comparing numerous 
categorical variables with continuous variables may prove some difficulty (Cross, 2001).  
4.3.4 Model specification  
As stated in section 4.3.3, there are three categorical dependent variables. These variables 
have been coded 0, 1 and 2 to allow them be analysed statistically.  
This is the same model used by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) in their microfinance impact 
assessment and Mersland and Strøm (2008) in evaluating ownership effects on outreach.  
As Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008) explained, the logit model assumes logistic distribution of 
the probability of an event:  
 
 
 𝑃𝑟𝑖 = (1 + exp(−𝜆𝑖))
−1 (4-1) 
 
 
Where λ is linearly dependent on the variables hypothesized to affect the probability:  
 𝜆𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 (4-2) 
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With the probability varying from 0 to 2 (𝜆 =  ±∞), and the model simplified by rearranging 
it into a log of the odds,  
 
ln (
𝑃𝑖
1 − 𝑃𝑖
) =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖 
 
(4-3) 
for samples consisting of individual outcomes, it can be estimated with maximum likelihood. 
Interpretation of the coefficients can be also done by reverting to the probabilities. Thus, it is 
estimated  
Pr {
LOW = 2
BROAD = 1
SB = 0
} = 𝑓 (𝛼 +  𝛽1COMP + 𝛽2COUNTRY +  𝛽3REGIONAL +  𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 +  𝛾`𝑍 (4-4) 
 
Where  
 LOW is the decision to lend to low end enterprises 
 Broad is the decision to lend to broad enterprises  
 SB is the decision to lend to high end and small business Enterprises 
 LEGAL is the variable for Legal Structure 
 COUNTRY are a wide range of country macro-economic and institutional factors 
 REGIONAL are the regional factors  
 GLOBAL are the global factors 
 and Z is a vector of variables that capture various characteristics of the MFI and the 
community in which it operates 
Substituting the variables for legal structure, institutional quality, culture and control 
variables gives 
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Where 
 LOW = Low end market (microenterprise)  
 BROAD = (Broad end market) 
 SB = High-end/Small business (Small enterprises) 
 COOP, BANK, NGO and NONBANK are dummy variables that is equal to 1,2,3 and 4 if 
the MFI Is a Cooperative, bank, Non-Government Organization and Non-Bank 
Financial Institution respectively  
 FCRIS 
 ROE Return on equity 
 PAR30 = Portfolio at risk (30 days) 
 Age =  grouped into NEW MFI,  YOUNG MFI and  MATURE MFI 
 WOMEN = % of female borrowers  
 REGION =  Regional Location index(SSA, East Asia and the Pacific,  Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,  LAC 
 REG = whether the MFI is regulated or not. 
 SIZE = Size of MFI  (Small, Medium  or Large) 
 INSTQUAL = Institutional Quality Index 
 CREDIT = Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)  
 GDP = GDP per capita growth (annual %) 
 INFLATION = Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)  
 MOBILE= Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 
 LABOUR= Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15-64) 
population growth (annual %) 
4.4 Data Sources and Sample Selection  
Data for this research was taken from the database of the Microfinance information Exchange 
(MIX Market) which is a not-for-profit private organization dedicated to the promotion of 
information exchange in the microfinance industry. They have tracked the microfinance 
industry since the 1990s and there is presently financial and social performance information, 
including quarterly results, on 2795 MFIs in the developing world (Table 5.2) covering over 94 
Pr {
LOW = 2
BROAD = 1
SB = 0
} = 𝑓 (𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐴𝑁𝑌𝑓(OWN,
ROE, PAR30, AGE, SIZE, REG) 
+  𝛽2 𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝑓 (𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝑀𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐸, 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇, 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁), + 𝛽3 REGIONAL 𝑓 (REGION)
+  𝛽4 GLOBAL (REGION) 𝑓 (FCRISIS) +  𝛾`𝑍 
(4-5) 
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million borrowers. It is also the most comprehensive data source for MFI related measures 
and is the used in a majority of empirical studies using secondary data. 
Table 4-1: Number of Current MFIs reporting to wwww.mixmarket.org7 
REGION # of MFIs 
Africa 195 
Asia 283  
Eastern Europe & Central Asia (ECA) 217 
Latin America & Caribbean’s (LAC) 333 
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) 56 
TOTAL 2795 
 
4.4.1 Data validity & Reliability 
Although it is a self-reporting website, MIX complements the data they receive from MFIs 
with data from audits, internal financial statements, management reports and other 
documents. To help improve the validity of its data, MIX staff review all data and validate it 
against a set of business rules before making it available to the public. This review system 
comprises of over 135 quality checks and 150 audit rules. The audit rules include checking 
whether financial statements balance or whether ratios levels are abnormally high or low for 
an MFI. Although participation in the Mix Market database is voluntary, many MFIs choose to 
consistently provide their financial and outreach information to the database, and the 
information provided is believed to be reliable. All the variables used in the study are based 
on financial statements outreach information reported as of 2006, and all monetary values 
are expressed in current United Sates dollars.  Mixmarket is the data source for this study for 
the following reasons. First is that it makes the distinction between Rural banks, NGOs, Non- 
                                                     
7 Taken from Microbanking Bulletin (2009), “The Microbanking Bulletin No.19”, Copyright 2009, 
Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc 
  
113  
  
Bank Financial Institutions and Credit Unions/Cooperatives. Secondly, it also makes a 
distinction between the various loan sizes, which this research uses as a proxy for type of 
business- Micro- small or medium enterprise. This is critical to this study as it allows the data 
be categorized and used as categorical dependent variables.   
The third reasons speaks to its validity as a data source and is the fact that it is a self-reporting 
site. Information offered is voluntary and represents an urge by MFIs to conform to certain 
standards, which speaks to the isomorphic forces this study is interested in.   
The final sample is an unbalanced panel made up of 6825 observations from 455 MFI 
institutions across the seven regions and covering the 15 years of this study as represented in 
table 4-2 
 
Table 4-2: Distribution of MFI types across regions 
Region NGO NBFI Rural Bank Other Cooperative Bank Total 
South Asia 31 17 2 1 0 6 57 
Africa 22 22 0 0 24 10 78 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
15 11 5 2 1 3 37 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia 
8 53 0 0 6 21 88 
Latin America and 
The Caribbean 
67 50 0 0 12 24 153 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
21 7 0 2 0 0 30 
TOTAL 164 160 7 5 43 64 443 
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This research uses a panel data approach and this allows for the observation of both cross-
sectional and time-series observations, goffering added degrees of freedom and a lesser 
amount of multicollinearity amongst the variables (Gujarati, 2003) 
4.5 Variables and measures  
This section outlines the dependent, independent and control variables and their proxies. It 
also explains why these variables were chosen 
4.5.1 Dependent Variable;  
As discussed in chapter 2, while loan size remains a research favourite as a proxy for depth of 
outreach, it comes with its weaknesses. As Schreiner (2001) pointed out, there are several 
other aspects of loan size apart from average outstanding loan and the average loan size itself- 
term to maturity of the loan, the amount of dollars per instalment, the amount of time 
between the instalments, the number of required instalments till the loan is paid off and the 
dollar-years of borrowed resources. This study further makes the argument that loan size 
poses two further challenges. First is that the size of the loan is not a de facto measure for 
poverty or business size but instead either signifies the risk the MFI is willing to take per 
individual or a measure of credit restraint of the client. Experienced professionals confirm 
this- average loan sizes are loosely linked to the poverty of clients with poorer clients more 
likely to take out smaller loans, but this relationship is very far from perfect (Kwon, 2010). 
Secondly, the decision of what size of loan a client takes out is not solely dependent on the 
MFI itself. Therefore, even if the MFI wanted to give out more, they are constrained by either 
the decision of the client or the limit of their resources 
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As such, this study uses target market as a proxy of depth. Although the target market is still 
linked to the loan size (the ratio of their average outstanding loan per client to GNI per capita 
used by Quayes, 2012, amongst others) and it does not entirely solve the first problem, using 
the target market allows us classify what groups are being targeted. This therefore allows us 
to argue that the choice of target market is a strategic decision. This eliminates the second 
problem as the decision of which target market to serve is one which MFIs continually debate 
over and as the data from MIX shows, the choice of target market can change over time, 
either upwards or downwards (Navajas et al, 2000). Using target market allows us to capture 
that change and the factors affecting it. Secondly, using target markets allows for 
categorization and in an ordered logit regression allows us examine the probability that one 
target group is selected over another. Thirdly, categorically grouping loan sizes by target 
market allows for cross regional comparisons. 
There are four main target markets as characterized MIX market and these are low end, 
broad, high end and small business. The low end represents loans of less 20% of the GNI or 
less than $150, the broad market are loans between 20% and 149% of the GNI, high end are 
loans of between 150 and 250% of the GNI and the small business market represents loans of 
over 250% of the GNI. Most research that looks at target market usually do not look at the 
small business market but focuses more on low end, broad and high end markets or merge 
the high end with small businesses which are 150% of GNI and above (Christen, 2001), this 
study adopts this approach. 
Studies that have looked at target market include Kwon (2010) who looked at factors affecting 
interest rates of MFIs, dividing MFIs into the markets they target and found that those serving 
the low-end market have the highest interest rates, average cost of funds and average 
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operating costs when compared to the broad and high-end markets. However, they were also 
found to have the lowest average cost per loan and better profitability (apart from 2011, as 
they were the worst hit in the Indian microfinance crisis of that year).  
The target market distribution in the sample data is shown below in Table 4-3: 
 
Table 4-3: Distribution of Target Market across Sample 
 Number of Observations = 6, 645 
Target Market Proportion Std. Err. [95% Confidence Interval) 
Low End 0.266667 0.005425 0.256167 0.277436 
Broad 0.413695 0.006042 0.401902 0.425587 
Small Businesses 0.319639 0.005721 0.308529 0.330957 
This indicates that 27% of the sample are low end, 41% are broad and 32% are small 
businesses. 
4.5.2 Independent Variables 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature, the independent variables for this research 
are:  
4.5.2.1 Company Level Variables 
The variable used to represent the isomorphic pressures exerted on MFIs at the company 
level were- 
 Legal Structure 
The legal structure variable is a time invariant variable and coded from 0-4 to be able 
to fit into the regression. Rural Banks are coded as 0, NGOs are coded as 1, Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions are coded as 2, and Credit Unions/Cooperatives are coded as 3. 
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 Return-on-Equity (ROE) 
While return on equity and return on assets both measure a company’s performance, 
and return on assets is favoured by studies such as Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014), this 
study favours Return-on-Equity (ROE). ROE was chosen because equity is the key 
constituent of Tier 1 capital as emphasised on by Basel III. The Committees reasons 
for preferring it include its being common to every countries' banking system, 
generally visible in published accounts, forms the basis on which most market 
decisions of capital adequacy are made; and because it has significant effect on a 
banks profit margins and ability to compete (Bank for International Settlements, 
2011).  
 Percentage of Women in Portfolio 
The success of the Grameen Bank and BancoSol in Bangladesh and Bolivia respectively 
fuelled the modern day renaissance of microfinance and they had a predominantly 
female client base (Quayes, 2015). There has also been several published empirical 
research papers showing that women are the overwhelmingly majority clients of 
microfinance institutions around the world with 74% of MFIs reporting MIX in 2003 
say that they target women (Damania, Fredriksson, & Mani, 2004). The use of women 
to measure depth of outreach seems to be justified by the empirical research that 
highlights the greater impact there is lending to women both socially and economically 
and greater impact on households (Khandker, 2005). It is expected that the universal 
cry for more women to be included in poverty alleviation development efforts would 
have a normative and mimetic effect on MFIs as they try to meet international 
standards and donor requests.  
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 Portfolio at Risk (30 days) 
Portfolio at risk is a measure of the quality of a portfolio and indicates what share of 
the portfolio is affected by payments that are still outstanding with a risk that they will 
be defaulted on. It is measured as the Outstanding balance on arrears over 30 days + 
total gross outstanding refinanced (restructured) portfolio)/total gross portfolio. Is a 
(Tchakoute Tchuigoua, 2014). It makes business sense that business would lend to the 
target market that offers a lower risk of default.  
 MFI Age: 
MFI age is usually used as a control variable in most microfinance studies and is 
calculated from the year the MFI was founded and has been active. Ahlin et al. (2011), 
Vanroose and d’Espallier (2013) and Barry and Tacneng (2014) found that the older 
microfinance institutions tend to have greater depth than the younger ones.  
 MFI Size: 
Another variable used as a control variable in most studies, Barry and Tacneng (2014) 
find that the larger banks, cooperatives, and non-bank financial institutions tend to 
have greater depth of outreach than smaller ones. Other studies that confirm this are 
Muller and Uhde (2013), Ahlin et al. (2011) and Vanroose and d’Espallier (2013). 
4.5.2.2 Country Level Variables 
The variable used to represent the isomorphic pressures exerted on MFIs at the country level 
were- 
Institutional Quality 
Developed by the World Bank and taken from www.govindicators.org, The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) are a set of collective and individual governance indicators for 
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the period 1996–2013 and for 215 countries. They represent six dimensions of governance 
and are described in the table 4-4 
 
Table 4-4: World Governance Indicators8 
Variable Description 
Voice and 
Accountability:  
Captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
This measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence, including terrorism.  
Government 
Effectiveness 
This variable captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.  
Regulatory Quality 
This variable captures perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.  
Rule of Law 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
Control of Corruption 
Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests 
 
These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and 
expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries.  They are based on 32 
individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms 
 
                                                     
8 Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc 
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Macroeconomic variables 
Some form of GDP is usually used as an indicator of a countries economic health and growth. 
GDP per capita was used by Barry and Tacneng (2014) while Assefa, Hermes, and Meesters 
(2013), Vanroose and d’Espallier (2013) and Muller and Uhde (2013) used GDP growth instead 
of GDP per capita.  
Other macroeconomic variables include Domestic Credit to the private sector (to proxy the 
depth of the country’s financial system), Inflation, labour Force participation, mobile cellular 
subscription and rural population growth 
4.5.2.3 Regional Variables 
A dummy variable was created for the regions similar to by Vanroose (2008) to represent the 
regions given by MIX market-  
4.5.2.4 Global Variables 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was chosen as the global variable and a dummy FCRISIS was 
created as a proxy, taking a value of 1 if the year fell between 2007 and 2009 and a value of 
0 if it fell outside this range. 
4.6 Robustness Tests/Sensitivity Analyses 
4.6.1 Issues with Multicollinearity  
The table in Appendix B contains a pairwise correlation matrix of the dependent variable and 
all the independent variables used in this research. The correlation amongst the variables is 
low apart from within the World Governance Indicators (Table 4.3). However, this was 
expected as it has been flagged in literature using these variables. It has been established by 
those who have used the Silva and Chávez (2015) indicators that there is a significantly high 
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level of correlation between them within the same country and various researchers have tried 
to explain this. Muriu (2011) basing their argument on several other research papers showed 
that political instability makes formal rules more unstable, causes legal reforms to fail and 
leads to a decline in the systems needed to enforce  and protect property- in summary, it 
leads to a decline in the rule of law. Tchakoute Tchuigoua (2014) in a study of corruption, 
empirically found that political stability plays an important role in shaping rule of law or 
judicial efficiency which in turn affects corruption. No direct link however, was found between 
political stability and corruption. The explanation for this was that increased corruption is 
brought about by lobbying for weak judicial systems, which in turn are a by-product of 
political instability.  
This multicollinearity has been handled in various ways in research. Using a regression with 
panel data makes it possible to consider the strength of the correlation of these variables 
(after controlling for other significant covariates). However, the correlation between these 
governance indicators does not allow for addition of more than one of the variables in the 
regression equation, so a series of regressions are usually run, each with a single variable of 
these governance indicators (Schreiner, 2001). This approach was also used by Silva and 
Chávez (2015). 
There are studies that group these variables together and use the resultant single index as a 
measure of the overall quality of a country’s institution. Barry and Tacneng (2014) in their 
study of how external governing mechanisms affect the social and financial performance of 
MFIs used institutional quality as a control variable. They used principal component analysis 
to combine the rank values for four of the six World Governance Indicators- control of 
corruption, political stability, quality regulation and rule of law. This study uses this method 
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and the following section describes the process. The table below gives the correlation for the 
world Governance indicators 
COR = Control of Corruption 
VAC = Voice and Accountability 
POL= Political Stability 
RQ= Regulatory Quality 
GEF= Government Effectiveness 
ROL= Rule of Law 
 
Table 4-5: Pairwise Correlation of World Governance Indicators 
 COR GEF POL RQ ROL VAC 
COR 1      
GEF 0.7476*** 1     
POL 0.4079*** 0.2845*** 1    
RQ 0.7103*** 0.7419*** 0.3496*** 1   
ROL 0.7744*** 0.7765*** 0.3935*** 0.6211*** 1  
VAC 0.6092*** 0.5599*** 0.3503*** 0.5755*** 0.5489*** 1 
 
As seen in Table 4-5, the pairwise correlation matrix shows that the analysis indicates a high 
level of correlation between the variables Corruption and Government Effectiveness, Rule of 
Law and Voice and Accountability ranging from 0.61 to 0.77.  
Due to the high level of correlation between Government Effectiveness and Corruption and 
Rule of Law make it, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was carried out and this is 
explained in the next section.  
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4.6.2 Principal Component Analysis 
A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy determines the suitability of data for 
Factor Analysis, measuring sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the 
complete model. The statistic is a measure of the proportion of variance among variables that 
might be common variance. The lower the proportion, the more suited the data is to Factor 
Analysis. The overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy for the World 
Governance Indicators was 0.86 (table 4-4), with the lowest value being 0.83. According to 
(Kaiser, 1974) values above 0.8 indicate the data is suitable for Factor Analysis.  
Emara and Chiu (2016) illustrate the use of Principal Component Analysis using a data matrix 
X with p variables and n observations … 
  X = [
Χ1,1 . . Χ1,𝑝
Χ2,1 . . Χ2,𝑝
. . . .
Χ𝑛,1 . . Χ𝑛,𝑝
] ; 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 i =  1 … 1, j = 1 … p  
The goal of principal component analysis or PCA is to project  the  data  matrix  X  from  p  
dimensions  to  a  smaller  dimension  k,  where  k  <<  p,  while retaining as  much  information  
as  possible  in  the dimension-reduced  data  matrix  with  the  size  n  by  k2.  In other words, 
PCA simplifies the description of a data set by reducing a large number of highly correlated 
variables   (X1, ...  Xp)   to   a   smaller   number   of   uncorrelated   variables   (Principal   
Components; PC1,  ...  PCk) while extracting and retaining the most important information 
from the data (Abdi & Williams, 2010; Emara & Chiu, 2016).   
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the research design, which forms the basis of this study. It first 
examined the prevalent research methods used and showed that the general problem with 
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these methods was their inability to explain changes in loan sizes. This study uses categorical 
dependent variables to look at the problem from a different perspective. Using an ordinal 
logit regression goes beyond just indicating the existence of a relationship (as the previous 
studies have done) to showing the probability that an MFI in a certain region will lend down 
the poverty line. This chapter also discusses the data source and issues of data validity as well 
as the other statistical methods and tests used- tests for multicollinearity and the Principal 
Component Analysis  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the methodology and data, explaining the model and the 
logistic regression used in this study. The Analyses and the following robustness tests were 
run using EViews and STATA. This chapter presents and discusses the results of the logistic 
and other tests. This chapter then discusses the interpretation and implications of the results 
presented in the preceding chapter. This discussion will compare the results of these studies 
with those of preceding studies and inferences drawn. Subsequently, this chapter discusses 
the interpretation and implications of the results, comparing the results of these studies with 
those of preceding studies and inferences drawn.  
 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis 
Table 5-1 shows the descriptive statistic of all the independent variables used in this study 
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics of Macroeconomic Data 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Return on Equity 0.1949 0.1075 276.9735 -12.4092 4.8224 3709 
Portfolio at risk 0.0567 0.0342 5.4845 0.0000 0.1336 3709 
% of female borrowers 0.6497 0.6433 1.1016 0.0000 0.2555 3709 
WGI 0.0015 -0.1374 9.2990 -6.2101 1.9832 3709 
Growth in PC GDP 0.0372 0.0360 0.2854 -0.1659 0.0365 3709 
Domestic Credit  31.9200 27.8432 148.8479 0.0000 18.6483 3709 
Inflation 6.5110 5.6679 53.2310 -10.0675 5.0132 3709 
Labour Force participation 69.2032 69.7000 90.8000 41.9000 9.2306 3709 
Mobile cellular subscription 59.2061 55.1926 185.8216 0.0713 41.4750 3709 
Rural population growth 0.6576 0.7645 6.1326 -3.2914 1.3022 3709 
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Table 5-2: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
Credit 
Union 
NBFI Bank ROE MEDIUM PAR YOUNG MATURE WOMEN REG SIZE INSTQUAL GDP CREDIT INSTQLAC 
Credit Union 1 -0.23416 -0.13064 0.007596 0.029281 0.050625 -0.03169 0.028166 -0.27456 0.087053 -0.02477 0.007629 -0.11756 -0.12945 -0.02947 
NBFI -0.23416 1 -0.30213 0.017968 0.032142 0.010079 0.10838 -0.12459 -0.10373 0.257994 0.056905 0.068704 0.168181 -0.03576 0.016823 
Bank -0.13064 -0.30213 1 -0.00488 -0.13561 -0.04425 0.00766 -0.03027 -0.1149 0.265608 0.271445 -0.10779 0.006523 -0.0553 -0.02601 
ROE 0.007596 0.017968 -0.00488 1 -0.01432 0.060715 -0.00821 0.015352 0.001248 0.021565 0.029333 0.012623 0.010604 0.015878 0.00313 
MEDIUM 0.029281 0.032142 -0.13561 -0.01432 1 -0.00169 0.066148 -0.07042 0.01615 -0.11815 -0.62464 -0.00467 -0.01541 -0.00232 -0.00655 
PAR 0.050625 0.010079 -0.04425 0.060715 -0.00169 1 -0.01324 0.02866 -0.05533 -0.0137 -0.01173 0.023508 -0.09129 -0.01977 0.023266 
YOUNG -0.03169 0.10838 0.00766 -0.00821 0.066148 -0.01324 1 -0.8469 -0.02087 0.067088 -0.18082 -0.05074 0.149388 -0.1352 -0.05576 
MATURE 0.028166 -0.12459 -0.03027 0.015352 -0.07042 0.02866 -0.8469 1 0.009272 -0.08889 0.259467 0.067554 -0.17215 0.181623 0.064211 
WOMEN -0.27456 -0.10373 -0.1149 0.001248 0.01615 -0.05533 -0.02087 0.009272 1 -0.12896 -0.13005 -0.03306 0.007017 0.130093 -0.0705 
REG 0.087053 0.257994 0.265608 0.021565 -0.11815 -0.0137 0.067088 -0.08889 -0.12896 1 0.319541 -0.15388 0.123574 -0.17947 -0.14656 
SIZE -0.02477 0.056905 0.271445 0.029333 -0.62464 -0.01173 -0.18082 0.259467 -0.13005 0.319541 1 -0.01663 0.001951 0.110927 -0.01172 
INSTQUAL 0.007629 0.068704 -0.10779 0.012623 -0.00467 0.023508 -0.05074 0.067554 -0.03306 -0.15388 -0.01663 1 -0.00309 0.414882 0.654071 
GDP -0.11756 0.168181 0.006523 0.010604 -0.01541 -0.09129 0.149388 -0.17215 0.007017 0.123574 0.001951 -0.00309 1 -0.02232 0.05328 
CREDIT -0.12945 -0.03576 -0.0553 0.015878 -0.00232 -0.01977 -0.1352 0.181623 0.130093 -0.17947 0.110927 0.414882 -0.02232 1 0.266865 
INFL -0.10221 0.042919 0.051618 0.004081 0.051782 0.006711 0.06335 -0.07611 0.031734 0.036157 -0.04046 -0.19349 0.076568 -0.07807 -0.11608 
LABOR 0.126613 -0.02878 0.085084 -0.02041 -0.01973 -0.04048 -0.01445 -0.00464 0.04791 0.148604 -0.05774 -0.16499 0.057981 -0.28494 -0.00758 
MOBILE 0.000396 0.01586 -0.019 0.001932 -0.04028 0.016677 -0.26651 0.356587 -0.1409 -0.1517 0.20576 0.227123 -0.12691 0.427108 0.124402 
RURAL 0.104886 -0.08313 0.014795 0.010409 0.023156 0.009697 0.063049 -0.09561 0.098997 0.132939 -0.00443 -0.38797 -0.11277 -0.2863 -0.30114 
EAP -0.07491 0.019816 -0.00394 -0.00571 0.00735 -0.05434 -0.00603 -0.0091 0.227771 0.084108 -0.0015 -0.04948 0.112513 0.091122 -0.02752 
EECA -0.00021 0.28293 0.047637 -0.00869 0.031486 -0.02554 0.149114 -0.17696 -0.34226 0.22889 0.026782 0.009238 0.247184 -0.07507 -0.04509 
MENA -0.07932 -0.10404 -0.10234 -0.00578 0.010164 -0.04836 0.010302 -0.00015 0.004052 -0.09324 0.056626 0.125532 -0.0637 0.330874 -0.02042 
South Asia -0.13475 -0.02853 -0.00076 0.044858 -0.03441 0.016262 -0.00578 -0.00185 0.34008 0.119631 0.126713 -0.17723 0.080272 0.117379 -0.04273 
LAC -0.0307 -0.10838 0.034448 -0.01698 -0.01947 0.010934 -0.14804 0.194266 -0.0757 -0.34567 -0.08306 0.136469 -0.17697 0.017844 0.129777 
FCRISIS 0.028401 0.009682 -0.02835 -0.01111 0.036596 0.012074 -0.04771 0.081337 -0.03181 -0.00617 0.043493 0.006099 -0.09329 0.017898 -0.01045 
INSTEAP 0.025391 -0.21657 0.037106 -0.00468 0.014085 0.037143 0.017519 -0.03004 0.00587 -0.06444 -0.05464 0.241385 -0.07657 0.045295 0.009569 
INSTQEECA 0.026977 0.029677 -0.08619 -0.00385 0.042572 0.011924 -0.0906 0.12286 -0.037 -0.06859 -0.01287 0.432768 -0.06806 0.187783 0.006909 
INSTQMENA -0.03935 0.01732 -0.05077 -0.00258 0.01432 -0.03375 0.020026 0.017114 0.060901 -0.01709 0.015675 0.242174 -0.02558 0.339987 -0.00887 
INSTQSA 0.049395 0.280192 -0.10845 0.028365 -0.03339 0.027985 0.041267 -0.04558 -0.00465 -0.00831 0.004308 0.4192 0.060851 0.115907 0.017094 
INSTQLAC -0.02947 0.016823 -0.02601 0.00313 -0.00655 0.023266 -0.05576 0.064211 -0.0705 -0.14656 -0.01172 0.654071 0.05328 0.266865 1 
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 INFL LABOR MOBILE RURAL EAP EECA MENA 
South 
Asia 
LAC FCRISIS INSTEAP INSTQEECA INSTQMENA INSTQSA 
Credit 
Union 
-0.10221 0.126613 0.000396 0.104886 -0.07491 -0.00021 -0.07932 -0.13475 -0.0307 0.028401 0.025391 0.026977 -0.03935 0.049395 
NBFI 0.042919 -0.02878 0.01586 -0.08313 0.019816 0.28293 -0.10404 -0.02853 -0.10838 0.009682 -0.21657 0.029677 0.01732 0.280192 
Bank 0.051618 0.085084 -0.019 0.014795 -0.00394 0.047637 -0.10234 -0.00076 0.034448 -0.02835 0.037106 -0.08619 -0.05077 -0.10845 
ROE 0.004081 -0.02041 0.001932 0.010409 -0.00571 -0.00869 -0.00578 0.044858 -0.01698 -0.01111 -0.00468 -0.00385 -0.00258 0.028365 
MEDIUM 0.051782 -0.01973 -0.04028 0.023156 0.00735 0.031486 0.010164 -0.03441 -0.01947 0.036596 0.014085 0.042572 0.01432 -0.03339 
PAR 0.006711 -0.04048 0.016677 0.009697 -0.05434 -0.02554 -0.04836 0.016262 0.010934 0.012074 0.037143 0.011924 -0.03375 0.027985 
YOUNG 0.06335 -0.01445 -0.26651 0.063049 -0.00603 0.149114 0.010302 -0.00578 -0.14804 -0.04771 0.017519 -0.0906 0.020026 0.041267 
MATURE -0.07611 -0.00464 0.356587 -0.09561 -0.0091 -0.17696 -0.00015 -0.00185 0.194266 0.081337 -0.03004 0.12286 0.017114 -0.04558 
WOMEN 0.031734 0.04791 -0.1409 0.098997 0.227771 -0.34226 0.004052 0.34008 -0.0757 -0.03181 0.00587 -0.037 0.060901 -0.00465 
REG 0.036157 0.148604 -0.1517 0.132939 0.084108 0.22889 -0.09324 0.119631 -0.34567 -0.00617 -0.06444 -0.06859 -0.01709 -0.00831 
SIZE -0.04046 -0.05774 0.20576 -0.00443 -0.0015 0.026782 0.056626 0.126713 -0.08306 0.043493 -0.05464 -0.01287 0.015675 0.004308 
INSTQUAL -0.19349 -0.16499 0.227123 -0.38797 -0.04948 0.009238 0.125532 -0.17723 0.136469 0.006099 0.241385 0.432768 0.242174 0.4192 
GDP 0.076568 0.057981 -0.12691 -0.11277 0.112513 0.247184 -0.0637 0.080272 -0.17697 -0.09329 -0.07657 -0.06806 -0.02558 0.060851 
CREDIT -0.07807 -0.28494 0.427108 -0.2863 0.091122 -0.07507 0.330874 0.117379 0.017844 0.017898 0.045295 0.187783 0.339987 0.115907 
INFL 1 -0.01466 -0.15087 0.085391 -0.05733 0.073362 -0.05561 0.127238 -0.15987 0.191793 -0.01083 -0.10947 -0.12326 -0.05618 
LABOR -0.01466 1 -0.1285 0.1066 0.243647 -0.06227 -0.5234 -0.15849 0.046696 0.010662 -0.16759 -0.10129 -0.28908 -0.04551 
MOBILE -0.15087 -0.1285 1 -0.26359 5.17E-05 0.216055 0.059986 -0.23766 0.217421 0.01522 0.046615 0.125099 0.045699 0.10864 
RURAL 0.085391 0.1066 -0.26359 1 0.144358 -0.22967 0.108761 0.062281 -0.36032 0.010498 -0.01828 -0.35467 0.017009 -0.03378 
EAP -0.05733 0.243647 5.17E-05 0.144358 1 -0.1368 -0.07686 -0.13057 -0.23525 -0.02993 -0.18695 -0.00253 -0.03813 0.047864 
EECA 0.073362 -0.06227 0.216055 -0.22967 -0.1368 1 -0.1106 -0.18788 -0.34368 0.00235 0.025574 0.018482 -0.05486 0.068872 
MENA -0.05561 -0.5234 0.059986 0.108761 -0.07686 -0.1106 1 -0.10557 -0.18871 0.003402 0.014369 -0.00204 0.496039 0.038697 
South Asia 0.127238 -0.15849 -0.23766 0.062281 -0.13057 -0.18788 -0.10557 1 -0.33197 -0.02625 0.02441 -0.00347 -0.05236 -0.36657 
LAC -0.15987 0.046696 0.217421 -0.36032 -0.23525 -0.34368 -0.18871 -0.33197 1 0.004327 0.05248 -0.00575 -0.09137 0.124495 
FCRISIS 0.191793 0.010662 0.01522 0.010498 -0.02993 0.00235 0.003402 -0.02625 0.004327 1 -0.01294 -0.0004 0.014488 0.029809 
INSTEAP -0.01083 -0.16759 0.046615 -0.01828 -0.18695 0.025574 0.014369 0.02441 0.05248 -0.01294 1 0.000473 0.007128 -0.00895 
INSTQEECA -0.10947 -0.10129 0.125099 -0.35467 -0.00253 0.018482 -0.00204 -0.00347 -0.00575 -0.0004 0.000473 1 -0.00101 0.001273 
INSTQMENA -0.12326 -0.28908 0.045699 0.017009 -0.03813 -0.05486 0.496039 -0.05236 -0.09137 0.014488 0.007128 -0.00101 1 0.019195 
INSTQSA -0.05618 -0.04551 0.10864 -0.03378 0.047864 0.068872 0.038697 -0.36657 0.124495 0.029809 -0.00895 0.001273 0.019195 1 
INSTQLAC -0.11608 -0.00758 0.124402 -0.30114 -0.02752 -0.04509 -0.02042 -0.04273 0.129777 -0.01045 0.009569 0.006909 -0.00887 0.017094 
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As seen in Table 5-2, the pairwise correlation matrix shows that the three financial system 
development variables, specifically DCP, DMB, and DMBOFI, are highly, statistically significantly 
correlated, with correlation coefficients above 0.90. Table 4.2 also shows that the historical and 
current institutional variables that are statistically significantly correlated with the financial 
system development variables generally have the signs as hypothesised, except Islamic law that 
is positively associated with financial system development instead of being negatively associated 
with financial system development as hypothesised in H3c. 
5.3 Principal Component Analysis Results 
The results from the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy are presented in 
table 5.3. From the table, it can be seen that the overall Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy for the World Governance Indicators was 0.86 with the lowest value being 
0.83. These values meet the 0.8 requirement set by Kaiser (1974) and imply the data is 
suitable for Factor Analysis. 
Using Factor Analysis (FA) to first determine the underlying structure of the six governance 
indicators, the results are shown in table 5-4 and 5-5  
  
Table 5-3:  Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable kmo 
COR 0.8763 
GEF 0.8237 
POL 0.8683 
RQ 0.8614 
ROL 0.8314 
VAC 0.9401 
Overall 0.8608 
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Table 5-4 : Principal Components/Correlation 
 Number of obs = 6073 
  Number of comp. = 6 
  Trace = 6 
Rotation: (unrotated= principal) Rho  = 1 
      
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 3.8998 3.09658 0.65 0.65 
Comp2 0.80322 0.289258 0.1339 0.7838 
Comp3 0.513962 0.136248 0.0857 0.8695 
Comp4 0.377714 0.14125 0.063 0.9325 
Comp5 0.236465 0.06763 0.0394 0.9719 
Comp6 0.168835 . 0.0281 1 
 
Table 5-5:  Principal Components (Eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained 
COR 0.4554 -0.0684 -0.1275 -0.1492 -0.8068 0.3138 0 
GEF 0.4452 -0.2887 -0.2326 0.0391 0.5417 0.6077 0 
POL 0.2653 0.9394 -0.137 0.0835 0.1127 0.0936 0 
RQ 0.428 -0.1464 0.0087 0.8009 -0.047 -0.3894 0 
ROL 0.4412 -0.0856 -0.3342 -0.5342 0.1708 -0.6097 0 
VAC 0.3823 0.0285 0.8939 -0.2058 0.1075 -0.0069 0 
 
According to Table 5-4, initial Eigenvalues indicate the first component explained 65% while 
the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth components have Eigenvalues below one and 
explained 13.39%, 8.57%, 6.3%, 3.94% and 2.81% of the variance respectively. To determine 
which of the factors are retained, several methods were used. The Kaiser-Guttman method 
uses only eigenvalues greater than the average eigenvalue, retaining these on the basis that 
these axes summarize more information than any single original variable (Jackson, 1993). 
From Table 5-4, this is only the first component. Using the Cattell (1966) Scree  test,  the  
eigenvalues  are  plotted  against  their  component  numbers  p.  If there is a drastic change 
in direction, the components before this change will be retained.  
All these criteria indicate that the first principal component should be retained. The results in 
Table 5-4 indicate that only the first factor has an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 and it explains 
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approximately 65% of the cumulative variance of all six variables. In table 5-5, all the weights 
of this first component are positive and close in magnitude. Figure 5-1 is the Scree plot 
diagram confirming that only the first component should be considered for interpretation 
(Kaiser's criterion).  
This suggest that the first component strongly explains the positive role on institutional 
quality of the original six World Governance Indicators.  
Figure 5-1: Scree Plot/Principle Component Analysis of World Governance Indicators 
 
 
As a result, a new variable INSTQUAL was created as a proxy for institutional quality 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Ordered Logit Regression & Discussion 
The results of the ordered logit regression are in table 5-6 below:  
Table 5-6: Ordered Logit Regression Model Results 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Equation 1   Equation 2  
Coefficient 
Test 
Statistic 
Marginal 
Effects 
 
Coefficient 
Test 
Statistic 
Marginal 
Effects 
Credit Union -0.38571 -2.50321*** -0.22785  -0.40375 -2.58569*** -0.09224 
NBFI -0.13316 -1.2367 -0.07866  -0.07324 -0.63677 -0.01673 
Bank -0.58516 -4.29473*** -0.34567  -0.63541 -4.57499*** -0.14517 
Return on equity 0.008466 0.491697 0.005001  0.009215 0.470736 0.002105 
Portfolio at risk (30 
days) -0.1837 -0.63028 -0.10852 
 
-0.37172 -1.26767 -0.08492 
YOUNG MFI 0.280784 1.379432 0.165866  0.350038 1.69207* 0.079971 
MATURE MFI 0.149044 0.759688 0.088044  0.227582 1.131823 0.051995 
% of female 
borrowers 4.331447 21.75071*** 2.558696 
 
4.412785 21.45463*** 1.008167 
Regulated INDEX -0.26374 -2.53019*** -0.1558  -0.24207 -2.30161** -0.0553 
Medium size index -0.81419 -7.10411*** -0.48096  -0.84753 -7.31261*** -0.19363 
Large size index -1.48535 -12.0555*** -0.87743  -1.55153 -12.4375*** -0.35447 
General 
governance 0.280306 11.14526*** 0.165584 
 
-0.04696 -0.80515 -0.01073 
Growth in GDP  3.280806 2.944335*** 1.938055  2.418319 2.132143** 0.552501 
Credit to private 
sector  -0.01926 -6.78669*** -0.01138 
 
-0.02268 -7.46987 -0.00518 
Inflation 0.010213 1.274408 0.006033  0.007394 0.915402*** 0.001689 
Labour force  -0.03234 -5.68308*** -0.0191  -0.02203 -3.60612*** -0.00503 
Mobile cellular  0.010277 8.130148*** 0.006071  0.010462 8.144515*** 0.00239 
Rural population 
growth  0.067295 1.703379* 0.039753 
 
0.032225 0.761648 0.007362 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 0.960093 5.407369*** 0.567151 
 
1.550309 7.138528*** 0.354191 
EECA -0.33102 -1.89632** -0.19554  -0.22526 -1.24947 -0.05146 
Middle East and 
North Africa 1.698344 6.512849*** 1.003255 
 
2.539961 8.602561*** 0.580292 
South Asia 2.620904 13.96589*** 1.548234  3.339527 13.1983*** 0.762965 
Latin America 0.417952 2.994685*** 0.246895  0.495417 3.356939*** 0.113185 
FCRISIS 0.113263 1.314938 0.066907  0.138406 1.58766 0.031621 
GOV * East Asia & - - -  1.058444 7.553747*** 0.241817 
GOV * EECA - - -  0.214749 2.854099*** 0.049063 
GOV * MENA - - -  -0.0746 -0.62104 -0.01704 
GOV * South Asia - - -  0.631169 5.985749*** 0.1442 
GOV *  Latin 
America - - - 
 
0.425659 6.307634*** 0.097248 
        
LIMIT_1:C(25) -3.00506    -2.27456   
LIMIT_2:C(26) 0.860759    1.66093   
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Pseudo R-squared 0.302059    0.319392   
LR statistic 2119.464    2241.085   
Prob(LR statistic) 0    0   
 
5.4.2 Global factors 
The first hypothesis developed to explore the relationship between global factors and depth 
of outreach. 
H1: Global Factors affect the depth of outreach 
The only global variable used, FCRISIS was shown to have no significant impact on lending to 
the low-end markets. As Pearce (2010) explained, this could be because the microfinance 
market is yet to reach equilibrium between demand and supply, reflective in the high levels 
of unmet demand for microfinance and its seeming lack of sensitivity to high interest rates.  
He further suggested that because volume in a majority of the microfinance markets is 
predominantly   as a result of available funding and  of  the  capacity  of  microfinance 
institutions   to  expand  sustainably  and  manage  risks and because these funding  levels  
were maintained  throughout  the  period of the crisis,  this could have served as an insulation 
from the global financial crises. As such, there is no evidence support H3,   so the hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative accepted 
5.4.3 Regional Characteristics 
The Marginal Effects Column section gives the likelihood of the event to occur in comparison 
to a base. For this analysis, Sub-Saharan African was taken as the base region and the 
likelihood of other regions lending to the low-end market compared to Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Looking at the hypothesis and the results: 
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 H2b: Locating an MFI in East Asia and the Pacific affects its depth of outreach- The 
Hypothesis is accepted and alternative rejected. Results are significant at the 1% 
level. 
 H2c: Locating an MFI in Eastern Europe and Central Asia affects its depth of outreach: 
The Hypothesis is accepted and alternative rejected. Results at the 5% level. 
 H2d: Locating an MFI in Latin America and the Caribbean affects its depth of 
outreach: The Hypothesis is accepted and alternative rejected. Results are significant 
at the 1% level 
 H2e: Locating an MFI in Middle East and North Africa affects its depth of outreach: 
The Hypothesis is accepted and alternative rejected. Results at the 1% level. 
 H2f: Locating an MFI in South Asia affects its depth of outreach The Hypothesis is 
accepted and alternative rejected. Results at the 1% level. 
The regional location of MFIs were a significant factor in all the regions, at the 1% level for 
East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Latin America and at 
the 5% level for Eastern Europe and Central America.  The results indicate that for an 
additional MFI added to each region. MFIs in South Asia were 1.54 times more likely to lend 
to the low end markets; MFIs in Middle East and North Africa were 1.003 times more likely to 
lend to low end markets; MFIs in East Asia and the Pacific were 0.56 times more likely to lend 
low end markets and MFIs in Latin America were 0.25 times more likely to lend to low end 
markets than MFIs in Africa. However, MFIs in Eastern Europe and Central America were 0.2 
times likely not to lend to low end markets when compared to their African counterparts. 
5.4.4 Country Level Characteristics 
The third hypothesis: 
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H3: The Country an MFI is located in affects its depth of outreach 
Of the country level factors, growth in per capita GDP (in constant 2010 US$) was found to 
have the most significant effect on lending outcomes, with a 1% increase in GDP per capita 
increasing the probability of lending to the by 1.93 times. Rural population growth and 
increase in mobile cellular use were also found to have a positive and significant effect on 
lending to the Low-end markets. Credit to the private sector and the labour force were both 
found to have significant negative effects on lending to low end markets with a 1% increase 
in credit to the private sector reducing the probability that a MFI would lend to the low end 
market by 1%. A 1% increase in the labour force decreased the probability by 1.93%.  The 
results for Inflation indicated that it had no significant effect.  
 
A major revelation to take away from these results is the fact that Institutional 
Quality/Governance on its own does not affect lending behaviour apart from in Eastern 
Europe and Central America when the regional contexts serve as moderating factors. In fact, 
it decreased the probability of lending to the low-end markets, implying that improvement in 
institutional quality makes MFIs lend higher up the poverty line. 
5.4.5 Company level Characteristics 
While Non-Bank Financial Institutions appear to have no significant relationship with lending 
patterns when compared to Non-Government Organizations, Credit Union and Banks are 
both less likely to lend to low end markets. For each additional Bank added to the sample, the 
probability of lending to the low end of market decreases by 34.6% while for Credit Unions, it 
reduces by 22.8%.  
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For the variables Return on equity, the portfolio at risk (30 days) and MFI age, no significant 
relationship was found.  The marginal effects for regulation indicate that addition of a 
regulated MFI to the data sample would decrease the probability of lending to the low-end 
sector by 15.6%. When considering the effect of MFI size on lending down the poverty line. 
Results indicated that the probability of both the medium and large size MFIs lending to the 
low-end market was less than the probability of the small MFIs lending to the low end market. 
For medium MFIs, the probability was 0.48 times less while for large MFIs, the chances were 
0.87 times less. The greatest significant positive impact on improving lending to the low-end 
market was the percentage of female borrowers in the MFI loan portfolio. There is a 2.56 
improved chances of lending to the low end market with the addition of a single female 
borrower to a MFIs portfolio.  
5.4.6 The Moderators 
Beyond just looking at the regional impact on MFI lending behaviour, one of the key aims of 
this study was to see what role regional factors play in the relationship with Institutional 
quality/Governance. On introducing the regional dummies as an interaction term in the 
second model, the general governance variable itself became insignificant. The breakdown 
into regions indicate that governance affected lending behaviour in East Asia and the Pacific, 
Eastern Europe and Central America, South Asia and Latin America while the interaction 
between governance and the region of the Middle East and Northern Africa indicates that 
governance has no significant effect on lending to the low end market in that country. The 
explanatory power of the model represented by the Pseudo R squared also improved by 2% 
in the second equation.  
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5.4.7 Ranking Predictors 
Of the several methods available to rank predictors in a logistic regression, this study will use 
the standardized coefficients. Menard (2011) explains that standardized coefficients are 
coefficients adjusted to the same scale to enable them be compared and ranked. The greater 
the absolute value of the standardized coefficient, the greater the predicted change in the 
probability of the outcome given a 1-standard deviation change in the corresponding 
predictor variable, holding constant the other predictors in the model. Taking the absolute 
value of the standardized coefficients enables them to be ranked from highest to lowest, in 
order of strength of association with the outcomes. The standardized coefficients were 
obtained using the listcoef, std help command in STATA and the results of the second model 
reported below in table 7-7 (full results are presented in the appendix) 
Table 5-7: Standard Coefficients (Ranked)9 
 
 b z bStdXY 
1 South Asia 3.340 13.198 0.428 
2 % women 4.413 21.455 0.403 
3 Middle East 2.540 8.603 0.213 
4 GOVLAC 0.426 6.308 0.195 
5 GOVSouthAsia 0.631 5.986 0.183 
6 GOVAsia 1.058 7.554 0.180 
7 East Asia 1.550 7.139 0.156 
8 Mobile Cell  0.011 8.145 0.155 
9 LAC 0.495 3.357 0.086 
10 GOVEECA 0.215 2.854 0.066 
-11 Young MFI 0.350 1.692 0.044 
12 Growth in  2.418 2.132 0.032 
13 Regulation -0.242 -2.302 -0.041 
14 Credit Union -0.404 -2.586 -0.042 
15 Labour Force -0.022 -3.606 -0.073 
16 Bank -0.635 -4.575 -0.080 
                                                     
9 Only significant relationships were reported 
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17 East Asia -0.848 -7.313 -0.136 
18 Domestic Credit -0.023 -7.470 -0.151 
19 Size Index -1.552 -12.437 -0.277 
 
The key implication of this result is that it indicates that of the group of variables- COMPANY, 
COUNTRY, REGION and GLOBAL, the REGION has the strongest effect on the lending 
behaviour.   
5.4.8 Validity Tests  
The Prediction Evaluation function of Eviews checks for the accuracy of classicisation of the 
variables used in the equations. Tables 5-8 and 5-9 present the results of the Prediction 
Evaluation for both models.  
 
Table 5-8: Prediction Evaluation for Ordered Specification for Model 1 
      
                  Estimated Equation  
      
      Dep. 
Value Obs.   Correct  Incorrect % Correct % Incorrect 
      
      0 368 78 290 21.196 78.804 
1 1777 1429 348 80.416 19.584 
2 1564 1193 371 76.279 23.721 
Total 3709 2700 1009 72.796 27.204 
      
            Constant Probability Spec. 
      
      Dep. 
Value Obs.   Correct  Incorrect % Correct % Incorrect 
      
      0 368 0 368 0.000 100.000 
1 1777 1777 0 100.000 0.000 
2 1564 0 1564 0.000 100.000 
Total 3709 1777 1932 47.910 52.090 
      
          Gain over Constant Prob. Spec. 
      
        Equation  Constant    
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Dep. 
Value Obs.   
% 
Incorrect % Incorrect Total Gain* Pct. Gain** 
      
      0 368 78.804 100.000 21.196 21.196 
1 1777 19.584 0.000 -19.584 NA 
2 1564 23.721 100.000 76.279 76.279 
Total 3709 27.204 52.090 24.885 47.774 
      
      *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
Table 5-9: Prediction Evaluation for Ordered Specification for Model 2 
      
                  Estimated Equation  
      
      Dep. 
Value Obs.   Correct  Incorrect % Correct % Incorrect 
      
      0 368 61 307 16.576 83.424 
1 1777 1437 340 80.867 19.133 
2 1564 1202 362 76.854 23.146 
Total 3709 2700 1009 72.796 27.204 
      
            Constant Probability Spec. 
      
      Dep. 
Value Obs.   Correct  Incorrect % Correct % Incorrect 
      
      0 368 0 368 0.000 100.000 
1 1777 1777 0 100.000 0.000 
2 1564 0 1564 0.000 100.000 
Total 3709 1777 1932 47.910 52.090 
      
          Gain over Constant Prob. Spec. 
      
        Equation  Constant    
Dep. 
Value Obs.   
% 
Incorrect % Incorrect Total Gain* Pct. Gain** 
      
      0 368 83.424 100.000 16.576 16.576 
1 1777 19.133 0.000 -19.133 NA 
2 1564 23.146 100.000 76.854 76.854 
Total 3709 27.204 52.090 24.885 47.774 
      
      *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
Each row in Table 5-8 and 5-9 represents a distinct value for the dependent variable. The 
second column indicates the number of observations with that value. Of those, the number 
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of observations in the correct column are those for which the predicted probability of the 
response is the highest. Thus, 61 of the 368 Target Markets listed as HIGH end were correctly 
specified. Overall, 73% of the observations were correctly specified for the fitted model versus 
48% for the constant probability model in Models 1 and 2. 
5.4.9 Goodness-of-fit 
To estimate the suitability of both models, Stata provides the command fitstat that produces 
a series of goodness-of-fit tests presented in Table 5-10. 
Table 5-10: Goodness of fit Table for Model 1 and 2 
 Model 2 Model 1 Difference 
Log-likelihood    
Model -2387.816 -2448.627 60.81 
Intercept-only -3508.359 -3508.359 0 
Chi-square    
D (df=3678/3683/-5) 4775.632 4897.253 -121.621 
LR (df=29/24/5) 2241.085 2119.464 121.621 
p-value 0 0 0 
R2    
McFadden 0.319 0.302 0.017 
McFadden (adjusted) 0.311 0.295 0.016 
McKelvey & Zavoina 0.58 0.534 0.046 
Cox-Snell/ML 0.454 0.435 0.018 
Cragg-Uhler/Nagelkerke 0.534 0.513 0.021 
Count 0.728 0.728 0 
Count (adjusted) 0.478 0.478 0 
IC    
AIC 4837.632 4949.253 -111.621 
AIC divided by N 1.304 1.334 -0.03 
(df=31/26/5) 5030.406 5110.935 -80.528 
    
Variance of    
e 3.29 3.29 0 
y-star 7.834 7.055 0.78 
    
Note: Likelihood-ratio test assumes saved model nested in current model. 
Difference of   80.528 in BIC provides very strong support for  model 2 
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Of particular interest in table 5-10 are the values of the McFadden R2 and BIC. The McFadden’s 
R2 which is also called the likelihood-ratio index compares a model with just the intercept to 
a model with all parameters (Long, 1997). Similar to the R in Ordinary Least Square 
regressions, the McFadden’s R2 is possibly the most widely used Pseudo-R. It can be 
interpreted as the log-likelihood owing to the explanatory variables in relation to the 
maximum possible achievable gain (Veall & Zimmermann, 1996). 
The Bayesian Information Criterion or BIC has is used as a measure of overall fit (Long, 1997; 
Raftery, 1996). The more negative the 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑘
′ , the better the fit. When used to compare two 
models, the difference in the BIC’s indicates which model is more likely to have generated the 
observed data.  If BIC1−BIC2 > 0, the second model is preferred and if BIC1−BIC2 < 0, the first 
model is preferred (Long, 1997). In choosing the strength of evidence favouring one model 
over the other, Raftery (1996) suggested that if the absolute difference is between 0-2, the 
evidence is weak; if it falls between 2-6, positive; 6-10, strong and greater than 10, the 
evidence is seen as very strong.  
5.5 Other findings 
There are several other issues of note that this study has shed light on and these will be 
disused in the sub sections below.  
5.5.1 Women and Microfinance 
Ever since Prof. Yunus and the Grammen bank started with his initial experiment with the 
women of Bangladesh, the role of women in the development of microfinance is one that has 
been well documented in literature. Consistent with the studies that focus on women and 
microfinance such as  (D’Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 2011), and those focused on depth of 
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outreach such as (Quayes, 2012), this study found a positive, significant relationship between 
the ratio of female borrowers in a MFIs portfolio and depth of outreach. Studies have 
identified women as less risky than man (D’Espallier et al., 2011), possibly because they are 
more likely to spend their loans on productive outcomes for their families (Lott, 2008; 
McCarter, 2006). The difference from these studies is the interpretations of our results. 
Grouping the variable used in this study allows us to draw the inference that the ratio of 
women to total borrowers is the singular strongest influencer to depth of outreach. In other 
words, if an MFI wants to deepen its outreach, it should target more women. This also 
presents a troubling picture because if depth of outreach is measured by the access of the 
poorest to credit (Quayes, 2012) then this paints a picture of credit worthy women being 
underserved-a mirror to the present challenge of microfinance.  
5.5.2 Technology and Microfinance 
South Asia utilizes mobile technology in delivering microfinance products and boasts some of 
the highest financial inclusion rates. How much of this is linked to technology? This was the 
question this study sought to answer. The results confirm there is a significant positive 
relationship between mobile penetration and depth of outreach.  
Asongu (2013) examined the relationship between mobile phone penetration and the 
development of financial intermediation in Africa and found that mobile banking has a 
positive correlation with the informal financial intermediary development. This link is likely as 
a result of the growth of m-banking, m-payments, m-transfers, m-payments, and m-finance – 
a collective for the set applications that facilitates the use of mobile phones to manipulate 
their bank accounts, store value in an account linked to their handsets, transfer funds, or even 
access credit or insurance products (Donner & Tellez, 2008). 
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5.5.3 Institutional quality impact on the depth of outreach  
The premise for the first model is twofold. First, from practise and the works on return on 
capital (S.  De Mel et al., 2008; Suresh De Mel, McKenzie, Woodruff, & World Bank., 2008; 
McKenzie & Woodruff, 2006; McKenzie & Woodruff, 2008) indicate the ability of the poor to 
repay loans, sometimes at above market interest rates. Secondly, as the neo-institutional 
theory postulates, the environment exerts mimetic, normative and coercive isomorphic 
pressures on organizations, which influences their behaviour. As such, the differences in 
lending behaviour is due therefore to the institutional distance (difference in quality of the 
institutional environments) of the various countries. A positive relationship was predicted as 
the aim and purpose of several of the identified isomorphic forces was to improve depth of 
outreach. A positive significant relationship was found at the 1% level. The results yield 
interesting insights when compared to the results of Müller and Uhde (2013) who found a 
significant positive relationship at the five-percent level between loan sizes and institutional 
quality. Contrary to their results and others that make claims that improved institutional 
quality leads to lower depth of outreach, this study shows that improved institutional quality 
increases the chances of an MFI targeting the smaller, poorer markets. The results of this 
study makes a case against the use of loan size as a proxy for depth of outreach by buttressing 
the assumption that there could be a different explanation for the relationship between 
institutional quality and loan sizes. This study favours the theoretical assumption that the 
increase in loan sizes is a reflection of the growing confidence/reduced information 
asymmetry and/or as a result of improved welfare of the MFI clients.  
There has been difficulty explaining the differences in the performances of MFIs across the 
globe and the differences in results obtained from various studies in different regions.  The 
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second hypothesis was developed based on the institutional theory and the argument that 
MFIs within certain institutional fields would tend to behave the same way, targeting the 
same markets and having similar problems. The results from the second model support this 
with show that the effect of institutional quality is depth of outreach is stronger in Asia (East 
Asia and the Pacific and South Asia), followed by Latin America and Caribbean’s and then less 
for Eastern Europe and Central America. The relationship between institutional quality and 
depth of outreach in the Middle East and North Africa is negative but not significant. As such, 
to look for improvements to depths of outreach in the Middle East and North America, 
institutional quality would not be one of the critical areas to be considered. The results from 
the logistic regression with moderators explains the variation in results obtained from the 
various studies that have looked at the relationship of governance with depth of outreach 
These differences in the effect that institutional quality has on the depth of outreach raise 
the questions as to the nature of the role institutional quality play in depth of outreach. 
Whereas previous studies such as Müller and Uhde (2013) suggest that improved institutional 
quality increases costs associated with microfinance, this study argues that improved 
institutional quality creates a better environment for microfinance lending. Contracts that are 
enforceable, government that can be held accountable. Reduced corruption, freedom of 
expression all would help not just in reducing information asymmetries and moral hazard but 
a greater push towards the development goals associated with microfinance.  
5.6 Discussion of Results 
The results of this analysis offers some new knowledge and hold several implications for 
theory, empirical research and policies. These are discussed below.  
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5.6.1 Implication for Research  
5.6.1.1 Theoretical Contributions 
The neo-institutional theory provided a framework with which to explore the behaviour of 
MFIs in terms of their lending practises. The institutional fields exert normative, coercive and 
mimetic pressures on organizations, which in a bid to find legality, leads to homogenization. 
However, the levels of homogenization varies with Microfinance institutions being similar in 
certain ways and dissimilar in others. The isomorphic pressures exerted in an institutional 
field come from various sources acting across different levels- global, regional, country and 
organizational. Current literature has not looked at the loci of these isomorphic forces and 
the role of distance in influencing organizational behaviour to conform. Looking at these 
forces from a global, regional and country perspective, the results of this study indicate that 
the financial crisis had no effect on how microfinance institutions’ choice of target market. 
The results also indicate that the regional indices ranked higher than the other variables 
indicating that isomorphic pressures emanating from the regions are stronger than that from 
both the global and country institutional fields.  This loci of pressure would seem to imply that 
pressure lines are formed around the regions and that the strongest isomorphic forces 
emanate at this level. 
5.6.1.2 Empirical Contributions 
A key contribution to this study is that it calls into question the use of loan sizes in studies 
relating to factors affecting depth of outreach.  The problem with using loan sizes in linear 
regressions has always been with the interpretation of the results as relationships that were 
found to exist between loan sizes and various factors lacked proper context. The results 
obtained using categorical variables and ordinal logit or probit regressions represent the 
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chances of an MFI choosing one category of another and makes for a better interpretation of 
results. For instance, when examining the effect of rising interest rates on profit of group-
lending MFIs, Cull et al. (2007) used the average loan size and average loan size to GNP per 
capita of the poorest 20%, while Nwachukwu (2014) used target markets. Cull et al. (2007) 
found a negative relationship while Nwachukwu (2014) found it had no effect. This study 
Whereas it is logical that with increasing interest rates, loan sizes would increase to cover 
costs, it would be a stretch to assume that the increased loan size implies they are lending 
less to a profitable group. The results of Nwachukwu (2014) offer alternative explanations.  
Using a larger database than has been used thus far in similar studies has also shown that 
contrary to other studies, the positive relationship found between institutional quality and 
certain regions is not an indication of lack of depth as this study finds that improved 
institutional quality creates an environment that encourages lending lower down the poverty 
line.  
5.6.2 Implication for industry practice and regulation 
In their 2015, report on their Millennium Development Goals the United Nations (2015) 
highlighted that their targets for the Goal 1 (which was to halve the number of people in 
extreme poverty) and Goal 3 (Eliminating gender disparity in all levels of education) had been 
met. However, this study shows a link between these goals and suggests that policies ensuring 
women have equal access to finance as their male counterparts. Apart from the gender 
targeted microfinance programs and development schemes, governments should improve 
the conditions under which female micro-entrepreneurs work ensuring they are offered 
equitable rights and access to information, education, technology and opportunities that their 
male counterparts are. In their new Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations 
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should add indictors to Goal 1 that would drive reduction of the incidence of poverty amongst 
women and indicators to Goal 5 that would drive equal access to microfinance for women.   
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter empirically tested the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3. First, we ran a test for 
correlation on the indicators for governance and in light of the high correlation; a Principal 
Component Analysis was carried out. Secondly, a correlation test on all the independent 
variables and results indicated there was no strong correlation between the variables. Thirdly, 
to test the hypothesis, this study ran two sets of logit regressions and the results reject the 
first hypothesis linking global forces and depth of outreach while accepting the second and 
third hypothesis linking regional and country characteristics with depth of outreach. A ranking 
of factors indicates that regional factors have the greater influence on lending to the low-end 
market than country effects. The country characteristics with the greatest influence on 
lending to the low-end markets were number of women, GDP per capita and technology.  The 
implications of these results were discussed. For research examining isomorphic pressures, 
establishing loci of pressure would help in ascertaining what forces have the most influence 
on conformity. For policy makers, the implications at the country level indicate a strong link 
between reduction of poverty amongst women and the reduction of the overall incidence of 
poverty implying a need to link the two in policy formation.  
  
  
147 
 
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction  
The studies trying to explain depth of outreach of microfinance have focused on several areas, 
especially on the effects of macroeconomic, macro institutional and policy changes on depth 
of outreach. This study is a departure from the previous methods based on two important 
issues. The first is that it approaches depth of outreach as an organizational behaviour issue 
and as such uses organizational behaviour theory to explain the phenomena. The neo-
institutional theory argues that organizations within similar institutional fields would tend to 
behave the same way. Secondly, the study departs from the use of loan size (or one of its 
variations) which have been most common as a proxy for depth of outreach in favour of using 
target markets as categorical variables. This choice was made to make for better explanation 
of the outcomes. The relationship between macroeconomic, institutional and policy variables 
have been accepted de facto to imply that MFIs are not reaching down the poverty line 
whereas this could simply be an indication of an improvement in the welfare of the clients or 
a reduction in asymmetric information. Using target markets classification of low end, high 
end and small businesses allows the use of an ordered logit regression. The results of this 
regression indicate the probability that an MFI would choose one group over the others.  
The rest of the chapter looks at the results in light of the hypothesis developed for this study in 
Chapter 3, the limitations of this study, the implications and directions for future research based 
on this study and finally, concluding remarks.  
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6.2 Summary of Results 
6.2.1 Global Factors effects on the depth of outreach 
The first hypothesis explored whether global factors had any effect on how MFIs lend to the 
poor using the 2009 financial crises as a proxy. The results indicated that the crises had no 
effect on their lending practises. This would seem to indicate that the microfinance industry 
is not as connected as we thought.  This study offers the following explanations. First is that 
according to (Ming-Yee, 2007), most of the funding for Microfinance came from Microfinance 
Investment Vehicles and they seem unperturbed by financial crises as the economic downturn 
in 2001-2002 did not appear to have had any impact on them. To the contrary, there was   an 
increase in number of Microfinance Investment Vehicles. Secondly, of the top 10 MIVs, 5 were 
from Luxembourg up till 2015 where Switzerland now controls 36% of the Microfinancing 
market valued at 13.5 billion USD (CGAP, 2017).  Following Switzerland, Netherlands owns 
23% of the market share, Germany has 15% and the USA has 9% (CGAP, 2017).  The economic 
stability of the top three could have insulated the MFIs from the economic downturn of 2009. 
Another possibility is that the Microfinance market is poses less of a risk than mainstream 
banking. After the financial crises of 2009. There was increase in funds in the microfinance 
market. These could explain why the financial crises had no direct effect on how MFIs target 
their clients, rejecting the hypothesis. 
6.2.2 The Regional effects on MFI depth of outreach 
The second hypothesis (H2) postulated that The Region an MFI is located affects its depth of 
outreach. The dummies for the regions all turned out significant in the regressions, supporting 
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the general hypothesis. However, the introduction of regional dummies as interaction terms, 
highlighted several differences across the regions.  
H2a: Locating an MFI in Sub Saharan Africa affects its depth of outreach 
One of the disadvantages of using an ordered regression is that one of the dependent 
variables has to be used as a base to compare the relationships of other dependent variables 
with the independent variables. As such, we lose out some detail.  However, when compared 
to the other regions, it seems that the Sub Saharan African region is less likely to lend down 
the poverty ladder than the other regions.  
H2b: Locating an MFI in East Asia and the Pacific affects its depth of outreach 
The results were significant for this hypothesis and MFIs located in this region are 0.56 times 
more likely to lend low-end markets than their African counterparts. The results from the 
second model support this but show that institutional quality does not improve this ratio, on 
the contrary, it weakens the likelihood of lending down the poverty line but by less than the 
other regions. This could be because government plays a critical role at all levels in the 
financial system in this region.    
H2c: Locating an MFI in Eastern Europe and Central Asia affects its depth of outreach 
The Eastern Europe and Central Asia region was the only one that changed in significance 
after the interaction term was introduced, becoming insignificant. The choice of target market 
for this region is not as a result of inherent cultural or other geographically associated 
characteristics but as a result of its strong institutional quality as reflected in the results. 
Interestingly, an improvement in Institutional Quality decreases the probability that an MFI 
located in this region will lend down the poverty line to the low-end market.  
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H2d: Locating an MFI in Latin America and the Caribbean affects its depth of outreach 
The results indicate a significant positive relationship, indicating that MFIs located within this 
region will likely lend down the poverty line to the low-end market. Institutional quality plays 
an important role decreases the likelihood of reaching down the poverty line.  This region has 
been one of the most successful in terms of commercialization and their philosophy has been 
focused on reaching those down the poverty line. It can be argued that their business logic 
has paid off and as such, it is traditional to target the poor as it has been proved to be 
financially rewarding.  
H2e: Locating an MFI in Middle East and North Africa affects its depth of outreach 
The relationship between institutional quality and depth of outreach in the Middle East and 
North Africa is negative but not significant indicating that in spite of their weak institutional 
structures; the MENA region has developed a strong lending culture. The second implication 
is that the argument that institutional reforms must be accelerated to be able to achieve 
stable and inclusive economic prosperity for all (Akobeng, 2016) does not hold water. Within 
the MENA region are other institutional codes of practise that influence the MFI behaviour. A 
possible explanation would be the strong influence of religion on business practises. 
(Abdelkader & Salem, 2013) found that when Islamic MFIs are compared to conventional 
MFIs, that they compete favourably on efficiency.  This idea is not new as religious and cultural 
norms in Muslim countries has been postulated to drive the preference of Islamic 
microfinance over conventional microfinance (Ali and William, 2014) and Ahmed (2002) 
argues that Islamic MFIs have some inherent   characteristics   that   can   mitigate   some   of   
the   problems   faced   by   conventional  MFIs.  
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H2f: Locating an MFI in South Asia affects its depth of outreach 
Results indicate that MFIs in South Asia were 1.55 times more likely to lend to the low-end 
markets than their Sub-Saharan counterparts.  This probability is higher than for all the other 
regions. The implication of this would be that South Asia has a better lending culture to low 
end markets than the other regions. As is consistent with the other results, institutional 
quality reduces the likelihood of lending down the poverty line and in this region that 
reduction is by almost 50%. This region has some of the lowest costs but also some of the 
lowest profits in the industry (Thapa, 2007). This could be because of the higher costs and 
bureaucracy involved in dealing with the government or ‘over-regulation’ of the system 
6.2.3 Effect of Country of Location an MFI depth of outreach 
The third and final hypothesis H3 put it that  
The Country an MFI is located in affects its depth of outreach 
Of the several country level variables used, the distinguishing factors that affected MFI 
lending were growth in per capita GDP (in constant 2010 US$), rural population growth and 
increase in mobile cellular. Credit to the private sector and the labour force were both found 
to have significant negative effects on lending to low end markets with a 1% increase in credit 
to the private sector reducing the probability that a MFI would lend to the low end market by 
1%. A 1% increase in the labour force decreased the probability by 1.93%. In summary, 
countries that have growing per capita GDP, an increase in rural population and increase in 
mobile cellular are likely to lend down the poverty line. This would seemingly imply a growing 
economy, increase in microfinance market (in the rural areas) and the necessary technology 
to implement products.  
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6.3 Research Contributions 
This study also calls into question the use of cross regional research studies that have 
examined the issues relating to microfinance on a global scale, leading to generalized results 
that could be misleading. Such studies include the studies of Quayes (2012) who established 
a relationship between the depth of outreach and financial sustainability based on a cross-
country study of 702 MFIs from 83 countries. This study directly challenges the cross-country 
study by Müller and Uhde (2013) and their assertion that improvement in institutional quality 
negatively affects depth of outreach. The argument this study makes is that the effect of 
institutional quality on depth of outreach varies and is dependent on the regional context of 
the Microfinance Institution. 
This study adds to the growing literature on the impact of gender roles in deepening 
microfinance that includes the works by Pitt and Khandker (1998). Using an ordered logistic 
regression allows for a different narrative from previous studies, showing that the presence 
of poor women in a target market would increase the chances of MFIs lending to that market.  
6.4 Research Limitations  
The source of the data for the microfinance institutions was MIX market, which is a self-
reporting website. The MFIs that report to MIX are not mandated to do so or under any 
obligation to do so. As not all MFIs within the countries used for this study report to MIX 
Market, the data obtained represent trends. A more representative sample would include all 
the microfinance institutions. However, MFIs reporting to MIX Market are those seeking to 
meet international standards and/or attract funding. As such in a bid to attain legitimacy, they 
  
153 
 
come under normative and mimetic pressures. This introduces a level of bias, as the sample 
would have been more robust if it contained MFIs that were not as susceptible to these 
isomorphic pressures as those indicating conformity by registering with MIX market. 
The use of an unbalanced panel data also posed several issues. It would have been of interest 
and in line with this study if the interaction between regions and legal structure could have 
been explored. However, with a  
Ideally, adding cultural variables to the second model would have allowed us to examine the 
effect on the overall model. However, to the lack of variability in Hofstede’s culture variables, 
exploring how the moderator (regions) affected its effect on death of outreach would have 
led to problems with singularity and as such wasn’t explored.  
6.5 Recommendations  
Quayes (2012) suggests that lack of outreach to women has not been a major issue with 
researchers or practitioners likely because they are the major recipients of microcredit. 
However, while studies continue exploring factors affecting the depth of microfinance 
outreach, as women make up a large portion of these borrowers, studies focusing on depth 
of outreach to women are also important.  
The issues of culture continue to be a relevant study in organizational behavioural studies. 
The major problem with culture is its lack of variability making it hard to carry out quantitate 
studies. However, selecting data of a continuous nature to serve as proxies for the various 
dimensions of culture would enable better examination.  
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This study has opened the door to re-examining what proxy’s depth of outreach in 
microfinance research.  In light of this, it is recommended that research studies that have 
used loan size in the past be re-examined using target markets.  
One of the challenges of using unbalanced data and the unprecedented number of 
observations was the amount of missing data made it impossible to use some other variables 
that had been used in other studies or were of interest to this study from literature. For 
instance, to proxy the technological culture of a country, this study used number of mobile 
phone subscriptions per 1,000,000 people. There however exist several other variables such 
as number of computers, internet subscription and number of ATMs. As advancements in 
technology continue to grow in leaps and bounds, understanding the relationship between 
technology and microfinance is important.  
The results indicate that although Microfinance Institutions in the Middle East and North 
African are more likely to lend to the low-end market segment, institutional quality has no 
impact on this, implying that there are other factors at work. The study by Bassem (2012) is 
the only empirical work we are aware of that empirically examines depth of outreach in the 
MENA region. Apart from the already mentioned issue of using loan size as a proxy for depth 
of outreach, the study used data covering only three years (2008-2010) and yielding only 192 
observations. The study could do with a larger sample size and using the target markets as 
the proxy for depth of outreach.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The research surrounding microfinance has received a lot of attention due to its relevance 
across political, developmental and business circles. The microfinance renaissance led by Prof. 
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Yunus challenged the general notion that poor people were incapable of paying back loans 
and led to a paradigm shift. Microfinance research has gone through various phases in a bid 
to understand and improve microfinance offerings. Presently, due to the interest of the 
United Nations and its global reach, research has moved towards sustainability - finding ways 
to ensure that microfinance gets to those who need it and to do so in a profitable manner. 
The key objective of this study was to gain an understanding as to why microfinance funds 
were not reaching those down the poverty line despite the fact that lending down the poverty 
line had been shown to be not only possible but profitable. The thesis turned to institutional 
theory to find an explanation and hypotheses developed in order to answer the research 
question. Organizations are made up of people and people within certain locations hold on 
to belief systems and ways of doing things. This study has found that certain geographical 
locations in the developing world embody certain characteristics, histories and trends that 
affect how MFIs target their customers that goes beyond simple commercial logic. Depth of 
outreach in the Eastern European and Central America region however, is affected more by 
institutional quality. 
In conclusion, there are two main points to take away from this study. First, the research 
findings of this study point to a need for a re-examination on how studies on microfinance 
institutions are conducted. A one-size-fit-all approach would lead to misguiding conclusions 
and as much as microfinance is a global phenomenon, how the finer details are interpreted, 
are greatly affected by the context of their locations and should be taken into consideration 
in policy and research. Secondly, the effect that the various regions have on organizations. 
The isomorphic pressures are strongest around the regions and as such, monetary and fiscal 
policies should consider regional characteristics when formed and implemented.   
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APPENDIX A: List of Developing Countries used in the Study  
1. Afghanistan 
2. Albania 
3. Argentina 
4. Armenia 
5. Azerbaijan 
6. Bangladesh 
7. Benin 
8. Bolivia 
9. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
10. Brazil 
11. Bulgaria 
12. Burkina Faso 
13. Burundi 
14. Cambodia 
15. Cameroon 
16. Chad 
17. Chile 
18. China, People's 
Republic of 
19. Colombia 
20. Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
21. Congo, Republic 
of the 
22. Costa Rica 
23. Cote d'Ivoire 
(Ivory Coast) 
24. Dominican 
Republic 
25. East Timor 
26. Ecuador 
27. Egypt 
28. El Salvador 
29. Ethiopia 
30. Georgia 
31. Ghana 
32. Guatemala 
33. Guinea 
34. Haiti 
35. Honduras 
36. India 
37. Indonesia 
38. Iraq 
39. Jordan 
40. Kazakhstan 
41. Kenya 
42. Kosovo 
43. Kyrgyzstan 
44. Lebanon 
45. Macedonia 
46. Madagascar 
47. Malawi 
48. Mali 
49. Mexico 
50. Moldova 
51. Mongolia 
52. Morocco 
53. Mozambique 
54. Nepal 
55. Nicaragua 
56. Niger 
57. Nigeria 
58. Pakistan 
59. Palestine 
60. Panama 
61. Papua New 
Guinea 
62. Paraguay 
63. Peru 
64. Philippines 
65. Romania 
66. Russia 
67. Rwanda 
68. Samoa 
69. Senegal 
70. Serbia 
71. South Africa 
72. Sri Lanka 
73. Swaziland 
74. Syria 
75. Tajikistan 
76. Tanzania 
77. Togo 
78. Tunisia 
79. Uganda 
80. Ukraine 
81. Uzbekistan 
82. Vietnam 
83. Zambia
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APPENDIX B: Ordered-Logit Regression for Equation 1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
Marginal 
Effects 
       
Credit Union -0.38571 0.154085 -2.50321 0.0123  -0.22785 
NBFI -0.13316 0.107676 -1.2367 0.2162  -0.07866 
Bank -0.58516 0.13625 -4.29473 0  -0.34567 
Return on equity 0.008466 0.017218 0.491697 0.6229  0.005001 
Portfolio at risk (30 days) -0.1837 0.291457 -0.63028 0.5285  -0.10852 
YOUNG MFI 0.280784 0.203551 1.379432 0.1678  0.165866 
MATURE MFI 0.149044 0.196191 0.759688 0.4474  0.088044 
Percent of female borrowers 4.331447 0.19914 21.75071 0  2.558696 
Regulated INDEX -0.26374 0.104237 -2.53019 0.0114  -0.1558 
Medium size index -0.81419 0.114609 -7.10411 0  -0.48096 
Large size index -1.48535 0.123209 -12.0555 0  -0.87743 
General governance 0.280306 0.02515 11.14526 0  0.165584 
Growth in GDP per capita 3.280806 1.114278 2.944335 0.0032  1.938055 
Domestic credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) -0.01926 0.002838 -6.78669 0  -0.01138 
Inflation, consumer prices  0.010213 0.008014 1.274408 0.2025  0.006033 
Labour force participation  -0.03234 0.00569 -5.68308 0  -0.0191 
Mobile cellular subscriptions  0.010277 0.001264 8.130148 0  0.006071 
Rural population growth  0.067295 0.039507 1.703379 0.0885  0.039753 
East Asia and the Pacific 0.960093 0.177553 5.407369 0  0.567151 
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia -0.33102 0.174558 -1.89632 0.0579  -0.19554 
Middle East and North Africa 1.698344 0.260768 6.512849 0  1.003255 
South Asia 2.620904 0.187665 13.96589 0  1.548234 
Latin America 0.417952 0.139564 2.994685 0.0027  0.246895 
FCRISIS 0.113263 0.086135 1.314938 0.1885  0.066907 
 Limit Points     
LIMIT_1:C(25) -3.00506 0.495729 -6.06191 0   
LIMIT_2:C(26) 0.860759 0.493682 1.743548 0.0812   
       
Pseudo R-squared 0.302059 Akaike info criterion 1.33439   
Schwarz criterion 1.377982 Log likelihood -2448.63   
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.349902 Restr. log likelihood -3508.36   
LR statistic 2119.464 Avg. log likelihood -0.66019   
Prob(LR statistic) 0      
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APPENDIX C: Ordered-Logit Regression for Equation 2 
Variable Coefficient 
Std. 
Error 
z-
Statistic Prob.  Marginal Effects 
       
Credit Union -0.40375 0.156148 -2.58569 0.0097  -0.09224 
NBFI -0.07324 0.115021 -0.63677 0.5243  -0.01673 
Bank -0.63541 0.138888 -4.57499 0  -0.14517 
Return on equity 0.009215 0.019575 0.470736 0.6378  0.002105 
Portfolio at risk &gt; 30 days -0.37172 0.293227 -1.26767 0.2049  -0.08492 
YOUNG MFI 0.350038 0.206869 1.69207 0.0906  0.079971 
MATURE MFI 0.227582 0.201076 1.131823 0.2577  0.051995 
Percent of female borrowers 4.412785 0.20568 21.45463 0  1.008167 
Regulated INDEX -0.24207 0.105172 -2.30161 0.0214  -0.0553 
Medium size index -0.84753 0.1159 -7.31261 0  -0.19363 
Large size index -1.55153 0.124746 -12.4375 0  -0.35447 
General governance -0.04696 0.058324 -0.80515 0.4207  -0.01073 
Growth in GDP per capita 2.418319 1.13422 2.132143 0.033  0.552501 
Domestic credit to private sector  -0.02268 0.003036 -7.46987 0  -0.00518 
Inflation, consumer prices  0.007394 0.008078 0.915402 0.36  0.001689 
Labor force participation rate,  -0.02203 0.006108 -3.60612 0.0003  -0.00503 
Mobile cellular subscriptions  0.010462 0.001285 8.144515 0  0.00239 
Rural population growth (annual 
%) 0.032225 0.04231 0.761648 0.4463  0.007362 
East Asia and the Pacific 1.550309 0.217175 7.138528 0  0.354191 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia -0.22526 0.180283 -1.24947 0.2115  -0.05146 
Middle East and North Africa 2.539961 0.295256 8.602561 0  0.580292 
South Asia 3.339527 0.253027 13.1983 0  0.762965 
Latin America 0.495417 0.14758 3.356939 0.0008  0.113185 
FCRISIS 0.138406 0.087176 1.58766 0.1124  0.031621 
INSTQUAL*East Asia &Pacific 1.058444 0.140122 7.553747 0  0.241817 
INSTQUAL*EECA 0.214749 0.075242 2.854099 0.0043  0.049063 
INSTQUAL*MENA -0.0746 0.120128 -0.62104 0.5346  -0.01704 
INSTQUAL*South Asia 0.631169 0.105445 5.985749 0  0.1442 
INSTQUAL*LAC 0.425659 0.067483 6.307634 0  0.097248 
 Limit Points     
LIMIT_1:C(30) -2.27456 0.525696 -4.32677 0   
LIMIT_2:C(31) 1.66093 0.525901 3.158255 0.0016   
Pseudo R-squared 0.319392 Akaike info criterion 1.304296   
Schwarz criterion 1.35627 Log likelihood -2387.82   
Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.32279 Restr. log likelihood -3508.36   
LR statistic 2241.085 Avg. log likelihood -0.64379   
Prob(LR statistic) 0      
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